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UNEXPLODED BOMB: VOICE, SILENCE, AND
CONSEQUENCE AT THE HAGUE TRIBUNALS
A LEGAL AND RHETORICAL CRITIQUE
TIMOTHY WILLIAM WATERS*

Voice-Information-Argument-Style-StructureConsequence-Silence
I.

INTRODUCTORY WORDS

In the spring of 1999, the atmosphere in Kosovo was, as
near to the literal sense of the word as possible, explosive. In
response to increasingly brutal mistreatment of ethnic Albanians by Serbian and Yugoslav forces-which in due course led
to the expulsion of over one million Albanians, the killing of
thousands more, and the indictment of Belgrade's leaders for
these acts by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia-NATO air forces bombed strategic and tactical targets throughout Serbia. For seventy-eight days, in its
first major1 operation and a defining moment in the history of
air combat, NATO released thousands of bombs and missiles
over Yugoslavia, killing several thousand soldiers and civilians. 2
Bombs of every description: great dumb steel bombs,
smart bombs, gravity bombs, cluster-bombs with micro-munitions, sea-launched and air-launched cruise missiles, fuel-air
munitions, armor-penetrating shells tipped with depleted ura* Reginald F. Lewis Fellow, Harvard Law School. J.D. Harvard Law
School; M.I.A. Columbia University (Harriman Institute); B.A. UCLA. Formerly a research officer at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. I wish to thank Richard Goldstone, Henry Steiner, Steven
Ratner, Carol SteikerJohn Allcock,John Packer, Col. Ken Watkin, Maximo
Langer, Mirna Adjami, Timothy Lynch, Michael Waters, Rachel Guglielmo,
participants in the Dubrovnik Inter-University Centre conference Law and
Justice Under Fire: Legal Lessons of the Yugoslav Wars, audiences at Boston Uni-

versity School of Law, New York University School of Law, and Harvard Law
School, as well as the Fellows of Harvard Law School's Human Rights Program for their comments. I also thank the Human Rights Program and the
Lewis Committee for fellowships that supported my research.
1. NATO was also involved in aerial operations in Bosnia in 1994 and
1995 on a much more limited scale. See DAVID FROMK1N, Kosovo CROSSINC:
THE REALITY OF AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN THE BALKANs 4-6 (1999).
2. For a survey of the background to the conflict, see infra note 18.
1015
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nium. Bombs that most often hit military targets, that almost
always exploded, that usually destroyed, and that sometimes
killed.
Still, this is not about the bombs, but what came after
them and what did not: what words, what silences, and what
consequences.
There were many consequences: the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces, the return of Albanian refugees, the flight of Serbs
and Gypsies, the establishment of a U.N. protectorate, the reaffirmation of NATO's prestige and purpose, and the eventual
transfer of Slobodan Milogevic to The Hague. But one consequence that did not ensue was the indictment or investigation
of anyone for the aerial attacks.
Many voices criticized the wisdom or legality of the bombing and the way it was done; some pressed the Tribunal to indict NATO, 3 which itself seemed extraordinarily sensitive to
public opinion about a war whose purposes went well beyond
the organization's traditional aims of self-defense. On May 14,
1999, with the war still underway, in response to "numerous
requests that she investigate allegations that senior political
and military figures from NATO countries committed serious
violations of international humanitarian law[,]" 4 the Tribunal's Prosecutor "established a committee to assess the allegations and material accompanying them, and advise the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor whether or not there is a suffi3. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the
NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ICTY Doc.

PR/P.I.S./510-E, June 13, 2000,

1, 6, 39 I.L.M. 1257 (2000) [hereinafter

Inquiry]; See Sonja Boelaert-Suominen, The InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor
the FormerYugoslavia and the Kosovo Conflict, 82 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 217, 247

(2000) ("the Prosecutor acknowledged that she had received requests from
persons and groups urging her to indict various NATO and other officials
for war crimes in relation to the air strikes conducted in Serbia"); see also
Letter from Professor Michael Mandel, et al., to Madam Justice Louise Arbour, Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, et al., Notice of the Existence of Information Concerning Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Within the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal, Request that the Prosecutor Investigate Named Individuals for
Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Prepare Indictments
Against Them Pursuant to Articles 18.1 and 18.4 of the Tribunal Statute (on
file with Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/icty.htm (last visited September 15, 2003).
4. Inquiy, supra note 3,

1.
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cient basis to proceed with an investigation into some or all
the allegations or into other incidents related to the NATO
bombing." 5 After an extensive internal review, 6 the Committee publicly issued its Inquiry on June 13, 2000. 7 It recom-

mended against investigating any official from NATO or its
member states.8 That is its recommendation concerning each
specific allegation" and its general conclusion,1o a recommendation the Prosecutor publicly accepted' '-and the only time
the Prosecution has publicized an affirmative intent not to investigate. The Inquiry's formal title-a Final Report to the
Prosecutor 2 -is instructive: Unless something is occurring
beyond public view, inquiry into NATO's actions is closed.
Of course, a lot has happened since Kosovo, so why
should we care what the Inquiry says-especially if, as many
suppose, NATO's intervention was justified and the Prosecution got it right? We should care because the Inquiryuniquely among all documents to come out of the ICTY-can
tell us how the Prosecution views its role as a legal institution
in a world of politics and power. The Inquiry is the one document that shows how the Prosecution responded to a question
5. Inquiry, supra note 3, 3.
6. "[A] nalysis of the material has taken many months, and has involved
an examination of all facts and a detailed legal analysis of all aspects involving the Tribunal's jurisdiction." Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecutor's Report
on the NATO Bombing Campaign (June 13, 2000), at http://www.un.org/
icty/pressreal/p51 0-e.htm [hereinafter ICTY Press Release, June 2000].
7. Id. The Prosecutor announced her intention not to investigate in an
address to the U.N. Security Council on June 2, 2000. Id.
8. See Inquiry, supra note 3,
91. The Tribunal only has jurisdiction
over natural persons; "NATO" is used as shorthand for the individuals acting
under its aegis. Cf Paolo Benvenuti, The ICTY Prosecutorand the Review of the
NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 12 EuR. J.

L. 503, 503 (2001) (criticizing the Inquiry for orienting its analysis to
issues of state, rather than individual, responsibility); Torsten Stein, The AttriINT'L

bution of Possible Internationally Wrongful Acts: Responsibility of AATO or of its
Member States?, in KosoVo AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: A LEGAL As-

181-82 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 2002).
9. See, e.g., Inquiry, supra note 3, 7 25-27 (recommending not to "commence an investigation").
10. See id. It 90-91.
11. See ICTY Press Release, June 2000, supra note 6.
12. In full, as it reads on the front page: "Final Report to the Prosecutor
by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." Id.
SESSMENT
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and a crisis directly implicating the core interests of the most
powerful states and its own institutional interests, and it is the
one document showing us a Prosecution choosing not to act.
By closely examining not its outcomes, but its sources, its arguments, and its style, we may understand how this Prosecution
makes decisions-and to understand that is to understand
something of the future for international criminal law.
At its conclusion, the Inquiry neatly summarizes the reasoning behind its findings:
NATO has admitted that mistakes did occur during
the bombing campaign; errors of judgment may also
have occurred. Selection of certain objectives for attack may be subject to legal debate. On the basis of
the information reviewed, however, the committee is
of the opinion that neither an in-depth investigation
related to the bombing campaign as a whole nor investigations related to specific incidents are justified.
In all cases, either the law is not sufficiently clear or
investigations are unlikely to result in the acquisition
of sufficient evidence to substantiate charges against
high level accused or against lower accused for partic13
ularly heinous offences.
The reasons for not investigating are therefore threefold-one interpretative, one evidentiary, and one substantive:
a belief that the governing law is insufficiently clear, an estimate that investigation would be unlikely to produce sufficient
evidence, and a belief that the absence of sufficiently serious
("particularly heinous") offences argues against liability.
A number of scholars have addressed the Inquiry, but all
have focused on weaknesses in the Inquiry's substantive legal
analysis of NATO's actions. 1 4 I take a different approach. I
13. Id. 90.
14. See, e.g., Michael Bothe, The Protection of the Civilian Population and
NATO Bombing on Yugoslavia: Comments on a Report to the Prosecutorof the ICTY,
12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 531, 532 (2001) ("The report is more interesting in its
general legal discussion than convincing in its conclusions regarding the application of the law to the particular facts"); Andreas Laursen, NATO, the War
over Kosovo, and the ICTY Investigation, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 765, 776
(2002) (calling the Inquiry "incoherent" and saying that it "exhibits a lack of
consistency"); Aaron Schwabach, NATO's War in Kosovo and the Final Report to
the Prosecutor of the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 9
& COMP. L. 167, 169 (2001) ("[The Inquiry] bases its findings

TUL. J. INT'L
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am emphatically not concerned with the innocence or guilt of
NATO officials, about which reasonable people may disagree;
indeed, precisely because the Inquiry's one-off conclusions
might be reasonable, it is more productive to focus on how it
reached them. I ask what the Inquiry says about the Prosecution's decision-making mindset to see what that might show us
about the shape of future prosecutorial decision-making; my
method is a rhetorical analysis of a document that may have a
defining impact on the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals
and the new International Criminal Court (ICC).15

Many of these same scholars assume the Inquiry was the
compromised product of direct political pressure. I do not.
There is no evidence in the Inquiry that the Prosecution succumbed to pressure from NATO. Perhaps it did-and
NATO's opportunities to apply pressure are obvious 6-but it
is at least as reasonable to suppose that the individuals who
populate that institution appreciated the pressures and genuinely believed that they had resisted them-that, whatever the
complexities, they had made an institutionally independent
conclusion, and that the Inquiry is the result.
not only on the facts, but also on interpretations of existing law that are
more restrictive than those that have been proposed since the 1991 Gulf
War."). See also Benvenuti, supra note 8, at 503; Thilo Marauhn, Environmental Damage in Times of Armed Conflict-Not "Really" a Matter of Criminal Responsibility?, 82 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 1029 (2000); Natalino Ronzitti, Is the Non
Liquet of the Final Report by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia Acceptable ?, 82 INT'L REV.

1017 (2000).
15. In this Article I seek to avoid a "substantive critique" of the Inquiry's
findings and instead focus on a "rhetorical critique." By "substantive critique," I mean an analysis of the Inquiry's findings of fact and law. In contrast, by "rhetorical critique," I mean an analysis of the peripheral or constructive elements that constitute those findings: methods of argument and
stylistics as clues about intention, valuation, identity, self-image, and belief
about law. Sometimes I have found it necessary in making a rhetorical critique to disagree on a substantive point; in the main, I believe my argument
valid whether or not one agrees with the Inquiry's outcomes. It might be
helpful for some readers to supply their own opening sentence, such as:
"NATO conducted itself in accordance with humanitarian law; the Inquiry
therefore got the right outcome, but its way of getting it is deeply troubling."
I have refrained from taking a position out of methodological conviction,
but readers are entirely free to guess at my substantive opinions; indeed, it is
hard to imagine that, reading this Article, they would not.
16. See infra notes 33948 and accompanying text.
RED CROSS
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But that should not end our inquiry. If the Inquiry was
the product of direct interference, then we have a serious
problem to address. But if, instead, this deeply flawed document really was the product of an independent review, then
the problem is perhaps even more grave. Direct interference,
though a danger, can be policed; subtler limits on a court are
the more troubling threat, and the fact that cooptation might
be effected through persons sincerely committed to a court's
independence simply underscores the institutional nature of
the problem.' 7 The question we must consider is this: Is a
court, constituted and situated as the Tribunal and ICC are,
institutionally capable of asking the questions about law-inpolitics that its advocates suppose it can, and that it must if it is
to fulfill the promise of international legal justice?
This Article argues that the Inquiry raises serious concerns about the compliant attitude the Prosecution took toward NATO's liability. It makes an original contribution to debate about the new Court through a case study of the overlooked, but troubling, effects of a prosecution's discretion not
to act. But more, it argues that the Inquiry's structure and style
entrench a worrisome immaturity in our approach to international justice-to the detriment of the ICC-where it could
have contributed to positive change. As we shall see, the Inquiry is evidence that the new Court's prospects are limited;
our aspirations and our strategies may have to be adjusted ac17. Two Prosecutors oversaw the Inquiry: Louise Arbour, who commissioned it, and Carla Del Ponte, who published it. (William J. Fenrick has
also publicly acknowledged his role as a principal author.) Had there been
only one, we might be inclined to assign credit or blame to her for the Inquiry. As it is, we may better see the persistent, patterned response of an
institution: not of a single Prosecutor, but of the Prosecution. This institutional effect will be as great in the new ICC, regardless of its Prosecutor's
personal qualities. See Kenneth W. Abbott, InternationalRelations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 Am.

J.

INT'L

L. 361, 378 (1999) (citing Justice Richard Goldstone, Conference

Luncheon Address at Symposium, Prosecuting International Crime: An Inside
View, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1997) (noting the creation of

an institutional "community of law" around the Tribunals)); cf Payam
Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future
Atrocities?, 95 AM.J. INT'L. L. 7, 27 (2001) (describing the ICC as a process of
"acculturation engaging thousands of diplomats, advisers, academics, and activists who represented states, international organizations, and NGOs"). See
generally Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Incentives and Bad Institutions, 86 GEO. L.J.
2267, 2280 (1998) (discussing the effects of institutional incentives).
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cordingly, because a court that produces answers-even right
answers-for the wrong reasons may never fulfill that promise.
A.

The Argument in Brief

The argument proceeds like this: 18 First, Part II discusses
the Inquiry's determinative status in law-why it matters and
18. The Inquiry addresses events that occurred during the conflict between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.) and NATO in early 1999.
The following background is included for readers' reference; the Article
does not rely on a particular account of the historical record or the conflict.
Kosovo: The region of Kosovo (Kosova in Albanian) is identified from
medieval times, when it already had Serb and, to a lesser extent, Albanian
populations. NOEL MALCOLM, Kosovo: A SHORT HISTORY 56-57 (1999). It
was long part of the Ottoman Empire, which won a decisive battle against
Serb-led forces there in 1389. Id. at 58-80. After the Balkan Wars and First
World War, the territory became part of the new Yugoslav kingdom; Orthodox Serbs, though a minority among the mostly Muslim Albanians, were politically dominant. Id. at 267. Under Tito's postwar communist regime, Kosovo was an autonomous province within Serbia but also had a separate federal personality. Id. at 314-16. At first Serbs retained control, but after the
1974 constitutional reforms Kosovo's Albanians increasingly dominated the
province. Id. at 327. The treatment of Kosovo's Serbs became one of the
major grievances driving the rise of Serb nationalism after Tito's death in
1981. Id. at 337-69. Consolidating his power in Serbia and, later, the new
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milogevic orchestrated the effective abolition of Kosovo's autonomy in 1989 and initiated repressive policies
against Albanians. Id. at 341-44. See generally TIM JUDAH, Kosovo: WAR AND
REVENGE (2002).
THE CONFLIcr:
Resistance was initially pacifist, but from 1997 on,
armed guerilla movements-especially the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA or
UCK)-began attacks, to which Serb forces responded with increasingly
harsh suppression; by mid-1998, a serious conflict was underway. SeeJUDAH,
supra, at 73. NATO countries in particular pressed for restored autonomy
and the withdrawal of Serb forces; they threatened intervention and
brokered a ceasefire that allowed international observers to operate in Kosovo from late 1998. See Peter Hilpold, HumanitarianIntervention: Is There a
Need for a Legal Reappraisal?,12 EUR. J. INT'L LAW 437, 438-42 (2001) (briefly

outlining the course of the conflict and the diplomatic developments related
to it). Fighting continued, however, and the number of refugees and internally displaced rose to perhaps a quarter of a million. JUDAH, supra, at 233.
By February 1999, talks in Rambouillet on a political settlement broke down,
and on March 24, 1999, NATO began its bombing campaign. Id. at 197-228.
In the days that followed, Serbs initiated a massive expulsion campaign, killing several thousand Albanians and forcing more than one million more to
flee. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Kosovo, FRY, U.N. High Com-

missioner for Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/10 (Sept. 7, 1999).
On June 10, 1999, Milogev ic agreed to NATO's occupation of Kosovo. There
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how it disposes of important legal issues. Part III discusses how
the Inquiry uses sources: By favoring some and disfavoring
others, it creates voice and authority that preempt serious legal
analysis. After defining "progressive" and "consensual" legal
interpretation, Part IV explores the Inquiry's curiously selective approach to consistency in legal argument about proportionality, targeting, and authority-in contrast to the Prosecution's practice in other cases. Part V examines the distorting
effects of stylistics-perspective, context, and authorial voice.
Part VI returns to the question of consistency and intention:
Whatever the seriousness of NATO's actions, the Prosecution
does not seem serious in considering them. This lack of seriousness is pregnant in the structure and the very public existence of the Inquiry. Finally, Parts VII and VIII move from the
evidence to its implications: The Inquiry's timidity evinces an
institutional failing with consequences for the ICC and for our
ability to ask questions about the changing nature of war.
B.

Background: Operations and Incidents in Operation
Allied Force

NATO's Operation Allied Force was almost entirely conducted from the air in a massive operation: More than 38,000
sorties released over 23,000 munitions over 78 days. NATO
struck Serb units engaging in expulsions and fighting the KLA
in Kosovo, as well as strategic military, political, and infrastructure targets throughout Serbia. NATO held daily press briefings and provided extensive, if controlled, publicity about its
decision-making and operations, such as pilot cockpit video. 19
In all, about 500 civilians were killed by NATO bombing in a
had been no U.N. mandate for NATO's action, but after hostilities were suspended, Security Council Resolution 1244 was quickly adopted, creating a
U.N. administration. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999); Hilpold, supra, at 441. Today, Kosovo technically remains under Yugoslav sovereignty but is run by the U.N. and local
officials. For a thorough compilation of official documents relating to the
conflict and the subsequent Operation Allied Force, see THE Kosovo CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYrIcAL DOCUMENTATION 1974-99
(Heike Krieger ed., 2001).
19. See NATO, NATO's ROLE IN Kosovo, at http://www.nato.int/kosovo
(last updated Oct. 28, 2003).
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number of incidents. 20 The Inquiry considers five of the most
serious or controversial incidents in detail:
THE TRAIN ON THE GRDELICA GORGE BRIDGE: On April 12,
1999, two NATO laser-guided bombs struck a five-carriage passenger train crossing the Leskovac railway bridge over the
Grdelica Gorge on the Ju2na Morava River in eastern Serbia,
killing at least ten people and injuring at least fifteen. 2 1
THE DJAKoVIcA REFUGEE COLUMN: On April 14, 1999,
bombs launched in a series of attacks from NATO aircraft flying above 15,000 feet struck one (or two) column(s) of vehicles carrying primarily or solely refugees, killing about 70 and
injuring about 100.22
THE RTS STUDIOS: Early on April 23, 1999, NATO intentionally launched cruise missiles into the central studios of Radio Televizija Srbija (RTS) in Belgrade, killing between ten
and seventeen people. 2 3 The incident provoked protests from
24
news media and rights groups.
THE CHINESE EMBASSY: On the night of May 7, 1999,
NATO missiles struck the embassy of the People's Republic of
China in Belgrade, killing three Chinese citizens, injuring
about fifteen others, and causing extensive damage to the embassy and surrounding buildings. 25 The U.S. claimed it had
mistakenly identified the building as Yugoslav Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement. 26 The incident caused a
diplomatic rift, and the United States later paid China reparations.
KORISA VILLAGE: On May 14, 1999, ten NATO bombs
struck the village of Koriga on the Prizren-Prigtina highway,

20. See Inquiry, supra note 3, 7 53 (noting an F.R.Y. report's estimate of
495 civilians killed and 820 wounded); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CrIILIAN
DEATHS IN THE NATO AIR CAMPAIGN (Feb. 2000), at http://www.hrw.org/
reports/2000/nato ("as few as 488 and as many as 527 Yugoslav civilians were
killed").
21. Inquiry, supra note 3, 1 58.
22. Id. 77 63-64.
23. Id. 71.
24. See George H. Aldrich, Yugoslavia's Television Studios as Military Objectives, 1 INT'L. L. F. 149, 150 (1999) (discussing legal issues).
25. Inquiy, supra note 3, 7 80.
26. Id. It 81-82.
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killing about eighty-seven civilians and injuring about sixty
27
others, mostly refugees.
GENERAL ISSUES: The Inquiry also addresses theater-level
use of depleted uranium munitions and cluster bombs, 28 environmental damage, 29 target selection,3 0 and casualty figures. 3 '
C.

Organization of the Inquiry

The Inquiry is organized into five sections: (I) a discussion of its background and mandate (paragraphs 1-4); (II) an
overview of the criteria for review (paragraph 5); (III) its work
program, listing the incidents and documents reviewed
(paragraphs 6-13); (IV) the assessment, divided into general
issues and the five specific incidents (paragraphs 14-89); and
(V) recommendations recapitulating those made in the assessment (paragraphs 90-91). The Inquiry uses Serbian (not Albanian) geographical and political nomenclature, and this Article follows its practice.
II.

A

DETERMINATIVE SILENCE:

THE STATUS OF THE INQUIRY

IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Before we examine the Inquiry's sources, structures, and
style, we must consider an important preliminary question:
Why do the Inquiry's words matter? After all, the Inquiry was
not submitted to the Tribunal, 32 and indeed there would have
been no purpose since it does not request any action. The
Prosecution was under no obligation to inquire about NATO
and owed the Tribunal no explanation of its decision not to
investigate. The Inquiry is not, therefore, a court document
any more than a press release is.
Still, the Inquiry is remarkable for its extensive explication of the Prosecution's methods and procedures, and as a
27. Id. 86.
28. Id. 7 26-27.
29. Id. 77 14-25.

30. Id. 17 28-52.
31. Id. 1 53.
32. By "Tribunal" I mean the Chamber, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), or the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) as a whole, as distinct from its Prosecution. "The
Court" means the ICC. Variant usage will be clear from context or noted
explicitly.
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contemporaneous statement of its institutional self-image; no
other public document from the Tribunal goes into such detail about the rationale for its operation or substantive arguments. For this reason alone it is a valuable document for
scholars interested in considering the Tribunal's role in developing the infrastructure of international law.33 The Inquiry is
determinative in one important sense: Because of it, there will
be no other definitive pronouncement about the bombing
campaign because the Prosecution, within its rights, declined
to bring the matter to the Tribunal's attention. One power
the Prosecution possesses is the ability to decide whether or
not to proceed to court 34-in that sense, its determination not
33. See Public Statement, Amnesty International, Amnesty International's
Initial Comments on the Review by the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia of NATO's Operation Allied Force aUune 13, 2000), at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engeur70032000?open&of=eng385 ("Amnesty International welcomes the unusual publication by the ICTY
of the reasoning behind the decision not to open an investigation related to
NATO's bombing campaign. The organization believes that this step contributes greatly to the Tribunal's transparency, offering important perspectives on the interpretation of the laws of war.").
34. Cf James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Discretion, 94

L. REV. 1521, 1523 (1981) ("[T]he existence of trials cannot check
prosecutorial powers not dependent on trial. These powers include the
prosecutor's wide discretion in making decisions about charging ... and
allocating investigative resources."). Most discussion of discretion asks if the
decision to prosecute was correct or legal. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448,
456 (1962) (upholding selective enforcement not based on unjustifiable
standards or arbitrary classifications); Vorenberg, supra, at 1539-40 (noting
that Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), was the only instance in which
the Supreme Court found an abuse of prosecutorial discretion). Less discussed is discretion in deciding not to prosecute. Cf KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
DISCRETIONARYJUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 22 (1969) ("IT] he power not
HARV.

to prosecute may be of greater magnitude than the power to prosecute, and
it certainly is much more abused because it is so little checked."); LEILA
NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURT AND THE TRANSFOR-MA-

228 (2002)
(calling prosecutorial independence "the foundational principle of the
[Rome] Statute" and explaining that "[t]his means independence in deciding whether or not to initiate an investigation and in deciding whether or
not to pursue a particular individual"); Sarah J. Cox, ProsecutorialDiscretion:
An Overview, 13 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 383, 392 (1976) ("[I]n prosecution ...
decisions not to charge, or not to prosecute further, represent an area of
discretion which is for the most part both unreviewed and unreviewable.").
TION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM

See also generally Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor'sDiscretion in the United States,

18 Am.J. CoMP. L. 532 (1970).
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as much legal authority as the matter likely
to proceed imparts
35
ever will have.

More than that, the Inquiry is a public document: The
Prosecution determined the Tribunal's silence but did not remain silent itself. Observers inevitably will compare future investigations to the arguments in the Inquiry and will judge future air campaigns-and the ICC's efforts to police themagainst its standards. Observers have as much interest in
knowing which issues do not constitute crimes as which do,
36
even if that determination is effected by a lower authority.
The Inquiry establishes an informal but influential minimum
estimate of liability whose higher reaches are described in
of the law, giving
court decisions; it creates a negative imprint
37
guidance as to where it will not tread.
Because the outcome (no investigation) would have been
38
identical if the Inquiry's reasoning had not been elaborated,
35. In this sense, it is also clearly more legally decisive than reports on
the NATO campaign produced by groups such as Human Rights Watch or
Amnesty International. See Laursen, supra note 14, at 772.
36. Schwabach, supra note 14, at 171-72 ("While decisions of the ICTY
tend to play an important role in the formation of normative expectations,
the actions of the OTP, in and of themselves, do not. By controlling the
types of cases which will be brought before the ICTY, however, the OTP
plays an important role in determining the types of norms that will be
formed. In this sense, the [Inquiry] may provide important insight into the
future formation and development of international human rights norms.").
37. The Inquiry does not bind the Prosecutor, see Inquiry, supra note 3,
3 (noting that Article 18 of the Tribunal's Statute provides for the Prosecutor" to assess information received and decide if there is sufficient basis to
proceed), yet it may guide the strategic thinking of the Prosecution and parties to future conflicts, informing their assessments of what will be thought
acceptable conduct.
38. Indeed, the outcome had been announced six months earlier. See
Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Office of the Prosecutor, Statement by Madame Carla Del Ponte, Prosecutor
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Dec. 30,
1999), at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p459-e.htm:
NATO is not under investigation by the Office of the Prosecutor of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
There is no formal inquiry into the actions of NATO during the
conflict in Kosovo.
During the past six months, the Prosecutor has met with and received information from a variety of individuals and groups urging
an investigation of NATO's actions during the Kosovo conflict, including members of the Russian Duma and several international
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the content and style of its internal argumentation represent
its main contribution. Also, because the outcome would have
been identical even if the Inquiry had never been made public, the purposes of its presentation are a legitimate object of
inquiry-a matter to which we shall return. It matters less
what conclusions were reached than how they were reached
and how they were presented.
Still, since the Tribunal has issued no other inquiries,
what is the proper basis for comparison? Though primarily
considering the text of the Inquiry, this Article also refers to
indictments issued by the Prosecution; is it even apposite to
compare them? Yet this seeming methodological objection is
perhaps the strongest argument for proceeding. Other inquiries may exist or not, but we cannot know because the Prosecution has chosen not to publish them; the lack of directly comparative material is a consequence of the Prosecution's own critical choices, and so one has every right to expect that the
Inquiry represents as equally final and equally felt an assessment as any indictment. 3 9 The fact that the Inquiry does not
look like an indictment is not a methodological difficulty, it is
the central question we must address: Why does it not?
Voice-Information-Argument-Style-StructureConsequence-Silence
III.

THE PROSECUTOR'S GAZE: INFORMATION AND AUTHORITY

A story that was the subject of every variety of
misrepresentation, not only by those who then lived
but likewise in succeeding times: so true is it that all
transactions of preeminent importance are wrapped
in doubt and obscurity; while some hold for certain
facts the most precarious hearsays, others turn facts
legal experts. As with any other information provided to the Prosecutor, this information is reviewed by her staff.
39. The Prosecutor reserves the right to revisit the NATO matter should
more information become available. This is also true for indictments, a
number of which have been amended or withdrawn; this does not make
them any less "final," or effective, on the day of their issuance. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, adopted Feb. 11, 1994, armendedJuly 17, 2003 (28th rev.), Rules 47,
50-51, U.N. Doc. IT/32/REV.28 (2003) (regarding submission, amendment,
and withdrawal of indictments by the Prosecutor), availableat http://www.
un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htrn.
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into falsehood; and both are exaggerated by posterity.
-

Tacitus4O

We begin with the Inquiry's use of sources, because the
bias it exhibits is so pervasive and foundational. Any examination of the Inquiry has to consider the rhetorical and substantive effects of its being, in effect, a quotation: Such a large

portion of the Inquiry is drawn directly from NATO sources
that the Inquiry's view, in a significant part, is NATO's. So
often its phrasing and its very words are NATO's, with all that
implies for argument, perspective, tone, manufacture of sympathy, authorship, and authority. We will examine, first, its
quantitative reliance on certain sources, then its qualitative biases and the effects these have on its view of authority, and
then how it responds to the absence of information.
A.

Creating a Univocal Record

By its own account, the Committee relied exclusively on
documents, most of which were in the public domain. 4 1 It lists
a broad array of sources, but in fact NATO and its members'
military and political leadership contributed the great majority

of the sources around which the Inquiry is structured. 4 2 In the
five incidents discussed in the Inquiry, at least 23 separate
NATO or NATO-related sources are cited, compared with only
43
six non-NATO sources.
In fact, the degree of reliance on NATO is even greater
than these numbers suggest: Citations from two of the nonNATO sources, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty Interna44
If
tional, consist almost entirely of quotations from NATO.
40. Cited in ROBERT GRAvs, I, CLAuDIus, at vii (1934).
41. Inquiry, supra note 3,
7, 90.
42. Cf Benvenuti, supra note 8, at 507 (noting the Inquiry's reliance on
NATO information to establish facts).
43. Inquiry, supra note 3, 11 57-89.
44. The citation to Human Rights Watch includes comments by three
NATO officers. Id. 68 (quoting, with commentary, General Wesley Clark
and Colonel Ed Boyle, and referring to "guidance" issued by CFAC [Combined Forces Air Component Commander] General Michael Short). Four
of five citations to Amnesty International are to quotations of NATO: a
NATO letter to Amnesty International, dated April 17, 1999 (affirming
NATO's belief that RTS facilities were used for military purposes and were
legitimate targets); an extract of a letter from NATO spokesman Jamie Shea
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we incorporate these observations into a table, it looks like
this:

45

TABLE
Incident
Grdelica
Train
Djakovica
Convoy

I:

SOURCES CITED IN THE INQUIRY

NATO SOURCE
4
47
Harnre;
U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary John
Wesley Clark
General
SACEUR
NATO
NATO
NATO
NATO
NATO

press conference of April 15, 1999;
50
Clark;
SACEUR General 5Wesley
1
Colonel Ed Boyle;
52
CFAC General Michael Short

49

6

Other Source
48
Ekkehard Wenz

F.R.Y. Ministry of
Foreign 5 Affairs
3
Report;
54
unspecified source
5
,
Serb TV footage;
56
Human Rights Watch

to the International Federation ofJournalists, dated April 12, 1999 (claiming
NATO only struck broadcast facilities integrated into military structures); an
unsourced NATO statement concerning efforts to avoid civilian casualties
and collateral damage; and an unsourced NATO statement that it did not
give specific warnings in order to protect its pilots. Id. 7 73, 76, 77 (citing
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,

NATO/FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA:

TIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR DURING OPERATION

ALLIED FORCE

VIOLA-

42, 47 (June

2000) [hereinafter AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL]).
45. The list includes sources that discuss circumstances relating to the
attacks in Kosovo and does not include sources that discuss the general state
of the law, such as ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols.
59 (without citation to the source of Hamre's
46. Inquiry, supra note 3,
statement).
47. Id. 59 (citing to "Press Conference, NATO HQ Brussels, 13 April
[1999]").
48. Id.
60 (referring to a "comprehensive technical report" by
Ekkehard Wenz, a German national).
49. Id. 64.
68 (citing a quotation from Clark in an unidentified Human
50. Id.
Rights Watch report).
51. Id. (citing a quotation from Boyle in an unidentified Human Rights
Watch report).
52. Id. (citing "guidance" issued by Short in an unidentified Human
Rights Watch report).
53. Id. 63. The Inquiry uses this report to frame its initial description
of the incident but first says "[t]he precise facts about this incident are
difficult to determine." Id.
54. Id.
66 (referring to a report on file with the Office of the
Prosecutor (OTP)). This may possibly be a report by Ekkehard Wenz, the
6
(g) (noting that the Committee
German national noted above. See id.
Wenz
on
the
Djakovica incident, although no
had reviewed a report by
explicit citation to any such report is made in the Inquiry).
55. Id. 1 67.
56. Id. 68 (report not identified).
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Incident
RTS TV
Station

NATO SOURCE
27,
NATO press conferences of April 9, Agril
7
April 23, April 28, and April 30, 1999; 5 8
U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair (twice);
5 9
8, 1999;
NATO statement of Aril
O
General Wesley Clark;
NATO press releases of May 611 May 3, April 30,
April 23, and April 21, 1999;
NATO communication to Amnesty International
dated April 17, 1999;62
Letter from NATO spokesman Jamie Shea to the
International Federation of Journalists, dated
April 12, 1999;63
64
unspecified NATO sources

Chinese
Embassy

unspecified U.S. Government sources;
6
U.S. Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering

Korisa
Village

unspecified NATO spokespersons;
69
unspecified NATO officials;
70
Gertz;
General
NATO
71
unspecified NATO source

6 6

68

7
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Other Source
65
Amnesty International

none
none

In four of the five incidents considered, the Inquiry relies
predominantly upon the very source whose potential liability is
at issue: in two a single non-NATO source is cited, while in two
others only NATO or U.S. Government sources are cited.
Yet the imbalance-the reliance on NATO's voice-goes
well beyond mere numerical preponderance in the sources.
In addition to relying on a larger number of NATO sources, the
57. Id. 1 72, 73, 76, 78.
58. Id.
74 (citing a statement by Blair on April 24, 1999); Id. 1 77
(citing AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 44, quoting Moral CombatNATO at War (BBC2 television broadcast, Mar. 12, 2000)).
59. Id. 74.
60. Id. 1 78 (citing AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 44, quoting Moral
Combat-NATO at War (BBC2 television broadcast, Mar. 12, 2000)).
61. Id. 78.
62. Id.
73 (citing AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 44, at 42).
63. Id. 1 76 (citing AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 44, at 42).
64. Id. 1 77 (citing AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 44, at 42, 47).
65. Id. 1 77 (citing AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 44, at 42, 47
(referring to warnings given to foreign journalists prior to the attack)).
66. Id. 11 80-81, 84. It seems likely that the information in 1 83 also
derives from U.S. Government sources, as it discusses internal decisionmaking processes about targeting.
67. Id. 1 81.
68. Id. 1 86.
69. Id. 1 87.
70. Id. 1 88 (quoting Gertz from the NATO press conference of May 15,
1999).
71. Id. 11 88-89.
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Inquiry gives those sources far more space as direct citation or
reformulation. Indeed, the space devoted to NATO sources is
extraordinarily disproportionate, with the narrative about all
five incidents almost entirely constructed from them. The
most extreme example7 2 is the discussion of the Grdelica
Gorge train incident, with seven paragraphs of direct quota73
tion from General Wesley Clark at a NATO press conference.
B.

From Utopia to

Apology:7 4

Favoring Unfavorable Formulations
of Fact

Looking beyond quantitative reliance, we now consider
how information is used and the conceptual contexts into
which it is inserted. In an indictment, a prosecutor is free to
75
develop the facts most favorable to successful prosecution.
The facts are rarely so favorable in reality or in court; still, it
would be naive to suppose that prosecutors never avail themselves of the chance to make arguments they hope they will be
able to win later. Yet despite explicitly applying this utopian
standard, 76 the Inquiry seems to assume the "facts least
favorable to the prosecution"-an apologia for the defendant.
The evidence is impressionistic, but compelling: The Inquiry
is far more likely to accept NATO statements at face value or
assign them a positive, and often decisive, interpretation. We
will consider how the Inquiry's treatment of sources creates
authority.
1.

Words are not Petards: Treatment of NATO Sources

A petard is an antiquated explosive, of no contemporary
value but surviving in language to remind us how rare the
weapon is that cannot be turned on its master. 77 A prosecutor
72. This measurement does not include the discussions of Koriga and the
Chinese embassy, for which no ratio is mathematically expressible.
73. Inquiry, supra note 3,
59 (attributing the statements to Clark and
citing to "Press Conference, NATO HQ Brussels, 13 April [1999]").
74. With apologies to Martti Koskenniemi.
75. Cf Vorenberg, supra note 34, at 1537-38 (describing indictment proceedings).
76. Inquiry, supra note 3, 64 ("Assuming the facts most appropriate to a
successful prosecution .. .").
77. See, e.g., WiL i m SHAKEsPEARE,

HAMLET act 3, sc. 4, at 332 (Harold
Jenkins ed., Methuen & Co. 1982) ("For 'tis the sport to have the enginer
Hoist with his own petard, and't shall go hard/But I will delve one yard
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can do no better than to damn a defendant with his own
words, to cut through denials or difficulties of proof and force
him to concede that, indeed, he once said so himself.
In war there are many weapons, and words are weapons
too; NATO knew that and used them, holding daily press conferences throughout the campaign to control the flow of information and turn it to its purposes. In the process, NATO put
into the public domain a wealth of information about its actions and intentions, which observers might use to establish
facts to NATO's detriment in ways it might not have anticipated.
It might be supposed, then, that having decided to use
NATO information almost to the exclusion of other sources,
the Committee would turn a critical eye to that information to
see what unintended revelations it could pry from it. Yet in no
instance does the Inquiry use these sources to hoist NATO
with its own petard-an uncritical reliance that conflates the
suspect's subjective opinions with proofs of objective fact. For
example, the sources for the conclusion that the train destroyed
on the bridge at Grdelica appeared not to have been targeted
deliberately-the heart of the matter-are U.S. Deputy Defense SecretaryJohn Hamre 78 and General Clark. 79 Although
General Wesley Clark is quoted for seven paragraphs, there is
no indication that the Prosecution is looking for signs of inconsistency, insincerity, unanswered questions, or any suggestion that things are not as NATO says. The general is simply
given the floor.
The Inquiry's reliance on sources partial to NATO affects
its conclusions on the most fundamental questions of liability.
In considering NATO's strike on RTS, for example, the Inquiry asks whether the attack was against a propaganda organ
(an illegal target) or a dual-use element of the command and
control system (a legitimate target). It concludes that "[i] t appears . .. NATO's targeting of the RTS building for propaganda purposes was an incidental (albeit complementary) aim
below their mines/And blow them at the moon"); see also H. W. Fowler, A
Dictionary of Modem English Usage 247-48 (Sir Ernest Gowers ed., 2d ed.
1965).
78. Id. 59 (not citing the source of Hamre's statement).
79. Id. (attributing statements to Clark and citing to "Press Conference,
NATO HQ Brussels, 13 April [1999]").
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of its primary goal of disabling the Serbian military command
and control system and to destroy the nerve system and apparatus that keeps Milosevic in power."8 0 Whatever its merit, that
conclusion is nothing but reportage of the suspect's opinion,
drawn from NATO's own public statements."'
The Inquiry's discussion purports to be answering the following question: "[W]as the station a legitimate military objective; and if it was, were the civilian casualties disproportionate
to the military advantage gained by the attack?"' 2 On this matter a suspect's opinion is not dispositive, nor even terribly interesting; the nature, purpose, or use of RTS as a military or
non-military objective is not subject to NATO's post hoc preference. Yet in deciding the facts of the incident, the Inquiry
relies entirely on NATO's stated subjective belief that it was
attacking justified targets. 83 The Inquiry says that it "appears"

NATO's interest in destroying the propaganda capacity of the
F.R.Y. was incidental to its primary aim-based only on
80. Inquiy, supra note 3,

76.

81. Id. (citing, inter alia, a NATO press conference of April 9, 1999, and a
letter from NATO spokesman Jamie Shea to the International Federation of
Journalists dated April 12, 1999, in support of its conclusion).
82. Id. 75. Additional Protocol I (1977) to the Geneva Conventions of
1949, art. 52(2)-(3), provides the standard definition of a legitimate military
objective:
2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as
objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at
the time, offers a definite military advantage.
3. In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated
to civilian purposes... is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Protocol
I),June 8, 1977, arts. 52(2)-(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 27 [hereinafter Additional
Protocol]. See also Aldrich, supra note 24, at 149-50; Vaughan Lowe, International Legal Issues Arising in the Kosovo Crisis, 49 INT'L. & COMP L.Q. 934, 941-

42 (2000).
83. See Inquiry, supra note 3,
76 (citing a NATO press conference of
April 9, 1999, and a letter from NATO spokesmanJamie Shea to the International Federation ofJournalists dated April 12, 1999, [both dated before the
attack in question] to the effect that it was not targeting television transmitters as such but rather military targets with which the transmitters were integrated, and therefore the damage was secondary; the relevance of comments
about transmitters to the attack on the actual television studios is not clear).
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NATO's assertion. Perhaps its assertion accords with the best
legal interpretation of the facts, but that is not for NATO to
say. The Prosecution's responsibility is to decide the matter,
not to delegate it to the suspect.
The same reliance occurs here, where, addressing the apparent fact that NATO knew its bombing of RTS would not
actually interrupt transmissions (a matter of importance for a
proportionality analysis), the Inquiry sets the attack in a
broader context constructed entirely from NATO ibidenda:
The attack on the RTS building must therefore be
seen as forming part of an integrated attack against
numerous objects, including transmission towers and
control buildings of the Yugoslav radio relay network
which were "essential to Milosevic's ability to direct
and control the repressive activities of his army and
special police forces in Kosovo" (NATO press release,
1 May 1999) and which comprised "a key element in
the Yugoslav air-defence network" (ibid, 1 May 1999).
Attacks were also aimed at electricity grids that fed
the command and control structures of the Yugoslav
Army (ibid, 3 May 1999). Other strategic targets included additional command and control assets such
as the radio and TV relay sites at Novi Pazar,
Kosovaka and Krusevac (ibid) and command posts
(ibid, 30 April). Of the electrical power transformer
stations targeted, one transformer station supplied
power to the air-defence coordination network while
the other supplied power to the northern sector operations centre. Both these facilities were key control
elements in the F.R.Y. integrated air-defence system
(ibid, 23 April 1999). The radio relay and transmitting station near Novi Sad was also an important link
in the air defence command and control communications network. Not only were these targets central
to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's governing apparatus, but formed, from a military point of view, an
integral part of the strategic communications network which enabled both the military and national
command authorities to direct the repression and
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atrocities taking place in Kosovo (ibid, 21 April
1999) .84

The sentence following is a recommendation not to inves85
tigate.
The consistent, nearly exclusive, and always sympathetic
use of NATO sources undercuts the normal prosecutorial exercise of creating a utopian prima facie (or even merely balanced) case. All human and institutional sources bias toward
their interests, so relying on them rarely constitutes the interpretation most favorable to objective enquiry unless they are
used to damn a defendant with his own words. That never
86
happens in the Inquiry.
2.

Words are Shields: Treatment of Non-NATO Sources

The Inquiry treats NATO sources with considerable deference; the few non-NATO sources are received far more critically and are subjected to greater scrutiny. The deference
shown NATO is therefore not simply a function of a universal
deference towards all sources-the Prosecution evidently can
be critical when it wishes to be. In fact, it turns the traditional
arsenal of lawyerly skepticism and scrutiny on non-NATO
84. Id.

78.

85. Id.
79. Similarly, in considering the Koriga attack, the Inquiry
notes, "According to NATO, all practicable precautions were taken and it
was determined that civilians were not present." This statement is followed
two sentences later by the recommendation not to investigate. Id. 89.
86. The Inquiry's seeming reticence to hoist NATO with its own petard
cannot be explained by saying that NATO did not manufacture that particular weapon. Indeed, there is an apparently unintended near-hoisting when
the Inquiry cites a passage from a Human Rights Watch report that quotes
NATO officials. Id. 68 (not specifying the report). The Human Rights
Watch report is apparently excerpted in order to draw out a point favorable
to NATO, ignoring the harmful argument embedded in its original context:
The original Human Rights Watch report cited uses the NATO commanders' comments about NATO's increasing caution to argue that "the
change in NATO rules of engagement indicates that the alliance recognized
that it had taken insufficient precautions in mounting this attack [on the
Djakovica convoy]." Id. Human Rights Watch cites the NATO officers to
show that they were aware of insufficient precautions taken to identify civilians in this attack. However, the Inquiry cites the passage as support for its
own assertion that "NATO has consistently claimed that it believed the
Djakovica convoy to be escorted by military vehicles at the time of the attack." Id.
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sources in a manner that shows it knows how to wield weapons,
to go on the attack to protect a position.
One form this scrutiny takes is a corroboration test for
non-NATO sources: In at least two instances, the Inquiry dismisses further consideration of a report principally because it
lacks corroboration. A Yugoslav report (claiming that intercepted conversations between NATO pilots showed that an attack on a civilian convoy was made with foreknowledge) is demoted in value, not simply as non-credible but as "not [being]
confirmed by any other source."8 7 Similarly, examining environmental damage, the Committee notes that it "has been
hampered in its assessment of the extent of environmental
damage in Kosovo by a lack of alternative and corroborated
sources regarding the extent of environmental contamination
"88

Corroboration is a legitimate standard, but it is not applied consistently in the Inquiry; it is never applied against unconfirmed NATO-related sources or in any instance in which
rejecting a factual claim would increase liability. NATO declarations are simply accepted in isolation or, given the overlapping plethora of NATO sources, are corroborated by other
NATO declarations. Of course, a hobgoblinnish insistence on
corroborative consistency can mislead; if a suspect's story is
plausible it need not be corroborated, whereas accusations
must almost always be.8 9 The requisite consistency is not between suspect and accuser, however, but between two suspects
or accusers: In no other instance has the Prosecution made a
suspect's denials probative. 9° Of course, corroboration will
87. Id. 66.
88. Id.
17. It is curious to raise corroboration objections regarding
damage in Kosovo: At all times since the Inquiry began, Kosovo has been
under international supervision, and the Prosecution's access to the province is unrestricted, so it could investigate the matter directly itself if corroboration were its main concern.
89. But see International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, adopted Feb. 11, 1994, amended July 17,
2003 (28th rev.), Rule 96, U.N. Doc. IT/32/REV.28 (2003), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm (exempting testimony by victims of sexual assault from corroboration requirements).
90. Perhaps there are unknown instances in which investigation was
halted because a suspect provided a plausible explanation for his actions,
but that is partly a question of publicity-a matter to which we shall return.
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never be obtained if investigation is halted the moment the
suspect denies liability.
Non-NATO sources that survive this harsher scrutiny are
neutralized in a different way: They are used mostly to establish facts that are unchallenged or uncontroversial-such as
the existence of a bombing attack or the exact number of
dead-rather than to examine questions of responsibility, mens
rea, and notice, for which NATO sources are used. Concern

with bias cannot be the reason, since the potential for bias in
NATO's statements is too obvious to ignore, and yet NATO's
words constitute the overwhelming bulk of the Inquiry's evi-

dence.

Even if we accept the decision not to use other

sources, two questions arise: (1) Why rely on NATO sources so
uncritically?9 ' (2) Why rely on them at all-why issue a report
that has the effect of exonerating NATO if there is insufficient
information-instead of remaining silent?
3.

Voice and Authority

To this point we have considered how the Inquiry uses its
(mostly NATO) sources. What does the Inquiry reveal about
why it uses them in these ways? Underlying the different treatment given to individual items is a patterned distinction in the
Committee's approach to informational authority, which effectively predetermines its choices about the value of facts and,
with them, its view of what happened. Quotation quotes both
a voice and a view.
The Inquiry notes that the committee "has tended to assume that the NATO and NATO countries' press statements
are generally reliable and that explanations have been honestly given."9 2 In no other document does the Prosecution
adopt an operating assumption that a potential suspect's statements are "generally reliable." Most are silent on the matter,
and unsurprisingly, the clear implication in them is that the
subject, in denying or explaining away moral or legal culpability, and even in describing the facts, may be lying. 93
91. As the Human Rights Watch report demonstrates, it is possible to
construct critical arguments about liability using NATO sources. See Inquiry,
supra note 3,
68.
92. Id. 90.
93. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, IT-98-33-PT, trial transcript at
8620-8708 (Mar. 19, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm
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Yet evidence was readily available to the Prosecution, both
in the Inquiry and outside it, that NATO was not always truthful. The Inquiry itself acknowledges shortcomings:
The committee must note, however, that when the
[Prosecutor] requested NATO to answer specific
questions about specific incidents, the NATO reply
was couched in general terms and failed to address
94
the specific incidents.
That is another way of saying that NATO's answers were
evasive or unresponsive, raising questions as to why its other
statements were seen as "generally reliable" or "honestly
given."
One prominent example of how NATO's approach to information was more nuanced than the Committee allows is actually discussed in the Inquiry, though with a different focus.
Following its attack on a train at Grdelica, NATO showed cockpit video of missiles striking the train; a German national supplied the Prosecution with an analysis suggesting the video had
been sped up. 95 The fact that NATO had indeed sped up the
video 9 6 surely raises serious questions about NATO's reliability
and intentions-questions one might understandably generalize to the wider set of NATO's statements. 9 7 The Inquiry does
not consider these implications, treating-and dismissing(questioning of witnesses concerning the identity of voices on a taped radio
transmission; Krstic had maintained that the tape was not of his voice).
94. Inquiry, supra note 3,
90.
95. Id.
60. The individual, Ekkehard Wenz, was acting in a private capacity. The speed with which the attack occurred-in which a pilot
launched two separate munitions that struck a moving train only seconds
apart-was an important element in NATO's explanations terming the event
an accident. See id. 59 (quoting General Wesley Clark's description of the
incident at a NATO press conference on April 13, 1999).
96. NATO later acknowledged (before the Inquiry was issued) that the
tape had been sped up three times, but claimed it was a mistake. Agence
France Presse, Tape of NATO Strike on Train Shown at Three Times Normal Speed
(Jan. 6, 2000); Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Reports that NATO showed videos of the bombing of a passenger train on a bridge in
Yugoslavia last spring at three times the normal speed remain at the center of media
attention, in SHAPE NEWS SUMMARY & ANALYsIs, KOSOVO-COMMENTS, at http:/
/www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/2000/saO7OlOO.htm (Jan. 7, 2000).
97. The Inquiry also notes that NATO "initially denied, but later acknowledged, responsibility for" the attack on a refugee column near
Djakovica on 14 April 1999." Inquiry, supra note 3,
64. On NATO's series
of statements about this attack, all of which would have been available to the
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the video analysis as bearing only on the narrow facts of the
incident.98 We shall return to this case in some detail.
NATO's handling of access to information 99 was also the
subject of public debate, as the Committee must have
known.100 Indeed, it is difficult to see how any observer could

believe that NATO was simply a disinterested supplier of truth
about events in which it was involved, unaffected by its war
aims; at a minimum, no observer could credibly think such a
view uncontroversial. When NATO supplied public 1° ' inforCommittee, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNDER ORDERS: WAR CRIMES IN Ko-

sovo 444-46.
98. The Inquiry does not reach the most relevant conclusion that Wenz's
analyses suggest: that the tape may have been deliberately sped up by NATO
for the purpose of making the pilot's reaction time appear shorter. Instead,
the Inquiry phrases it this way: "A comprehensive technical report submitted by a German national, Mr Ekkehard Wenz... queries the actual speed at
which the events took place in relation to that suggested by the video footage of the incident released by NATO. The effect of this report is to suggest
that the reaction time available to the person controlling the bombs was in
fact considerably greater than that alleged by NATO." Inquiry, supra note 3,
1 60. With regard to analysis of the incident, this is indeed a reasonably fair
summary of Wenz's argument. With regard to the broader question of
NATO's general reliability, the formulation appears crafted to avoid the obvious implication that NATO may have manipulated the evidence deliberately and lied.
99. "Correspondents travelling with NATO forces ...were also granted
'selective' or 'filtered' access, a constraint often reinforced by their sense
that the side they were covering was in the right." INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL
ON

HUMAN

RIGHTS

POLICY, JOURNALISM,

MEDIA

AND

THE CHALLENGE

OF

HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING 99 (2002).

100. NATO itself acknowledged such disputes at its assessment press conference in September 1999. Gen. Wesley K. Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and Brigadier Gen. John Corley, Chief, Kosovo Mission
Effectiveness Assessment Team, Press Conference on the Kosovo Strike Assessment (Sept. 16, 1999) (transcript available at http://www.nato.int./kosovo/press/p990916a.htm) (referring to various news reports suggesting
that the NATO bombing was ineffective and that NATO deliberately lied
about or distorted bombing figures).
101. Even within NATO governments, information was not necessarily reliable. See, e.g., John Barry & Evan Thomas, The Kosovo Cover-Up, NEWSWEEK,

May 15, 2000, at 22 (reporting that ranking American military officials had
"buried" a U.S. Air Force damage report, later obtained by Newsweek, showing that the air campaign had been far less effective than NATO had publicly
claimed and noting that "[a] 11during the Balkan war, Gen. Wesley Clark, the
top NATO commander, was under pressure from Washington to produce
positive bombing results from politicians who were desperate not to commit
ground troops to combat").
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mation, it did so because it felt it was in its interest to do so;
when it withheld information and when, possibly, it dissimulated or lied, its interests were the same-this would have been
the logical assumption for the Prosecution to make and the
logical public strategy to adopt. The assumption of truthfulness became even more tenuous for NATO statements made
after the Prosecution began its Inquiry, as even the most virtuous individual or institution feels the incentives of self-interest
if it knows its comments will be scrutinized for criminal liability. Statements NATO made after the Inquiry began should
have had attached to them an assumption that they likely and
logically were the self-interested statements of an organization
intent on protecting itself. The Inquiry belatedly admits it assumed the opposite.
Why would the Prosecution assume that NATO was truthful? In the Inquiry we find no explanation. In failing to account for its reasoning, the Committee left itself open to a different assumption by its readers-that it may not have made a
considered assessment at all but rather was determined to
grasp an evidentiary advantage by assuming the authority of
NATO's representations. This merely returns us to the question: why? The answer, in the absence of explanation, is speculative and, for that reason, all the more troubling.
We shall return to this question of motive at the end. We
turn now to another matter at which we previously hinted:
how the Prosecution responds to information not before it.
We have seen how the Committee's assumptions distort the
information it presents to us, but behind that lie further questions about what (other) information the Committee had:
Was the availability of information the result of the merest incident or chance, or was there a discernible pattern in how the
Prosecution came to see some things and not others? Where
did it direct its gaze, and where did it not? What did the Prosecutor not see?
C.

What The ProsecutorPurports Not to See: Creating the Absence
of Information
In appearance, the podestA undertook the initial investigations according to due process. An inquisitio
into a murder case was begun by the authorities, who
questioned both medical experts and credible wit-
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nesses. Fundamental to the due process of inquisitio,
however, was the assumption that the magistrates had
every right to investigate persons of ill repute (mala
fama) and that the testimonies were given by credible
Christian witnesses. The Jews, by definition, were
02
people of bad repute.
The Prosecution's reliance on NATO sources is all the
more striking when one recalls that NATO was not forthcoming with probative information. If NATO had demonstrated
good faith and fully opened its archives, then (critical) reliance on NATO sources might indeed have sufficed to make a
sufficient determination. As we have seen, the Inquiry itself
acknowledges that this (admittedly unlikely) event did not
happen.10 3 Faced with NATO's effective refusal to cooperate,
the Committee simply turned to public documents. In the Inquiry, there is no meaningful suggestion that this is a problem.

102. R. PO-CHIA HSIA, TRENT

1475:

STORIES OF A RITUAL MURDER TRIAL 33

(1992).
103. Cf Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Office of the Prosecutor, Address to the Security Council by Carla
Del Ponte, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, to the U.N. Security Council (Nov. 24, 2000),
JL/P.I.S./542-e (discussing access to documents in Croatia) [hereinafter
OTP Address]; RFE/RL Newsline, Hague Prosecutor Slams Yugoslavia as Ob-

structionist, (Oct. 31, 2002), available at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/
2002/10/311002.asp ("Carla Del Ponte, chief prosecutor of the war crimes
tribunal in The Hague, told the UN Security Council on 30 October that
Yugoslav authorities are deliberately obstructing the tribunal's work, RFE/
RL reported. She noted that archives are closed .... ); Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Office of the Prosecutor, ICTY Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte Addresses Once Again "The Unsatisfactory Co-Operation" of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the Office
of the Prosecutor (Dec. 20 2002), FH/P.I.S./721-e:

It is ...not true that my Office was asking for general access to all
archives in Yugoslavia .... The Requests for assistance and infor-

mation send [sic] to the authorities in Belgrade are concrete about
the documents sought . .

.

. It is clear from this application that

there are a number of outstanding Requests, some of which are 20
months old. The best results and fair results ...

are only possible

to achieve if [sic] best possible documents are made available in a
timely manner.
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The Standard Invocation

At intervals throughout its text and at the end of its discussion of each specific incident, the Inquiry notes, using similar language, that based on the information available to it, it
does not recommend investigation. 10 4 Its summation provides
one example: "On the basis of information available, the committee recommends that no investigation be commenced by
the [Prosecutor] in relation to the NATO bombing campaign
or incidents occurring during the campaign."' 10 5 This is a formulaic invocation; prosecutors reasonably wish to remind observers that their decisions are based upon judicious assessment of the best information to show their non-capricious nature and reserve the right to revise if new information comes
to light.
The Inquiry's almost exclusive reliance on NATO-related
sources does not mean that it exhaustively mines those
sources. Almost all information comes from public statements
made during or shortly after the war, or from a single communication from NATO in response to the Prosecution's queries. 10 6 The Inquiry does not always rely on these sources to its
own complete satisfaction; as has been noted, it complains, in
the end, about NATO's failure to be more forthcoming.1 0 7 In
addition, the Committee notes on at least six occasions that it
08
lacks necessary information.
The prospect of obtaining sufficient evidence is a factor in
determining whether or not to proceed with an investigation,
as the Inquiry acknowledges. 10 9 What if the likelihood of conviction depends on access to information in the hands of enti104. Inquiry, supra note 3, 1 62, 70, 79, 85, 89.
105. Id.

91.

106. Id. 11 6(i), 12, 90. NATO responded to the request but apparently
did not grant access to its archives; the Inquiry notes only "public documents
made available by NATO, the US Department of Defense and the British
Ministry of Defence" and "the response to a letter containing a number of
12
questions sent to NATO by the OTP." Id. 11 6(b), 6(i); see also id.
("[The committee] prepared a list of general questions and questions related to specific incidents. A letter enclosing the questionnaire and incident
list was sent to NATO on 8 February 2000. A general reply was received on
10 May 2000."); id. 1 90 (referring to "the NATO reply").
107. Id. 90.
108. Id. I 7, 8, 13, 17, 23, 24.
109. See id. 5.
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ties hostile to investigation? As a practical matter, this may
make it so difficult to proceed that prudence counsels against
wasting resources unlikely to yield information sufficient for
conviction-and that is a determination about which prosecutors reasonably have considerable discretion. Every prosecutor
selects his sources; inevitably, not only truth but also the politics of the possible play a role in determining what to rely on
and what claims to advance. This gives prosecutors valuable
discretion in a world in which formally legal matters are set in
broader political contexts. Still, we expect prosecutors to
make the best case they can and to maintain some real measure of professional independence, much as we expect courts
to.
The Committee acknowledges that it did not approach
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.). 11° Certainly, it
might have been reasonable to suppose that F.R.Y. officials
would be unlikely to cooperate; in any event, there were no
official channels between the Tribunal and Belgrade. 1 11 Thus
the only available evidence of consequence was and is in the
archives of NATO and its member states. What was the Prosecution's strategic response to this?
2.

Means of Securing Information
The Prosecution has tools at its disposal to pressure states

and individuals that do not cooperate in providing informa12
tion, such as initiating proceedings before the Chamber'
and reporting to the Security Council;' 1 3 in addition, it can
110. Id. 7.
111. Id. ("[T] he committee did not travel to the FRY and it did not solicit
information from the FRY through official channels as no such channels
existed during the period when the review was conducted."). The Inquiry
nonetheless acknowledges it took cognizance of reports written by the F.R.Y.
Id. 6(c), 7.
112. See Prosecutor v. Dugko Jovanovic, IT-02-54-T-R77.2, Initial Indictment (Apr. 7, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/ jov_ci031008e.htm (charging Jovanovic with contempt of the Tibunal for publishing the name of a protected witness); Peter Maas, Editorial,
Journalists and Justice at The Hague, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2002 (discussing the
issuance of a subpoena against a Washington Post journalist ordering his
testimony before the Tribunal).
113. See Inquiry, supra note 3,
5; OTP Address, supra note 103 (excerpting the text of the Prosecutor's scheduled address to the Security Council and discussing, inter alia, Croatia's continued non-cooperation).
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use publicity to encourage states to bring economic and political pressure to bear on recalcitrant actors. 114 Yet a reader of
the Inquiry will not see mention of such actions taken against
NATO. Instead, the Committee did not attempt to interview
NATO officials, 15 and while it requested information in writing from NATO, as noted above, the Committee itself acknowledges that the answers were not satisfactory," 16 though they
were deemed sufficient to conclude there was no liability.
Yet it requires a close reading to note this. Indeed, the
Inquiry's restrained choice of language about NATO's response is interesting: A more prosecutorial tone would have
noted NATO's obligation to provide satisfactory information
and then made much of NATO's reticence-its refusal-to do
so. 1

7

The Prosecution's attitude toward NATO may be con-

114. In October 2001, the Prosecutor criticized Yugoslav authorities for
their failure to cooperate, noting, "I had hoped that I would finally have
access to all necessary evidence, but I was waiting in vain. Denying access to
this information .. only fosters suspicion that people in power are not interested to [sic] disclose and face the truth." RFE/RL Newsline, Hague Prosecutor Slams Yugoslav Government for Vot Cooperating (Oct. 23 2001), available at
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2001/O/231001.asp. Cf Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Office of the Prosecutor, Statement by Madame Carla Del Ponte, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Dec. 22, 1999), PR/
P.I.S./ 4 57-e, at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p457-e.htm:
I will also continue to press for action to be taken against any State
that refuses to co-operate with my Office in its investigations. The
obligations of States to comply with their obligations under international law are very clear, and the international community must not
tolerate any obstruction of the mandate given to the Tribunal.
Where I find such opposition to our work, I will continue to report
the situation to the President of this Tribunal for the attention of
the Security Council. We must not be naive about the lengths to
which certain elements may be prepared to go to block our investigations.
115. See Inquiry, supra note 3,
6-7.
116. See id. 90; see also id. 12 (referring to NATO's "general reply").
117. It is possible to frame demands for information, or highlight the lack
of information, in a public document:
But was it lawful to bomb a broadcasting station which clearly had
civilian purposes and had civilians working in it? . . . We do not
have evidence either to confirm or deny the proposition that Serbian radio or television stations were being used for military purposes or to incite ethnic cleansing. Had the Chief of Defence Intelligence been permitted to give evidence to us, perhaps we would be
in a better position to make a judgment on this important issue.
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trasted with its zeal in pursuing documents from the successor
states of the former Yugoslavia-and with its willingness to
draw conclusions about the effect of non-compliance on its investigations.' 18 Of course, there can be no obligation without
a request, nor any obligation if the Prosecution declares itself
satisfied-and without an obligation refused, there can be no
non-cooperation to report.' 19 To be sure, NATO's refusal
never reached the levels of repeated defiance that the F.R.Y./
Serbian and Croatian governments demonstrated in the face
We recommend that the Government set out the reasons for the
attacks on broadcasting stations in order to make clear the legal
justification.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS SELECT COMMITrEE, FOURTH REPORT, 2000, HC 28-1, at
152, in Benvenuti, supra note 8, at 524 n.84.
118. Compare this excerpt from the Prosecutor's report to the Security
Council in 2000:
Where Croatia perceives co-operation to be against its political or
narrow security interests, a real difficulty still exists. One longstanding problem, namely the provision of Croatian material for
use as evidence in the Kordic trial, remains unresolved, and time is
fast running out for full compliance with the Court orders that are
still outstanding in that case. And in relation to the 1995 Croatian
campaign against Serbs in Croatia, known as Operation Storm, we
still face a stubborn refusal to allow access to witnesses and documents that are essential for the completion of our investigations.
Our work has been seriously delayed as a result.
OTP Address, supra note 103. See also Press Release, International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Judge Claude Jorda, President of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Reports the Continued Non-Cooperation by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Security Council (Oct. 23, 2002), JDH/P.I.S./706-e, at http://www.un.org/icty/
pressreal/p706-e.htm; Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, Letter from President McDonald to the President of the
Security Council Concerning Outstanding Issues of State Non-Compliance
(Nov. 2, 1999), JL/P.I.S./444-e, at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p444e.htm.
119. Indeed, the Prosecution's substantial coercive powers are not available to the Committee absent an investigation, see Benvenuti, supra note 8, at
504-5, though this merely begs the question of why no investigation was initiated. Cf The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Office of the Prosecutor, Request by The Prosecutor Under Rule 7 bis (b) That the
President Notify the Security Council of the Failure of the Republic of Croatia to Comply with Its Obligations under Article 29 (July 28, 1999)
2 (119 requests for
cooperation),
6-8 (requests concerning military operations "Flash" and
"Storm"), and
3 (weekly meetings between Croatian and Tribunal officials), at http://www.un.org/icty/latest/index.htm.
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of repeated requests. But then, as far as we know, NATO was
never asked a second time.
Considered in light of the information NATO actually
provided and the minimal steps the Prosecutor took to secure
it, the formulaic invocation about available information seems
inapposite, because the body most likely to have the "available
information" is the very one under consideration for investigation-and the Prosecution was fully aware of this. Why then
would it invoke the formula attesting to the diligence of its
efforts, save to gloss over this fact and defend against the observation that the "information available to it" was incomplete,
suspect, and insufficient to form an opinion, and that it had
evidently not taken steps to secure more information? Perhaps, of course, it genuinely believed that this information,
from this source, sufficed. Whatever the reason, the formula,
the invocation, creates a buffering sense of completion; it does
not openly or easily admit questions about why this information was available and other information was not.
A prosecutor cannot act on information he does not
know; but at the same time, he abuses his discretion if he takes
steps to ensure that he does not find out something on which
he would have to act. Timidity-excessive caution-can be an
abuse of discretion. 120 If a lack of information is, in some significant part, consequent upon the Prosecutor's own decision
not to take steps to secure it, then it makes little sense to declare the information insufficient and less to draw legal conclusions from it. 1 2 1 One does not have to reach the Inquiry's
substantive outcomes to see why such methods are unsatisfactory and give rise to concern about the Prosecution's posture
towards the potential accused or the seriousness of its purpose.
Saying there is insufficient information in the Prosecution's
120. Cf Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998,
art. 17, 37 I.L.M. 999, 1012 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (providing complementary jurisdiction if a domestic court has proven unable or unwilling to
prosecute). Thanks to Professor Steven Ratner for bringing this comparison to my attention.
121. Cf INDEP. INT'L COMM'N ON Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT 184
(2000) ("The Commission accepts the view of the [Inquiry] that there is no
basis in available evidence for charging specific individuals ....

Neverthe-

less, some practices do seem vulnerable to the allegation that violations
might have occurred, and depend for final assessment upon the availability
of further evidence.").
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possession is a distraction from the issue of a potential suspect's real, if presently unknown, liability-and from the more
important question as to why the Prosecutor would be satisfied
to present observers with such a bootstrapped non sequitur.
D.

"AnotherInterpretationis Equally Available":' 22 Explaining
an Incident

Let us consider one incident in more detail, because it
shows the deformative consequences of the Inquiry's deference to the reliability-the authority-of NATO's voice and of
its strangely myopic vision. The attack at Grdelica is a fit example because it centers on what a pilot did not see, what NATO
did not show, and what the Prosecution chose not to say.
Recall the basic facts not in dispute: A NATO plane fired
two missiles in succession, both of which struck a passenger
23
train on a bridge, killing at least ten and injuring fifteen.
The Inquiry accepts in passing that the bridge was the "designated target" 124-conceding an issue of core importance in
deciding liability. Yet even reading the NATO sources the Inquiry itself cites, it is not at all obvious that the target was the
bridge instead of the train on it. The Inquiry does not inquire
why a pilot, "[r]ealising the bridge was still intact"'12 5 but also
realizing that he had just hit a civilian train, would decide to
target the bridge a second time, this time with full knowledge
that the train was still on it-a train that, as it turned out, he
hit a second time.
One could easily imagine a case lying for recklessness in
launching the second missile against a bridge over which a passenger train was known to be passing; 12 6 if the missile was in
fact aimed at the train, willful intent to kill protected persons
could be made out. The Prosecution does not make, or even
consider, either. It appears to consider the matter, in that it
discusses and dismisses the suggestion that the train itself, and
not the bridge, was targeted-but its discussion, whatever its
122. Inquiry, supra note 3, 61.
123. Id. 58.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Cf Schwabach, supra note 14, at 183 ("The firing of the second bomb
at the Grdelica Gorge bridge would certainly be considered 'reckless' by municipal criminal and tort law standards.").
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merits, actually addresses only the first missile. Evidence concerning the intended target of the second missile that hit the
train is not discussed; 12 7 instead, after declaring that there is
no liability for the first missile, the Inquiry then notes that:
The committee has divided views concerning the attack with the second bomb in relation to whether
there was an element of recklessness in the conduct
of the pilot or [the weapons systems officer]. Despite
this, the committee is in agreement that, based on
the criteria for initiating an investigation (see para. 5
above[ 128 ]), this incident should not be investi29

gated. 1

Thus the whole discussion actually concerns only the first
bomb, while the second is reduced to an unexplicated notation about divergent views on liability within the Committee, 131 followed by the formulaic recommendation not to investigate. If, to the Committee's own divided mind, the second bomb presented the only possible locus of a reckless mens
rea, surely it would constitute the more interesting incident
and warrant more discussion. Yet all the weight is placed on
the first bomb, which, when defused, takes the second with it.
This singular passage-so heavily weighted to the view
most favorable to NATO because it is NATO's view-represents the only suggestion of debate within the Committee (and
thus the only clear indication of an editorial hierarchy within
the Committee 31 ) and the only indication that NATO might
have come near liability for any action. As was noted, video
analysis showing that the pilot in fact had more time to delib127. The only mention is in quotation of General Clark's comments at the
NATO Press Conference, NATO HQ Brussels, April 13, 1999, in Inquiry,
supra note 3,
59.
128. The criteria require that there be a prospect of obtaining sufficient
information and that "the prohibitions alleged [be] sufficiently well-established as violations of international humanitarian law to form the basis of a
prosecution .... The Prosecutor may, in her discretion require that a higher
threshold be met before making a positive decision that there is sufficient
basis to proceed under Article 18(1)." Id.
5.
129. Id. 62 (noting also that there is no information warranting investigation of the chain of command).
130. Id.
59.
131. Cf id. 7 8, 9, 10 (describing interim steps in creating the Inquiry), 12
(describing the Prosecutor's involvement).
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erate was ultimately thought neither to affect the outcome
nor, more importantly, to raise doubts about the wisdom of
relying on NATO to construct an opinion about that outcome.
This need not mean that either the pilot or NATO command was liable for the attack. Mistakes are made in war, as
the Inquiry points oUt,' 32 SO the matter may simply not rise to
the level of seriousness required,1 33 or it might be thought that
a single (two-part' 34 ) decision to launch the missiles, even with
grisly results, could be explained away by a skillful defense.
Rather, we consider the Inquiry's approach to these facts.
Here we see all the deformations observed above: reliance on
NATO sources, demotion of non-NATO sources, failure to
consider alternatives and consequent location of an almost dispositive authority in the favored sources, and willingness to
close debate despite clear lack of sufficient information. Perhaps, had the Committee inquired about why the pilot fired a
132. Id. 90 (noting NATO's acknowledgement that it had made mistakes
during the campaign).
133. A claim of insufficient seriousness seems problematic in comparative
perspective. In January 2003 the U.S. Air Force conducted proceedings preliminary to a court martial for two pilots who killed four Canadian soldiers in
a friendly-fire incident in Afghanistan on April 17, 2002. The pilots were
charged with involuntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, dereliction of
duty, and failure to exercise good leadership, with possible sentences of 64
years. The defense suggested that systemic organizational and communications failures were to blame and that the U.S. pursued the case out of deference to an important ally. See David M. Halbfinger, Court-MartialHearing
Begins for U.S. Pilots, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2003, at A16. See also DeNeen L.
Brown, Canadian Troops' Fire Preceded U.S. Airstrike, WASH. POST, Nov. 28,
2002, at A28 (describing the preliminary investigation and suggesting that
evidence tending to mitigate liability was not included in the report). The
charges are analogous to those which logically would have obtained in the
Grdelica case had it been pursued. This suggests that the U.S. does not believe on principle that negligence or "an element of recklessness," see Inquiry,
supra note 3,
62, if found, fails to rise to a justiciable level or that it is
insufficiently serious to investigate. See David M. Halbfinger, Pilots Ignored
Rules on Attacks, Commander Testifies, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 16, 2003 (discussing this
incident and noting both that the pilots who shot down U.S. helicopters in
Iraq in 1993 faced similar proceedings and that an AWACS radar officer was
court-martialed for dereliction of duty in the same incident and acquitted in
1994).
134. The discussion does not make it entirely clear if the pilot (or whoever
controlled the weapon) had more time before the first bomb, the second, or
both, although the logical conclusion from the cockpit video having been
sped up is that he had more time than NATO suggested before each launch.
See Inquiy, supra note 3, 11 59-61.
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second time, it would have produced a satisfactory answer; perhaps, had it found no answer, it could have deferred an opinion pending further information. Perhaps, but in the real
world it did neither of these things. It did nothing, and by
doing nothing it determined that no liability lay.
Beyond questions of correctness, the Inquiry's alternative
explanation clearly falls within that category of interpretation
and characterization that is the art of lawyering-but here it
was put to the purpose of minimizing contrary evidence. Is
this just due diligence? Of course, a responsible prosecutor
does not leap at any scheme to indict no matter how implausible. 135 Perhaps the Prosecution was considering defenses
NATO might raise; yet there is no sense of a "gut guess" or a
"but can we prove it?" approach. The a priori reliability the
Inquiry accords NATO effectively decides the outcome; the
Committee's estimate is not an "alternative," it is the preferred
interpretation. Views about the pilot's actions may differ, but
readers judging the Inquiry could well conclude that another
interpretation of its approach is equally available and more
compelling.
Voice-Information-Argument-Style-StructureConsequence-Silence
IV.

DIFFICULTY:

FRAMING A DEFATIST DISCOURSE ABOUT

LEGAL ARGUMENT

Although the "most favorable" formulation conventionally refers to issues of fact, it also may bear upon the continuum of argument about law. In addressing the relevant legal
standards, the Inquiry asserts curiously marginal interpretations unfavorable to a finding of liability. In particular, its rhetorical posture repeatedly emphasizes the difficulty of defining
standards or applying the law, and its attitude toward consensus and progressiveness in legal interpretation varies significantly from its practice in other cases.
135. Cf Sunstein, supra note 17, at 2273 ("Often... a prosecutor will drop
a case at an early stage, after issuing subpoenas, or considering the defendant's state of mind, or simply deciding, after an 'all things considered' judgment, that this is not the kind of case that calls for a formal criminal investigation, even if there was a technical violation of law ....
This use of
prosecutorial discretion . . . is a major, if overlooked, safeguard of liberty
under law.").
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A.

The Verges of Consensus: Progressive and
Conservative Approaches

We may distinguish between progressive and conservative
consensual approaches to legal argument; each offers benefits
and risks. Progressiveness implies willingness to depart from,
law 136 -to
standards. 13 7 Such

or lead, consensus about

forge a new consensus

through evolving
an approach is highly
flexible 138 but also risks the legitimacy that comes from acting
only on settled matters, since an overly creative prosecutor will
find himself accused of inventing law.1 39 In contrast, conservative consensualism asserts that nullem crimen and legal certainty
140
discourage juridical novelty, partly to protect defendants.
Such an approach increases confidence, but also foregoes op136. I do not use "progressive" to mean "having ideological commitments
on the left." Rather, I use "progressive" to mean "willing to advocate
change." It supposes one need not be bound by an existing consensus that is
not in accord with one's view of what the law properly should be-and therefore incorporates politically "regressive" (or "reactionary") views as well. Advocates for reactionary causes may (indeed likely will) have the same disregard for the constraints of centrist consensus that political progressives have.
137. Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, Policy-OrientedJurisprudence
and Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of

Human Dignity, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 316, 319-20 (1999) ("For policy-oriented
jurisprudence, 'law' is the process through which members of a community
seek to clarify and secure their common interest ....

[This is a] dynamic

conception of law.").
138. Cf Developments in the Law: International Criminal Law, 114 HARv. L.
REV. 1943, 1977 (2001) ("[I]nstitutional designers should flush out any underacknowledged aims that may in the future motivate prosecutions sub
silentio. For example, international lawyers may be driven to seek prosecution in order to expand the substantive scope of international humanitarian
law .... International tribunals amenable to flexible interpretation may be
able to advance the law more quickly than the convention process permits.").
139. See Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The Responsibility of Individuals
for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View, 93 AM. J. INT'L

L. 302, 305 (1999) ("If tribunals exceed the discretion inherent in the delegation [of authority to create norms], they act ultra vires and are prone to
lose not only their legal authority but also their political influence . . ").
140. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, IT-96-22-A, Appeals J., Separate and Dissenting Op. ofJ. Cassese 11 (Oct. 7, 1997), 111 I.L.R. 386, 395; STEVEN R.
RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES

21-22 (2d ed. 2001)
("overreliance on scholarly writings, where progressive views often seek to
move the law forward, could instead lead to prosecutions that run afoul of
defendants' rights"); Susan Lamb, Nullem Crimen, iVulla Poena Sine Lege in
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY
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portunities to change the law, since a prosecutor who waits for
true consensus may not risk bringing controversial indictments. 1 4 The formal consensus on how law is made is closer
to the conservative consensual model; even progressive advocates phrase their arguments as if they already constitute a consensus, and the action therefore always plays out in defining
the verges of consensus. 14 2 At the same time, observers have
praised the Tribunal for its progressive expansion of the
law. 143 We need not decide which is the better view. Either
may be an acceptable posture for a prosecutor to adopt, for
consistency is the real test: does he employ a consistently conservative or progressive approach? If not, why does he deviate
when he does?
As a first approximation (although one we will find too
simplistic to encompass the full depth of the problem we confront), we may say that the Prosecution's approach to progresInternational Criminal Law, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE: THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 733, 733-35 (Cassese et al. eds., 2002).
141. See, e.g., Wiessner & Willard, supranote 137, at 320 (criticizing positivism for its "futile quest for 'certainty' of law" that fails to "take into account
changing and changed contexts").
142. See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, Letter to the Editors of the Symposium,
93 Am.J. INT'L L. 351, 355 (1999) (discussing legal language's "simultaneously strict formalism and its substantive indeterminacy" and the law's "predictable and highly formal argumentative patterns [that] allow any substantive outcome"); Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Appraising the
Methods of InternationalLaw: A Prospectusfor Readers, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 291,
293 (1999) (calling positivism "the lingua franca of most international lawyers, especially in continental Europe"); Simma & Paulus, supra note 139, at
316 ("[I] t is standards derived from legal sources deemed representative of
the attitude of the community that provide the yardsticks for finding a-not
the--correct solution to a legal problem ....").
143. See, e.g., Kelly Dawn Askin, Women's Issues in International Criminal
Law: Recent Developments and the Potential Contribution of the ICC, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES,

PEACE, AND

TIONAL CRIMINAL

HUMAN

RIGHTS:

THE

ROLE OF THE INTERNA-

COURT 47 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); Yoram Dinstein,

Crimes Against Humanity after Tadic, 13 LEIDEN J. INT'L. L. 373, 373 (2000)
("[The Tadic trial] has made an invaluable contribution to the development
of international legal norms governing crimes against humanity .... [A]s a
result ... it can safely be stated that crimes against humanity have come of
age."). But see, e.g., Mary Ellen O'Connell, New InternationalLegal Process, 93
AM. J. INT'L L. 334, 346 (1999) (criticizing the Tadic Chamber for not
"end[ing] the now-artificial distinction between internal and international
armed conflict for the purpose of applying" the Geneva Conventions' category of grave breaches).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

20031

UNEXPLODED BOMB

1053

siveness in the Inquiry seems to differ from its approach in
other cases. The Inquiry generally adopts a consensus-bound
approach; in its other cases, however, the Prosecution shows a
willingness to make progressive arguments. We shall consider
why this is so.
The Inquiry expresses a distrust of progressiveness, 44 advocating a conservative, consensual approach to its role in explicating law. In its introduction, the Inquiry notes that its
standard for evaluating an investigation's reasonableness requires that "the prohibitions alleged [be] sufficiently well-established as violations of international humanitarian law to
form the basis of a prosecution .... ,,145 Lack of a present
"consensus view in international legal circles" is specifically
identified as a reason why liability for the use of depleted uranium projectiles may not lie, 146 and the lack of a "general legal
consensus" concerning the status of cluster bombs is alluded
14 7
to as a reason why liability may not lie for their use.
One consequence of rejecting progressiveness is that liability for NATO is made less likely. Because of the very different kind of war NATO fought, most of its actions did not fall
clearly into the same factual patterns as cases previously
brought by the Prosecution, and the logical theories upon
which to base liability-such as for strategic bombing or use of
prohibited weapons-likewise have been less tested in the
combat of trial. But despite limited precedent, saying that on
the facts NATO incurred no liability remains a matter of interpretative discretion; there is no such thing as an estimate of
liability on the facts alone, because law can prescribe liability
for any set of facts. When a prosecutor opines as to what the
law is, or means, or what would make out liability, he materially affects the determination the law ultimately makes about
144. It uses the word once, to describe the cumulation test used in the
KupreskicJudgment (Prosecutor v. Kupregkic, IT-95-16-T, J. of Trial Chamber
II (Jan. 14, 2000)), with which it disagrees. See Inquiry, supra note 3,
52.
145. Id. 5.
146. Id. 1 26.
147. Id.
27. Likewise, concern about the absence of a clear consensus
seems to inform the Inquiry's discussion of the targeting of the RTS studios,
see id. 1 47 (referring to the legitimacy of the media as a target as a "debatable issue," implying a non-consensUal debate about the matter), and its explicit rejection of minority arguments for liability based on jus ad bellum analysis.
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the facts, and it cannot be said that the prosecutor is simply
1 48
applying settled law. He is advancing an interpretation.
If it can be shown that a prosecutor is making marginal
interpretative choices in an inconsistent fashion, it becomes
difficult to know, without more, if his choice falls within the
reasonable bounds of discretion. If, furthermore, it can be
shown that a prosecutor's marginal interpretations actually reduce the scope of liability or preclude certain fact patterns
from serious consideration, then it is difficult to see why he is
not engaged in a progressive restriction of liability; this may be

sensible, though curious, as it is not normally the function of a
prosecutor. These tendencies can indeed be shown by a careful reading of the Inquiry and a comparison with the Prosecution's other arguments: Indeed, the Inquiry appears not simply consensual, but also strangely cautious, in a way the Prosecution often is not. We will consider two kinds of problems
with the Inquiry's approach to consensus and consistency: one
internal to the document, and one external and comparative.
B.

Selective Consistency: Approaching Consensus

First, although the Inquiry unquestionably is consistent in
finding no liability for NATO, it is not consistent in its response to the supposed presence or lack of consensus, raising
questions about lack of consensus when it does not appear to
be a legitimate concern, or seeming less punctilious about novelty when consensus does exist.
For example, the Inquiry specifically notes the lack of its
own precedent as a supporting reason for not assigning liability
for use of depleted uranium projectiles.1 49 A record of charging or not charging a crime argues for similar treatment when148. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 143, at 349 ("The act of applying a
treaty or a rule of custom will necessarily involve interpretation, clarification
and/or addition. When international courts and tribunals or other institutions are established, this fact has to be recognized."); Wiessner & Willard,
supra note 137, at 317-21. See generally MARTr1i KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY
TO UTOPIA:

THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL

LEGAL ARGUMENT

(1989)

(surveying "schools" or theoretical and methodological approaches to international law); Ratner & Slaughter, supranote 142, at 293-5 (identifying seven
methods of international legal scholarship and describing how they are used
to evaluate legal theories and developments).
149. Inquiry, supra note 3, 26 ("In view of the uncertain state of development of the legal standards governing this area, it should be emphasised that
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ever similar facts arise, but surely the absence of prior uranium-related charges is related to the total absence of uranium-based weapons in the war before the NATO bombing.
The lack of analogous fact patterns cannot give guidance
about consistent charging, and the Prosecution cannot rely on
precedential argument merely because the wars preceding
NATO's war were as low-tech as they were brutal. The Inquiry
confronts a novel situation, yet argues as if the novel facts
before it are consonant with a conservative charging history,
and interprets the matter as a question of consensus in part
defined by its own lack of precedent. Other examples may
clarify this curious usage, and hint how it is indeed consistent
in another way.
1.

Restraining the Court: The Kupreskic Cumulation Test

How does the Prosecution respond when there is other
evidence about precedent and consensus? The most singular
instance of selective interpretation is the Inquiry's treatment
of the Kupreskic Chamber's dicta about cumulative liability; it is
worth considering in some detail, especially as it incorporates
an external comparison into the Inquiry's text. This is the passage the Inquiry cites:
526. As an example of the way in which the Martens
clause [1 5 0] may be utilised, regard might be had to
considerations such as the cumulative effect of attacks on military objectives causing incidental damage to civilians. In other words, it may happen that
single attacks on military objectives causing incidental damage to civilians, although they may raise
doubts as to their lawfulness, nevertheless do not appear on their face to fall foul per se of the loose prescriptions of Articles 57 and 58[151] (or of the corresponding customary rules). However, in case of rethe use of depleted uranium or other potentially hazardous substances ...
has not formed the basis of any charge laid by the Prosecutor.").
150. The Martens clause refers to a declaration, inserted in various conventions on humanitarian law, "provid[ing] a minimum threshold of humanitarian treatment by combatants even in the absence of specific treaty
language." Theodor Meron, Customary Law, in CRIMES OF WAR 113, 114 (Roy
Gutman & David Rieff eds., 1999).
151. Referring to Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. Additional Protocol, supra note 82, arts. 57-58, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 29.
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peated attacks, all or most of them falling within the
grey area between indisputable legality and unlawfulness, it might be warranted to conclude that the cumulative effect of such acts entails that they may not
be in keeping with international law. Indeed, this
pattern of military conduct may turn out to jeopardise excessively the lives and assets of civilians,
1 52
contrary to the demands of humanity.
The Chamber seems to contemplate a standard of cumulative liability for borderline incidents in a legal gray zone "between indisputable legality and unlawfulness" that evince a
recklessness not visible in any single instance but only in the
pattern. Observers might differ about the value of this standard, or its odds of surviving further scrutiny. But it is undeniably a standard the Chamber suggests it might favor, and a
standard that would expand the scope of liability.
Yet the Inquiry actually disagrees with the Chamber's proposed standard and seeks to limit its potential to expand liability, arguing instead that the Chamber's standard is properly a
measure of total civilian deaths measured against the campaign in toto:

This formulation in Kupreskic can be regarded as a
progressive statement of the applicable law with regard to the obligation to protect civilians. Its practical import, however, is somewhat ambiguous and its
application far from clear. It is the committee's view
that where individual (and legitimate) attacks on military objectives are concerned, the mere cumulation of
such instances, all of which are deemed to have been
lawful, cannot ipsofacto be said to amount to a crime.
The committee understands the above formulation,
instead, to refer to an overall assessment of the totality
of civilian victims as against the goals of the military
campaign. 153

The Chamber's judgment, on its face, refers to no such
thing. Nothing in the Inquiry's analysis indicates a basis for
this posture, such as a belief that the Chamber did not really
152. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, IT-95-16-T,J. of Trial Chamber II
14, 2000), quoted in Inquiry, supra note 3,

153. Inquiry, supra note 3,

526 (Jan.

52.

52.
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mean it, or that a progressive standard would not prevail on
appeal; 5 4 it does not cite to any authority. 155 Its only objection is that the test is of ambiguous import and unclear application-which might be seen as offering the Prosecution
scope for developing or clarifying a progressive standard to its
benefit, rather than reasons to retire from the field.
This reticence cannot be from a lack of lawyerly skill,
since, as we have seen, the Inquiry produces an admirably assertive "clarification" of what the Chamber meant. Though it
may be a plausible gloss, it definitely restricts the scope of liability; 156 it undeniably advances a lower standard for liability despite the opportunity to develop other plausible interpreta-

tions. Moreover, this is a matter of law, not of fact about which
the Prosecution would have an obligation to bring forward exculpatory information; a court's determination as to what constitutes the correct legal interpretation is a gift the prosecution
never need return. 15 7 Instead, the Prosecution simply disagrees with the Chamber and turns down the opening.
154. On appeal, the Kupreskicjudgment was overturned, with the Appeals
Chamber finding that the Prosecution case, and the Amended Indictments,
had serious flaws. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, IT-95-16-A, App. J.
79-125,
306-326, 372-378 (Oct. 23, 2001), availableat http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/ english/jovci031008e.htm. Nothing in the appellate judgment
would appear to reject the lower court's dicta concerning a theory of responsibility, and in any event the Inquiry was written long before the appeal was
decided.
155. But see Ronzitti, supra note 14, at 1026 n.25 (noting similarities between the Inquiry's view and reservations made by various NATO countries
on ratifying Protocol I).
156. See Benvenuti, supra note 8, at 517-8; see also Laursen, supra note 14, at
793-94; Ronzitti, supra note 14, at 1026-7 (both making very similar critiques).
157. Cf Benvenuti, supra note 8, at 517 (suggesting that because the Committee's task was to determine if there was "probable cause" to investigate, it
had no right to set aside the Court's interpretation, and so was acting ultra
vires); Laursen, supra note 14, at 793-94 ("[I]t would appear to be untraditional for a prosecutorial authority to undercut the court that may subsequently decide the case. If a court has adopted a broad interpretation that
works to the detriment of the accused, prosecutors will rarely fail to follow
through. One possible explanation is, of course, that the prosecutorial authority is looking for reasons not to prosecute."). Some authors note an analogous situation in the Inquiry's interpretation of the ICJ's Advisory Opinion
on the legality of nuclear weapons, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons (Advisory Opinion), 1996 I.C.J. 226, which arguably attributes a
view on the customary law status of Protocol I, Articles 35(3) and 55 contrary
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Of course, the Prosecution routinely disagrees with the
Chamber-when the Chamber limits defendants' liability. Indeed, prosecutors are normally expected to be more assertive
than their courts; prosecutors inevitably seek to push the
pocket while couching their probes in the language of precedent or legal certainty, and it is supposed that judges restrain
this impulse. Here, there is no need, as the Prosecution has
fully internalized the process of review and decided in advance
that only the most conservative approach is warranted. The
Tribunal's jurisprudence offers no other instance in which the
Prosecution has argued that liability ought to be less than the
Chamber expressly has indicated it might accept. At the time
the Inquiry was written, the Chamber's test would have
presented the Prosecution with, at the least, a tempting opportunity; the Committee treats it like a threat to be disposed of.
Yet the Kupreskic gray zone test proves to have its uses after
all: The Inquiry itself later expressly invokes Kupreskic when it
asserts that "[tjhe proportionality or otherwise of an attack
should not necessarily focus exclusively on a specific incident," 158 citing its own discussion of Kupreskic to show "the need
for an overall assessment of the totality of civilian victims as
against the goals of the military campaign." 159 Regardless of
the quality of this argument, it is almost surely not what
Kupreskic says: The cited dictum does not deny-or even speak
to-liability for a single attack if it otherwise meets the legal
standards, but rather proposes a standard for multiple attacks
when each alone does not. Yet the Prosecution uses the
Kupreskic formulation-after reinterpreting and rejecting itto suggest that culpability must be considered in overall context. The practical result of this rejection and cooptation is to
reduce the scope of liability Kupreslkic offered. The Prosecution has turned the Chamber's argument on its head-and in
the process finds as a matter of law that there is no liability for
to the plain meaning of the ICJ's decision. See Inquiry, supranote 3, 15; see
also Marauhn, supra note 14, at 1031.
158. Inquiy, supra note 3, 78. Cf id. 50 ("The answers to these questions [about applying the principle of proportionality] are not simple. It
may be necessary to resolve them on a case by case basis, and the answers
may differ depending on the background and values of the decision
maker.").
159. Id. 1 78 (emphasis added).
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aggregated incidents, for single incidents, or, as we shall see,
for anything at all.
C.

EmphasizingDifficulty: (Not) Applying the Principle
of Proportionality

Alongside its selective treatment of legal arguments, the
Inquiry repeatedly emphasizes the practical difficulties inherent in the interpretative enterprise, discouraging expansion of
liability through the fact pattern. Here, rather than insisting
that there is no consensus, the Prosecution argues that while
the law may be clear, it is impossible to apply. 6 °1 We have seen
hints of this in its treatment of Kupreskic, in the rest of the Prosecution's dicussion of proportionality 16 1-so central to the
most interesting issues arising in the NATO campaign and
likely to arise in future wars1 62-the Prosecution finds it difficult to apply proportionality in general and equally hard in
specific cases. Not only does the Prosecution find it so: at
every opportunity, the Inquiry emphasizes it.
1. Difficulty with the General Principle
Here is the Inquiry's main comment on analyzing proportionality:
160. Cf Lowe, supra note 82, at 942 ("The problems arise not from the
law, but rather from the making of factual judgments in concrete cases on
the application of a perfectly clear rule, often on the basis of dated and
incomplete information .... ).
161. Proportionality is a central concept of humanitarian law, and is governed both by custom and, especially, treaty:
As formulated in Additional Protocol I of 1977, attacks are prohibited if they cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or
damage to civilian objects that is excessive in relation to the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage of the attack. This
creates a permanent obligation for military commanders to consider the results of the attack compared to the advantage anticipated.
Horst Fischer, Proportionality,Principle of in CRIMES OF WAR,supra note 150, at
294, 294.
162. Disproportionate force and illegitimate targeting seem the most
likely areas for liability given that NATO did not use ground troops, and so
was less likely to commit the sorts of interpersonal atrocities underlying
many of the indictments the Prosecution has issued in other cases. See discussion on targeting infra Part IV.C.2.
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The main problem with the principle of proportionality is not whether or not it exists but what it means
and how it is to be applied. [163] ... Unfortunately,
most applications of the principle of proportionality
are not quite so clear cut. It is much easier to formulate the principle of proportionality in general terms
than it is to apply it to a particular set of circumstances because the comparison is often between unlike quantities and values. One cannot easily assess
the value of innocent human lives as opposed to cap164
turing a particular military objective.
It is difficult to know where to begin critiquing such a truism. Yes, this is hard stuff, but it is what courts do; prosecutors
are not supposed to stress the difficulty of mounting an investigation under the existing law. Yes, measurement is difficult,
and it seems implicit in proportionality, which weighs tradeoffs, that no a priori calculus of the loci and limits of liability
163. In this discussion, the Inquiry describes two paradigmatic situations
safely within any consensus: "[B]ombing a refugee camp is obviously prohibited if its only military significance is that people in the camp are knitting
socks for soldiers. Conversely, an air strike on an ammunition dump should
not be prohibited merely because a farmer is plowing a field in the area."
Inquiry, supra note 3, 1 48. In addition, the Inquiry notes that bombing
whose principal purpose is to kill, terrorize, or demoralize the civilian population-such as occurred at Hamburg, Dresden, and Tokyo during World
War II-would now be illegal under Additional Protocol I, and improved
targeting technology affects what warring parties may aim at or hit as collateral damage. Id. 1 43. See also W. Michael Reisman, Scenarios of Implementation of the InternationalCriminal Court, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNAA CHALLENGE TO IMPUNITY 281, 281-283 (Mario
Politi & Guiseppe Nesi eds., 2002) (discussing the dynamic interrelationship
of military technology, strategy, and international criminal jurisprudence).
164. Inquiry, supra note 3, 48. The Inquiry then lists questions that "remain unresolved once one decides to apply the principle of proportionality,"
noting that "[t]he answers to these questions are not simple," id. It 49-50:
a) What are the relative values to be assigned to the military advantage gained and the injury to non-combatants and/or the damage
to civilian objects?
b) What do you include or exclude in totaling your sums?
c) What is the standard of measurement in time or space? and
d) To what extent is a military commander obligated to expose his
own forces to danger in order to limit civilian casualties or damage
to civilian objects?
Id. 1 49.
TIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
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could ever be derivedI 65-indeed, it is implicit in the very notion of disproportionate force that some uses of force are proportionate, that it is sometimes acceptable to take innocent
lives for military objectives. Yet equally implicit is the corollary
that some number of lives is too many and that this is precisely
what the law must determine; the Prosecution's argument,166for
all its reasoned tone, effectively denies this can be done.
No one denies the difficulties inherent in prosecuting a
case predicated on proportionality, but who normally has an
interest in emphasizing that difficulty? A common defense strategy is not to deny the underlying action but to claim that it is
unclear in law, impossible to categorize as criminal without
risking the limits of legal certainty, and therefore nullem crimen. Indeed, what is most interesting about the Inquiry's disputations on proportionality is that they are made in a general
mode, as a commentary on the meaning of the law, not its
application to this case. 16 7 Before turning to the evidence, the
Inquiry asserts as a general principle that proportionality is exceedingly difficult to apply. The Inquiry's call and response
about proportionality's difficulties look as if they were drawn
from a defense brief.
An example-environmental damage- The Inquiry considers

damage to the environment and use of depleted uranium projectiles in its general discussion. 168 Noting that the Additional
Protocol's provisions about environmental damage have a very
high threshold of application, the Inquiry proposes that "[environmental] effects are best considered from the underlying
165. Cf Christoph Schreuer, Is There a Legal Basis for the NATO Intervention

in Kosovo?, 1 INT'L. L. F. 151, 153 (1999) (noting, in the context of Kosovo,
that "[piroportionality is more difficult to assess").
166. In a similar manner, it notes the difficulty concerning assessing excessive environmental damage: "Unfortunately, the customary rule of proportionality does not include any concrete guidelines to this effect." Inquiry,
supra note 3, 20.
167. The only concrete mention is an oblique reference to information
about civilian war deaths without comment on any relationship to proportionality; the mention rebuts the notion that the mere fact of civilian deaths
might be proof of disproportionality. See id. 51.
168. The Inquiry's discussion of uranium is derivative of its general environmental analysis, noting "it is the committee's view that the analysis undertaken above (paras. 14-25) with regard to environmental damage would apply, mutatis mutandis, to the use of depleted uranium projectiles by NATO,"
and recommending no investigation. Id. 26.
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principles of the law of armed conflict such as necessity and
proportionality." 169 Although proportionality and necessity
are its preferred mode, the Inquiry does not see much promise in them. It does identify certain thresholds-the language
of thresholds and tests is used here more than anywhere else
in the Inquiry-noting, for example, that
[e]ven when targeting admittedly legitimate military
objectives, there is a need to avoid excessive longterm damage to the economic infrastructure and natural environment ... military objectives should not
be targeted if the attack is likely to cause collateral
environmental damage which would be excessive in
relation to the direct military 70advantage which the at1
tack is expected to produce
and that "[a]t a minimum, actions resulting in massive environmental destruction, especially where they
do not serve a clear and important military purpose,
would be questionable."17 '

But these thresholds re-

gurgitate the most obvious and uncontroversial minimums, while again the Inquiry explicitly emphasizes
the difficulty of the enterprise:
It is difficult to assess the relative values to be assigned to the military advantage gained and harm to
the natural environment, and the application of the
principle of proportionality is more easily stated than
172
applied in practice.

Even when it purports to lay out the requirements for establishing the relevant mental state of a commander, its
threshold acts more to forestall analysis than to initiate it:
[T] he requisite mens rea on the part of a commander
would be actual or constructive knowledge as to the
grave effects of a military attack; a standard which
would be difficult to establish for the purposes of
prosecution and which may provide an insufficient
169. Id. 15 (noting also that the "conditions for application [of the Additional Protocol] are extremely stringent and their scope and content imprecise").
170. Id.
18 (citing A.P.V. Rogers, Zero-Casualty Warfare, 82 INT'L. REV.
RED CROSS 177-8 (March 2000)).
171. Id.
22.
172. Id. 19.
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basis to prosecute military commanders inflicting environmental harm in the (mistaken) belief that
such
73
conduct was warranted by military necessity.'
It probably would be difficult, and certainly very progressive, to identify a consensus around a threshold of damage that
would easily capture the effects of NATO's actions.1 74 The
question, however, is whether the Inquiry aims to minimize or
emphasize difficulties surrounding the lack of consensus. Regardless of the empirical question about the existence of a
consensus, the opportunity is there to clarify and refine the
standards to (prosecutorial) advantage. The Inquiry does not
do this; instead, it reinforces the admitted difficulties in the
process of establishing liability.175 It may be that the threshold
for environmental damage is sky-high and decades-long; the
Inquiry does not lower it all, nor reduce it by even a day.
2.

Aiming Away from the Target: Discursive Closure

The Prosecution is not a passive object, neutrally observing the creation of consensus upon which it then acts. It is
itself an actor, advancing consensus through a synthetic pro173. Id.
23 (noting the Hostages case before the Nuremberg Military
Tribunals, which acquitted the German General Rendulic of charges of wanton devastation for a "scorched earth" policy in the Norwegian province of
Finnmark that Rendulic believed to be justified by military necessity, citing

11

TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS

1296 (1950)).

174. The Inquiry discusses in passing the differing opinions of ecologists
and others concerning damage levels, and notes a lack of consensus concerning depleted uranium weapons. Inquiry, supra note 3,
15, 26:
There is a developing scientific debate and concern expressed regarding the impact of the use of [depleted uranium] projectiles
and it is possible that, in future, there will be a consensus view in
international legal circles that use of such projectiles violate general principles of the law applicable to use of weapons in armed
conflict. No such consensus exists at present.
175. See Marauhn, supra note 14, at 1031 ("[T]he Committee has not only
failed to follow the [ICTY] in one of its main achievements, namely the clarification of controversial rules of humanitarian law, but has added to the already existing ambiguities in interpretation of the applicable rules on the
protection of the environment"); Schwabach, supra note 14, at 175 ("The
OTP's interpretation would seem to leave the environmental provisions of
Protocol I with almost no applicability .... The OTP's approach to Protocol
I thus represents not a step forward toward greater accountability for environmental damage during wartime, but a step back to a pre-Gulf War standard.").
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cess1 76-or discouraging that process by failing to act-based
on its valuations and values. Such is the case with issues of
targeting. Given the nature of NATO's long-distance operations, as well as the Inquiry's own professed preference for
campaign-level analysis, the most interesting questions for clarifying the scope of international humanitarian law were likely
to be command responsibility for strategic bombing and highflight rules 17 7 rather than "shooter" cases. By elaborating tests
and thresholds, even without reaching NATO's actions, the
Prosecution could have put the world on notice about liability
for, and the seriousness of, aerial bombardment. Yet, given its
broader assumption of difficulty, it is perhaps unsurprising
that, although the Inquiry actually devotes considerable space
to strategic bombing and targeting,1 78 it says surprisingly little
that clarifies the law. We are therefore concerned with what
the Inquiry did not discuss, 1 79 and how the alchemy of discursive defeatism and reliance on NATO sources terminates debate in the act of beginning it.
Consider the Inquiry's general approach to targeting and
distinction. 180 The Inquiry notes that most of the targets de176. See, e.g., THEODOR MERON, WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE: ESSAYS
298 (1998) (noting the "synergistic relationship among the statutes of the
international criminal tribunals, the jurisprudence of the Hague Tribunal,
and the growth of customary law, its acceptance by states, and their readiness
to prosecute offenders under the principle of universality of jurisdiction").
177. There has been lively debate on the efficacy of high-level bombing.
See, e.g., Barry & Thomas, supra note 101; Press Conference on the Kosovo
Strike Assessment, supra note 100 (noting comments of a NATO pilot that
"as the war progressed I ... increased my altitudes ... because it was tactically smarter").
178. See Inquiry, supra note 3,
28-29, 35-47 (discussing targeting and
permissible military objectives).
179. Some discussion of the Inquiry's substantive conclusions seems unavoidable in order to develop the argument here; the point, as always, is the
decisional and conceptual limitations those conclusions reveal.
180. The principle of distinction refers to the obligation to distinguish between military and civilian objects. See Fred6ric de Mulinen, Distinction Between Military and Civilian Objects, in Kosovo AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: A LEGAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 8, at 103, 122-25 (surveying target
distinction and discussing the NATO case). In considering targeting, the
core questions are: Were the categories of targets legal in their particulars?
Did NATO take sufficient steps to distinguish military from civilian in conducting its high-flight bombing campaign? See Additional Protocol, supra
note 82, arts. 48, 51-52, 57, 85(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25-27, 42 (establishing
obligations to protect and to take precautions, and declaring attacks on civil-
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scribed in the Cohen, Shelton Joint Statement on Kosovo
given to the U.S. Senate1 8 1 and in NATO's after-battle re82
port'
are clearly military objectives. The precise scope of
"military-industrial infrastructure, media and other
strategic targets" as referred to in the U.S. statement
and "government ministries and refineries" as referred to in the NATO statement is unclear. Whether
the media constitutes a legitimate target group is a
83
debatable issue. 1
At a substantive level, one could hardly argue with the
suggestion that most objects NATO acknowledged targeting
were, as the Inquiry notes, "clearly military objectives.' 184 The
question, of course, is the others. It might be that the majority
of actions by the warring parties in the former Yugoslavia were
directed against "clearly military objectives"-as were most actions by the Third Reich or the Japanese Empire; acknowledging that tells us nothing about liability for those instancesmany or few-when the target was not clearly military. Yet after noting the existence of targets not clearly licit under the
Additional Protocol, the Inquiry says nothing more: only media is briefly considered, 85 while the "unclear" categories of
"military-industrial infrastructure," "government ministries
and refineries," and "other strategic targets" are not defined at
all.' 8 6 At a minimum, an opportunity to clarify matters has
ians a grave breach). Violations require a consideration of the requisite mens

rea. Id.
181. Identified only as the "Cohen, Shelton Joint Statement on Kosovo
given to the US Senate," Inquiry, supra note 3, 1 45.
182. Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, Kosovo One Year On:
Achievement and Challenge (Mar. 21, 2000), available at http://www.nato.int/

kosovo/repo, cited in Inquiy, supra note 3, 46.
183. Inquiry, supra note 3, 1 47.
184. Id. Cf Aldrich, supra note 24, at 149 (noting that almost all of
NATO's targets were "classic examples of legitimate military objectives").
185. It is discussed again in connection with the analysis of the RTS attack.
See Inquiry, supra note 3,
71-79.
186. Cf Joy Gordon, Cool War, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Oct. 2002, at 44 (noting a Washington Post article dated June 23, 1991, in which Pentagon officials acknowledged that the targeting of Iraq's electrical grid during the Gulf
War was intended to undermine the civilian economy and that they were
aware of, and intended, the likely effects of the bombing on water and sewage systems).
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been foregone; the Inquiry's determination is not based on a
fuller discussion, but on the observation that NATO's own
description1 8 7 of its targets falls into two categories:

clearly

military and unclear.
When its discussion briefly resumes, the Inquiry initially
appears to adopt a more searching analysis: Targets must be
considered individually, not in blanket categories; 188 attacks
on military-industrial infrastructure and ministries "must make
an effective contribution to military action and their .. .destruction must offer a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the time";' 8 9 attacks on refineries must
be considered in light of potential environmental damage; 9 0
and media may only be targeted "to the extent particular media components are part of the C3 (command, control and
communications) network."' 19 1 Then, as we have seen, having
raised these issues, the Inquiry says that "[a]s a general statement ... it is the view of the committee that NATO was attempting to attack objects it perceived to be legitimate military
objectives."' 192 This regurgitation of NATO's perceptions actually closes the general discussion, so recently opened, of these
unsettled issues.
The Inquiry employs a similar closing device when it refutes allegations that NATO's high-flight bombing strategy was
criminal as such 9 3 by noting that although " [t] he 15,000 minimum altitude adopted for part of the campaign may have
meant the target could not be verified with the naked eye[,]
with the use of modern technology, the obligation to distinguish was effectively carried out in the vast majority of cases
.... -194
While the Inquiry's assertion that NATO distinguished targets "in the vast majority of cases" is almost certainly true, it inevitably prejudices and preempts the targeting
debate even for the minority of cases in which NATO admit187. The Inquiry's analysis immediately follows and is explicitly based on
quotations from two NATO sources-the Cohen/Shelton Joint Statement
and NATO's report, Kosovo One Year On. Inquiry, supra note 3,

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

47.

55.

56.
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tedly did not meet the obligation. As with proportionality, so
with target distinction: The Inquiry advances a pre-emptive
campaign-level analysis, subsuming all individual incidents,
however disproportionate in their particulars, to a global assessment.
3.

Difficulty in Specific Cases

When it turns to specific cases, the Inquiry makes no
more headway past the difficulties it has adumbrated; its argument leads inexorably to the conclusion that proportionality is
very hard-too hard-to define and apply in most real-life
cases. Indeed, as we have seen with Kupreskic, even though the
Inquiry accepts that it may be necessary to assess proportionality "on a case by case basis,"195 the Prosecution's argument is

even more discouraging about finding liability for a single collateral killing than for a sustained bombing campaign. Here is
an example.
The RTS bombing This is how the Inquiry frames its analy96
sis of the attack on the RTS studios:'
The committee finds that if the attack on the RTS
was justified by reference to its propaganda purpose
alone, its legality might well be questioned by some
experts in the field of international humanitarian
law. It appears, however, that NATO's targeting of
the RTS building for propaganda purposes was an incidental (albeit complementary) aim of its primary
goal of disabling the Serbian military command and
control system and to destroy the nerve system and
197
apparatus that keeps Milosevic in power.
Based on its own assertion about the general state of the
law, the Inquiry could have declared forthrightly that bombing
a media outlet solely engaged in propaganda efforts is ille195. Id. 50 (which in context could refer either to individual incidents or
individual campaigns).
196. Cf Aldrich, supra note 24, at 150 (discussing legal issues arising from
the RTS attack).
197. Inquiiy, supra note 3,
76. The paragraph continues, substantiating
the statement about NATO's targeting purposes by citing to a NATO press
conference of April 9, 1999, and a letter from NATO spokesman Jamie Shea
to the International Federation of Journalists, dated April 12, 1999. Id.
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gal. 198 But in addressing the particular facts-and NATO's
public admission that it very much had propaganda in
mind 1 9 9-it supposes the legality of the attack "might well be
questioned by some experts[," implying there is not consensus on the issue. 20 0 In the general discussion, as an abstract
rule, it asserted liability; applying the rule to the facts (or
rather, a version of the facts that should be most favorable to
the Prosecution), liability is only an opinion. Even accepting
the Inquiry's formulation that only "some experts" might question the legality of attacking a media outlet, why not consider
that hypothetical scenario? 20 ' That would have afforded an
opportunity to develop standards on military objectiveswhich it asserts are in need of clarification-without coming to
a conclusion in this case. Yet in the next sentence, as we have
seen, the Inquiry declares that in fact NATO targeted RTS with
the "primary goal" of attacking the command and control sysif media
198. "The media as such is not a traditional target category.
components are not part of the C3 network then they may become military
objectives depending upon their use. As a bottom line, civilians, civilian objects and civilian morale as such are not legitimate military objectives. The
media does have an effect on civilian morale. If that effect is merely to foster
support for the war effort, the media is not a legitimate military objective."
Id. 55. Earlier, the Inquiry notes interpretations that include broadcast
38-40 (discussing Major
facilities as legitimate military objectives. See id.
General A.P.V. Rogers, LAW ON THE BAYrLEFIELD 37 (1996); Commentary on
the Additional Protocols of 8June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August

1949 632-633 (Y.Sandoz et al. eds., 1987); W. Hays Parks, Air War and the
Law of War, 32 A.F.L. REv. 1, 135-45 (1990)).
199. See Inquiry, supra note 3, 1 74 (referring to a NATO statement of April
8, 1999, that warned the F.R.Y. that its media would be targeted unless it
broadcast six hours of Western media reports each day, and quoting NATO
as saying: "If President Milosevic would provide equal time for Western news
broadcasts in its programmes without censorship 3 hours a day between
noon and 1800 and 3 hours a day between 1800 and midnight, then his TV
could be an acceptable instrument of public information."); see also Laursen,
supra note 14, at 789 (noting Amnesty International's assertion that NATO
emphasized to it that RTS was targeted solely because of its propaganda activities).
200. Earlier in the same paragraph, the Inquiry characterizes the legal basis for attacks aimed at disrupting propaganda efforts as "more debatable."
Inquiry, supra note 3, 76.
201. Even if incapacitating a propaganda machine was only a secondary
purpose, it still would have been possible to explore the legitimacy of that
secondary purpose. Cf Benvenuti, supra note 8, at 523 (discussing NATO's
admissions).
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tem and only an "incidental aim" of disabling a propaganda
machine, closing the opportunity for a hypothetical exploration.
So the Inquiry proceeds to discuss proportionality on the
unexamined assumption that the station was a legitimate target. 20 2 It does not suggest that the number of civilian deaths

was acceptable as such, focusing instead on the question of
damage and the likely military advantage gained. 20 3 It initially
presents the problem in a manner that seems to highlight the
potential for clarifying liability:
[I]t appeared that NATO realised that attacking the
RTS building would only interrupt broadcasting for a
brief period. Indeed, broadcasting allegedly recommenced within hours of the strike, thus raising the
issue of the importance of the military advantage
gained by the attack vis-d-vis the civilian casualties in204
curred. 1
The military advantages of a specific incident thus appear
to be under consideration, but here is how the Inquiry continues:

The FRY command and control network was alleged
by NATO to comprise a complex web and that could
thus not be disabled in one strike ....

The propor-

tionality or otherwise of an attack should not necessarily focus exclusively on a specific incident ....

[T] he

strategic target of these attacks was the Yugoslav command and control network. The attack on the RTS
building must therefore be seen as forming part of
an integrated attack against numerous objects, including transmission towers and control buildings of
the Yugoslav radio relay network which were "essential to Milosevic's ability to direct and control the repressive activities of his army and special police forces
in Kosovo" (NATO press release, 1 May 1999) and
which comprised "a key element in the Yugoslav airdefence network" (ibid, 1 May 1999).205
202. Inquiry, supra note 3,
77-78.
203. Id. (discussing also the need for effective warning). See discussion of
warning as an instance of tu quoque argument infra Part V.A.
204. Inquiy, supra note 3, 78.
205. Id.
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This passage advances a core factual assertion and a core
argument: RTS was part of a larger command and control
structure; and if an incident is part of a larger campaign or
integrated attack, it must be considered in that context.
Whatever the facts, 2 0 6 the argument is problematic as a matter
of rule formation: The Inquiry is asserting a novel standard,
taking the bare, acknowledged fact that NATO knew it would
gain little from the attack-which one would think likely to
increase NATO's liability-and deriving a proof of its own
prior assertion that only the larger context matters in proportionality analysis. It does not ground this analysis in proofs of
consensus, but instead, as we have seen, on an extraordinary
reading of the very test in Kupreskic that the Inquiry has already
rejected.

20 7

And the effect? The Inquiry's insistence that individual
incidents cannot be the focus of proportionality analysis raises
the threshold for liability until it can capture only massive, repeated, and systematic uses of disproportionate force at the
theater or campaign level. 20 8 That is a possible standard, but

not one that consensus or even the Prosecution's own previous
206. Another instance of source bias: After citing a litany of NATO assertions about the goals of its campaign, the Inquiry confirms, in its own voice,
that these were the goals, although that view's correctness is the legal issue.
Id.
207. Id.; see discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
208. The Inquiry develops the preference for theater-level analysis elsewhere as well. For a discussion of the principle of distinction see, e.g., Inquily, supra note 3,
29:
[A] determination that inadequate efforts have been made to distinguish between military objectives and civilians or civilian objects
should not necessarily focus exclusively on a specific incident. If
precautionary measures have worked adequately in a very high percentage of cases then the fact they have not worked well in a small
number of cases does not necessarily mean they are generally inadequate.
Cf Benvenuti, supra note 8, at 514-15 ("[T]he Committee forgets to stress
that the corollary is also true: if the precautionary measures have worked
adequately in a very high percentage of cases, this does not mean that they
are generally adequate, so as to excuse violations occurring in a small number of cases ... the concern deriving from the Committee's comment ... is
that.., one could be induced to think that war crimes occur and should be
prosecuted only if committed in the context of a plan or of a large-scale
commission, when the inadequacy of precautionary measures is deliberate
on the part of the warring party. This approach is inconsistent with the case
law of the ICTY itself.") (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-A, App. J.
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charging pattern would require, 209 and it unquestionably
makes proportionality analysis more difficult. 2 10 Yet it also

makes analysis easier: Among the arabesques and assertions
about the proper measure of military advantage, the other half
of the equation at the heart of proportionality-that civilian
deaths are in the balance-is never actually discussed.
4.

Making a Difficult Distinction: Proportionalityand Wanton
Destruction

In emphasizing the doctrine's difficulty, the Inquiry is
staking out a conservative consensual position; yet on analogous facts, the Prosecution evidently finds the law easier to apply, given its frequent and assertive use of closely related
charges of "wanton destruction not justified by military necessity" in other cases. 2 11 If its sole objection was to "proportion285-86 (July 15, 1999); Prosecutor v. Blaskic, IT-95-14-T, Trial Chamber J.

(Mar. 3, 2000)).
209. Cf Laursen, supra note 14, at 791-93 (discussing the choice of an individual or campaign-level focus); id. at 806-08 (critiquing the Inquiry's statistical approach to precautionary measures in light of Additional Protocol I,
Article 57(a)(i)); Schwabach, supra note 14, at 184 ("[T]he OTP seems to be
disregarding a fundamental principle of international human rights law:
that human lives have value not only in the aggregate but also in the individual."). But see United Kingdom Reservations to Protocol I, Additional Protocol, supra note 82, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 432-33 (asserting that military advantage
anticipated from an attack refers to the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of
the attack). Even if the U.K. reservations defeat claims of consensus, however, they could hardly be relied upon to assert a countervailing non-consensual (and restrictive) consensus, yet that is what the Inquiry does.
210. Cf Laursen, supra note 14, at 792 ("If consistently applied, the logic
presented by the OTP Report will end by weighing the total number of casualties, around five hundred, against the entire Operation Allied Force. Even
if the total number of civilian casualties was limited in light of the extent and
intensity of the bombing campaign, it is questionable whether such a comparison is useful for anything."); Schwabach, supra note 14, at 182 ("Casualty
averaging seems to indicate that almost no single incident involving civilian
deaths can ever be disproportionate unless it is part of a larger pattern of
incidents involving excessive civilian deaths.").
211. "Wanton destruction not justified by military necessity, a violation of
the laws or customs of war as recognized by Article 3(b), 7(1) and 7(3) of
the Statute of the Tribunal," has been charged, inter alia, in: Prosecutor v.
Radovan Karadiic and Ratko Mladic, IT-95-5-I, Initial Indictment,
22, 26,
27, 36, 40, 41, Counts 5, 7 (July 24, 1995), available at http://www.un.org/
icty/indictment/english/kar-ii950724e.htm; Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and
Mario Cerkez, IT-95-14/2, Am. Indictment, Counts 38, 41 (Sept. 30, 1998),
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ality" as a discrete category, why not explore the implications
of this variant form? I do not suggest that the Prosecution
ought to be indiscriminate, zealous, or bloody-minded in the
face of clear limits on the facts or the law's development; 212 if
proportionality were really so weak a reed, the Prosecution
ought to say so-though perhaps with some hint of regret, or
some effort to see if there is not some way to apply it. Yet here
there is no discussion of alternative grounds; here there is no
regret, only a hard-edged certitude that the matter is too difficult to take up.
No matter how difficult the application of the law to the
facts may be, the Inquiry's arguments inevitably define liability
and necessarily affect the law's locus and shape. The Inquiry's
emphasis on difficulty is little more than a manifestation of the
Prosecution's selective approach to consensus and progressiveness: When the Prosecution states that, on these facts, it is too
difficult to apply proportionality or decide if a target is legitimate, it implicitly locates liability beyond the threshold of the
instant case; when it falls back on formulae about the difficulty
of deciding, it abdicates prosecutorial responsibility in the
name of caution, yet makes law in the process.2 1 3 By not unavailable at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/kor-lai980930e.
htm; Prosecutor v. Milan Kovacevic, IT-97-24-I, Am. Indictment, Counts 14,
15 (June 23, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/kov-lai980623e.htm; Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilic also known as (a/
k/a) "Tuta" and Vinko Martinovic also known as (a/k/a) "Stela", IT-98-34-1,
Initial Indictment, Count 20 (Dec. 21, 1998), available at http://www.un.
org/icty/ind-e.htm. I in no way suggest equating the actions underlying
these indictments and those alleged against NATO, whether in terms of effect, intentionality, or seriousness, save the apparent relevance of doctrines
derived from proportionality in analyzing them.
212. See Recommendation Rec (2000)19 of the Committee of Ministers to Member
States on the Role of Public Prosecution in the CriminalJustice System, Eur. Comm.

of Ministers, 724th Meeting, Art. 27 (Oct. 6, 2000); cf United Nations, Secretariat Centre for Human Rights, Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, Art.
14 (Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 1990) ("Prosecutors shall not initiate or continue prosecution, or shall make every effort to stay proceedings,
when an impartial investigation shows the charges to be unfounded.").
213. Cf Ronzitti, supra note 14, at 1020-21, arguing that the Committee's
recommendation not to investigate
is equivalent to a non liquet. Difficulties in interpretation are not a
good excuse for not starting an investigation. There are fields of
humanitarian law, as with any body of law, which are not sufficiently
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dertaking a serious analysis despite the difficulty, the Inquiry
foregoes an opportunity to develop the law on proportionality
and the rules of air war, regardless of the outcome in this instance. We may think this reasonable, but we must recognize
it as a choice: By denying, almost as a matter of law, that proportionality analysis is even feasible, the Inquiry chooses to set
the limit of liability somewhere safely far above the bombers,
flying three miles high.
5.

Easierfor Some: The Careful Prosecutorand the Reasonable
Commander

The Inquiry does not suppose proportionality analysis is
equally difficult for everyone. Suggesting that combatants' actions cannot be understood from a purely civilian perspective,
2 14
it argues for a "reasonable military commander standard[,]"
saying that "[a]lthough there will be room for argument in
close cases, there will be many cases where reasonable military
commanders will agree that the injury to non-combatants or
the damage to civilian objects was clearly disproportionate to
the military advantage gained."2 15 This proposed standard of
deference to military commanders' subjective assessments is
very broad; the Inquiry notes it is "unlikely that a human rights
lawyer and an experienced combat commander would assign
the same relative values to military advantage and to injury to
non-combatants. '2 16 This standard-whatever its merits in letting military expertise trump civilian determinations 2 17 -is not
clear. However, the task of law interpretation and 'clarification' is
entrusted to the Tribunal, which thus cannot conclude by saying
that it cannot adjudicate the case, since the law 'isnot clear.' The
non liquet is not part of the jurisprudence of the Hague Tribunal
nor of any other tribunal.
214. Inquiry, supra note 3,
50 (placing the phrase in quotations, but not
citing to a specific source).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Criticism of the Inquiry's standard arises from the consensus view
that civilians, not military experts, ultimately decide such matters. Cf Bothe,
supra note 14, at 535 ("[The Inquiry's proposal] is not really a satisfactory
solution, at least not unless the reasonable military commander is defined in
more civilian terms. In democratic systems, the values pursued by the military and those by society at large cannot be far apart. The value system on
the basis of which the military is operating has to conform to that of the civil
society, not vice versa.").
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clearly fixed in international law; 21 8 rather, the Prosecution it-

self proposes a novel standard biased toward lower liability for
commanders. This seems to contradict its stated position that
it will avoid progressive interpretations not clearly in the legal
2 19
mainstream.
Even more problematic is the Prosecution's inconsistency
220
in advancing its standard: A similar subjective deference
has never been proposed for the perspective of military commanders from the former Yugoslavia in any of the Prosecution's indictments. Why, then, does the Prosecution deviate
from its established position and practice here? One explanation might be ethical: Absent clear standards, prosecutors bias
toward less liability to protect defendants. Yet such protection
can be achieved simply by noting a lack of consensus; one
lower standard,
need not propose-and help create-a
22 1
though that is what the Inquiry does.
Whatever the reasons for its proposal, the Inquiry's "reasonable military commander standard" would restrict liability
for disproportionate use of force to instances in which most or
almost all commanders would agree-and thus not reach cases
in which there was disagreement. 222 This might constitute a
218. Cf Rome Statute, supra note 120, arts. 28, 30 at 1017-18.
219. But see, e.g., Benvenuti, supra note 8, at 517 ("An objective approach
[to evaluating proportionality] must be used: the reference by the Committee . . . to the concept of the 'reasonable military commander' can be ac-

cepted."). The Inquiry's reasonableness prong relies on the Rendulic case;
General Rendulic was acquitted of wanton destruction because he believed-mistakenly but reasonably-that his scorched-earth policy was militarily necessary. United States v. List (Case 7), XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS

757, 1297 (1948).

220. The reasonable commander standard is formally an objective test,
but given the Inquiry's reliance on NATO's sources and its sympathetic perspective, see discussion infra Part V.B, it functions as a subjective test, making
NATO, not some average "reasonable commander," the functional arbiter of
legality. Cf Benvenuti, supra note 8, at 518 (noting that the Committee bases its view of an attack's legitimacy on the perception of NATO commanders).
221. If the absence of a clear standard was the concern, it should have
obtained in other, earlier cases too.
222. The Inquiry is clearly not proposing just a fictive "reasonable commander," but rather some standard based, at least notionally, on the subjective experiences of real commanders, since it notes how real commanders
have different perspectives on combat than human rights lawyers. See Inquiry, supra note 3, 50.
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viable standard, though it clearly limits a civilian Tribunal's
ability to assess liability, especially if one credits commanders'
good intentions and reasonableness as the Inquiry does. It is a
cautious standard-but not a consensus one, nor one restrained, as it so recently was, by the difficulty of application.
That can be acceptable in theory, yet if a cautious approach, or
any other approach, is applied only selectively based on which
actor is being investigated-well, that is novel indeed.
D.

Selective Consistency II: The Progressive Prosecutor's
Other Voice

Of course, if consensual caution were the Prosecution's
norm, the novel "reasonable commander" standard might just
be an anomaly. Yet there is another, more progressive incarnation of the Prosecution's voice against which we may assess
the Inquiry: Evidence from indictments shows that in fact the
Prosecution is not conservative in approaching novel issues of
liability, and many observers see the Tribunal as not merely
reflecting settled law but rather progressively creating and ad3
vancing it.22

One of the most significant examples of the Tribunal's
progressiveness has been its approach to sexual crimes. The
Tribunal has created significant new law governing sexual
crimes where little existed before, 224 and in its rape trials the
Prosecution's approach to jurisdictional concerns that seem to
constrain it in the Inquiry is entirely more assertive. A "strong
trend"-and perhaps a sense of the rightness of the causeappears to have been more than sufficient grounds for advancing the law, rather than a reason not to proceed.
223. This is not only true of outsiders: "Another of our biggest cases, the
'media' case, started last month. That is the prosecution in which evidence
is being led about the alleged central role played by the media in the
Rwandan genocide. The case is recognised as breaking new legal ground,
and is attracting a great deal of interest." OTP Address, supra note 103.
224. The 1996 trial of Bosnian Serbs for mass rape committed at Foca was
the first international criminal proceeding solely for that crime. ARYEH
NEIER, WAR CRIMES, BRUTALITY, GENOCIDE, TERROR, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR

175 (1998). "International criminal law has made greater progress
on women's issues since 1993 than during any other time in recorded history." Askin, supra note 143, at 47. See generally Caroline Kennedy-Pipe &
Penny Stanley, Rape in War: Lessons of the Balkan Conflicts in the 1990s, in THE
Kosovo TRAGEDY: THE HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSIONS 67 (Ken Booth ed.,
2001).

JUSTICE
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Prior to the Tribunal, rape was considered a crime against
humanity but was not clearly understood as a war crime or a
grave breach of the Geneva Conventions. Consider what thenProfessor Meron had to say on liability for rape:
It is time for a change. Indeed under the weight of
the events in former Yugoslavia, the hesitation to recognize that rape can be a war crime or a grave breach
has already begun to dissipate. The International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and various
states aided this development by adopting a broad
2 25
construction of existing law.

By calling for "a change"-a prospective developmentand noting that opposition had "begun to dissipate"-rather
than already "dissipated"-Meron acknowledges that, while
matters were moving in a direction he favored, a new consensus had not yet formed. 226 (It is interesting to note that this
passage was published in 1993, the year the Tribunal was estab225. MERON, supra note 176, at 207.
226. Commentators analyzing the Tribunal's Statute could not readily or
consistently ignore the evident lack of consensus on rape as anything other
than a crime against humanity:
To make it absolutely clear that rape would be subject to prosecution before the international tribunal for ex-Yugoslavia, the Security Council of the United Nations said so explicitly in the tribunal's
charter. Paragraph 48 states: "Crimes against humanity refer to
inhumane acts of a very serious nature, such as wilful [sic] killing,
torture or rape, committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic,
racial, or religious grounds .... " Paragraph 49 provides that "the
International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed
conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population . .. rape ....

"

supra note 224, at 182 (first ellipsis in final sentence original to
Neier). With Paragraphs 48 and 49, the Security Council explicitly made
rape a crime against humanity. It may be argued, however, that the Security
Council had no such clear intent regarding rape as a war crime or grave
breach. Normal statutory interpretation raises the inference that, having explicitly referred to rape in one place, the Security Council's failure to include it elsewhere is intentional. The later Rwanda Statute, for example,
explicitly includes rape and enforced prostitution as violations of Common
Article 3 and Additional Protocol II. Askin, supra note 143, at 49;
NEIER,

Navanethem Pillay, Sexual Violence in Times of Conflict: The Jurisprudenceof the
International Criminal Tribunalfor Rwanda, in CIVILIANS IN WAR 165, 166-68

(Simon Chesterman ed., 2001).
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lished.2 2 7) In discussions of law, use of phrases such as "broad

construction" (or "emergence," "evolution," or "clarification"2 28 ) signals attempts to locate the progressive vanguard of
consensus-which is to say, to make a new consensus. They
are used by authors who know their position is progressive in
that it is not universally agreed upon (i.e., that it is not yet a
consensus).229 This seems obvious as a matter of language: A
Even when clearly looking to maximize the scope of liability, such analyses were largely compelled to adopt language that conceded the project's
prospective (i.e. progressive) element. Meron, for example, notes:
The approval by the Security Council (Res. 827) . . .of the tribu-

nal's charter recognizing rape as a punishable offense under international humanitarian law validates this important normative development and, it is hoped, may expedite the recognition of rape, in
some circumstances, as torture or inhuman treatment in the international law of human rights as well.
MERON, supra note 176, at 209. The normative development represented by
the Statute's mention of rape as a crime against humanity is not at issue:
The Prosecution need not hesitate on a matter plainly within the text of the
Statute. Meron calls rape a "punishable offense," however, which diverts attention from the fact that the Statute criminalizes rape under one head of
jurisdiction, but not others. Text cannot get him to such a conclusion, but
claims of consensus can.
227. Cf Minna Schrag, Observations on the Rome Statute, I INT'L. L. F. 34
(1999) (noting that "lack of concern [about sexual assault] ended in 1992,"
but also that "the substantive law set forth in the Statute [that the Security
Council] promulgated contained only one provision regarding sexual assault").
228. See, e.g., MERON, supra note 176, at 263 ("The clarificationof customary

law [about violations of international humanitarian law in internal conflicts]
is the most important normative contribution of the [Tadic] decision.") (emphasis added).
229. For additional examples, see Kelly D. Askin, Sexual Violence in Decisions
and Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: Current Status, 93 Am.

J. INT'L. L. 97, 123 (1999) ("creative and varied indictments"); id. at 122
(calling charges brought by the Prosecution "significant progress for the
heretofore inadequate international law on gender-based crimes"); MERON,
supra note 176, at 202, 204 ("rapid adjustment" of the law); id. at 296 ("The
Hague Tribunal has issued several important decisions that clarify and give a
judicial imprimatur to some rules of international humanitarian law");
Schrag, supra note 227, at 34-35 (the "Prosecutor at the Tribunal made creative use of the Statute"). Compare MERON, supra note 176, at 221 (asserting a
lack of consensus on the requirement of a nexus between crimes against
humanity and war), with Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to
Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a PriorRegime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2589-90

(1991) ("while post-Nuremberg developments have tended to free crimes
against humanity from a wartime context, the trend has been inconclusive").
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proponent of a view would not resort to such qualifying
phrases if he knew with confidence that his view already held
230
the full force of consensus.
Yet despite the evident absence of consensus on broader
liability for rape, the Prosecution pursued just such charges,
first in the Foca case. 2 3 1 Indeed, this first attempt at applying
the 'existing consensus' was quite consciously understood as
an effort to establish a consensus:
The first indictments solely for rape-in June 1996,
cover[ed] the rape camp at Foca .... According to
the indictments, the defendants ... had committed
war crimes. The defendants were not charged with
other offenses, which was important: Indictments
specifying rape and only rape seemed to resolve once
and for all the question of whether the crime is covered by the provisions of the Geneva Conventions
23 2
enumerating grave breaches.
The determination to charge rape alone as a demonstration case is both within a prosecutor's discretion and a hallmark of progressiveness. This was all the more so at a time
when it was still necessary to "resolve once and for all the question of whether the crime is covered." Rather than finding or
following an existing consensus, Foca created a new one.
Observers approved the Tribunal's (and Prosecution's)
actions 233 and in so doing confirmed the progressive, consensus-making nature of the decisions:
230. This is particularly relevant when the usage refers to the immediate
past. One might observe that a norm, now well-settled, evolved with great
rapidity at some point in the past. The case is different if that rapid development is presently underway or, in the phrasing of a progressive advocate, has
just been completed.

231. Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac and Radomir Kovac, IT-96-23-PT,
Third Am. Indictment (Dec. 1, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/icty/
ind-e.htm. More than half the Prosecution's indictments include sexual
crimes. Askin, supra note 143, at 49.
232. NEIER, supra note 224, at 182-83.
233. "Many delegations [to the ICC process] recalled the position taken
by the Prosecutor of the ICTY to overcome the fact that sexual crimes are
not self-standing crimes under the ICTY Statute by charging the crime of
rape as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions...." THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EviDENCE 185 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001) [hereinafter Lee] (citing Patricia Viseur
Sellers & Kaoru Okuizima, Intentional Prosecution of Sexual Assaults, 7 TRANS-
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It is significant that the Office of the Prosecutor
(OTP) has moved beyond the explicit language of
these provisions [234] to find other bases on which to

prosecute sex crimes. The OTP has charged and the
judges have accepted by confirming the indictments,
various forms of sexual violence as grave breaches, violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide,
crimes against humanity, and violations of Common
Article 3 and Additional Protocol

11.235

The record on rape shows the Prosecution proceeded in
the absence of a consensus, and in so doing made one236that
It
materially affects the work and prospects of future courts.
an
note,
as
to
project
of
that
is not an attack on the rightness
45 (1997)); see also Kennedy-Pipe & Stanley,
supra note 224, at 76.
234. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 5(g), adopted 6y S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); amended S.C. Res. 1166, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess.,
3878th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1166 (1998); amended S.C. Res. 1329, U.N.
SCOR, 55th Sess., 4240th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1329 (2000); amended S.C.
Res. 1411, U.N. SCOR 57th Sess., 4535th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1411
(2002); amended S.C. Res. 1481, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4759th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1481 (2003) [hereinafter ICTY Statute] (designating rape as a
crime against humanity); International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and
Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations
Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States, Between 1 January 1994
and 31 December 1994 Arts. 3(g), 4(e), adopted by S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR,
49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/INF/50 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute] (including rape as a crime against humanity and enunciating rape and enforced
prostitution as a violation of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II).
235. Askin, supra note 143, at 49.
236. Cf Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Remarks ofJudge Richard May,Judge of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, to the Fourth Session of the Preparatory
Commission for the International Criminal Court (Mar. 20, 2000), JL/
P.I.S./479-e, at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p479-e.htm, noting that
in creating the Tribunal's rules,
[T]he Judges intentionally rejected many of the evidentiary rules
[T]he [ICC]
applied to rape trials in national jurisdictions ....
certainly will face issues relating to sexual violence committed
within the context of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide. It will thus have to grapple with the same issues faced by the
Tribunal. The Judges believe that the approach taken in its Rules
and in its subsequent jurisprudence represent a progressive develNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
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historical matter, that no consensus existed until very recently-until after the Prosecution claimed one. That was progressive in a way the Inquiry is not, which is all this discussion
intends to show.
This merely historical observation matters because the
Tribunal publicly has undertaken to prosecute only matters on
which there is consensus-and determining consensus properly is supposed to be a neutral, technical, historical question.
In reality, of course, human beings have an interest in outcomes and are prepared, out of ideological or moral conviction, to apply looser or stricter standards to measuring consensus-that is to say, progressive or conservative standards. To
call this simply a matter of statutory construction somehow unrelated to consensus is to deny the considerable (indeed, consensus) weight of legal scholarship about the law-making nature of interpretation. The Prosecution's progressive interpretations in other cases were either right or wrong, but they were
progressive and therefore not in the mode the Prosecution
claims, nor the mode it mostly uses, in the Inquiry. This is a
problem of consistency: in process, in outcome, in attitude,
and, perhaps, in intention.
Realist voices will say doctrinaire reliance on consensus
creates a sophomorically rigid view of law that nafvely supposes
prosecutors adopt consistent approaches out of formal obligation and do not have their own agenda. Clearly, that is not the
way the world works; the question, though, is why the Inquiry
insists that it is. We are sophisticated enough to know that
prosecutors pursue progressive strategies, advancing the law in
ways they thinkjust when they can, refraining when they must.
Clearly the Prosecution is sophisticated enough to pursue such
strategies in other cases, yet a reader of the Inquiry could well
suppose that such things cannot happen. Perhaps this was
simply a case in which the Prosecution felt it could not act, or
in which it did not consider the attempt just or serious enough
to be worth the effort.
Voice-Information-Argument-Style--StructureConsequence-Silence
opment of the law which has been instrumental in protecting victims of sexual violence ....
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TRACES OF THE REDACTOR'S HAND:

THE EVIDENCE OF,

AND FROM, STYLE

As I returned to this fire-ravaged area night after
night to ascertain whether I'd left behind any traces
that might betray me, questions of style increasingly
arose in my head. What was venerated as style was
nothing more than an imperfection or flaw that revealed the guilty hand.
23 7
-Orhan Pamuk, My Name is Re
A discussion of style is perhaps the most problematic approach to employ in considering the qualities of the Inquiry.
While everyone appreciates the role of rhetoric and emotion
in law, 238 when called to account for law's effects, most observers understandably retreat to the more objectively assessable
areas of evidence, precedent, and logical argument.
Yet a persuasive if impressionistic case can be made that
the style and tone adopted in the Inquiry supplement its sense
that liability not only does not, but shall not lie. The Inquiry
employs a number of stylistic devices that materially advance
the message that none of NATO's actions verged upon the serious issues that are the Tribunal's proper business: The Inquiry sets NATO's actions in an ameliorative context though tu
quoque arguments, it focuses on NATO actors' subjective views
in a way that unnecessarily relativizes its legal arguments and
factual descriptions, and it exhibits a strikingly different level
of emotional distance-seen in expressions of regret and frustration-than in other Prosecutorial pronouncements.
It is perhaps unsurprising that style comports with out2 39
come, yet the Inquiry's stylistic choices affect its evaluations.
As noted earlier, for example, extensive quotation of NATO
sources distorts not only information but also viewpoint. Quotation quotes a style too, and indeed we are concerned with
something deeper than the borrowing of words: the absorption of a voice.
237. ORAN PAMUK, My NAME IS RED 18 (Erdag M. G6knar trans., Alfred
A. Knopf 2001) (1998).
238. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, LAw AND LITERATURE 255-58 (1998).
239. Cf Koskenniemi, supra note 142, at 358 ("any style of legal argument
may work as a mechanism of blindness").
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Misdirection: ProsecutorialTu Quoque Arguments

Context can illuminate how a seemingly innocuous act is
in fact culpable, or how a seemingly culpable act is not. In the
Inquiry, context chiefly serves to limit the scope of liability.
Classically, tu quoque arguments, which claim mitigation because others have engaged in analogous behavior, have been
240
rejected by courts, though defendants still resort to them.
So it is curious to hear the Prosecution, which has argued
against such mitigation in other cases, adopting the tactic:
The Inquiry explicitly raises the issue of Serb forces' or their
leadership's contributory involvement in the deaths of civilians
in two attacks-mention that, in both cases, deflects attention
from the question of NATO's contribution to those deaths.
RTS: In discussing whether or not NATO gave sufficient
warning prior to its attack on RTS, the Inquiry first notes that
NATO acknowledged not giving warning, 24 1 which, the Inquiry notes, might have increased civilian casualties. 24 2 It then
determines that there was effective notice because Western
journalists were forewarned 24 3 and draws the conclusion that
"some Yugoslav officials may have expected that the building
was about to be struck" and therefore may have been partially
responsible for the deaths.

244

The Inquiry thus not only sug-

240. Milogevic frequently employs such tactics, for example. See Mirko
Klarin, Milosevic Wants It Both Ways, IWPR TRIBUNAL UPDATE, No. 253 (Feb.
12, 2002), at http://wv.iwpr.net/index.piarchive/tri/tri 253-_1eng.txt.
241. Inqui7y, supra note 3,
77 (noting that NATO officials in Brussels
allegedly told Amnesty International that they did not give a specific warning, as it would have endangered the pilots).
242. Id.
243. Id. Although it acknowledges that this would not necessarily absolve
NATO of its duty to warn, in another example of discursive closure, the Inquiry does not pursue the logical thrust of this, or the opportunity to elaborate on the obligations warring parties have to warn civilians; instead it simply considers that "[e]vidence on this point is somewhat contradictory." Id.
244. Id.:

[I]t would also appear that some Yugoslav officials may have expected that the building was about to be struck. Consequently, UK
Prime Minister Tony Blair blamed Yugoslav officials for not evacuating the building, claiming that "[t]hey could have moved those
people out of the building. They knew it was a target and they
didn't .... [I]t was probably for... very clear propaganda reasons
....
Although knowledge on the part of Yugoslav officials of the
impending attack would not divest NATO of its obligation to forewarn civilians .

.

. it may nevertheless imply that the Yugoslav au-
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gests that NATO's notification of Western journalists sufficed,
but also interprets this as suggesting that Yugoslav officials
might be contributorily liable. That the source for this accusation is the British Prime Minister, who himself authorized the
attack, is at least as infelicitous as the argument is agile in developing NATO's own best defense for bombing a civilian television station: Though the missiles were NATO's, the fault was
someone else's.
The Inquiry's mention of Yugoslav complicity in the
deaths at RTS is not, properly speaking, tu quoque, since it is
presented passim as evidence that Yugoslav officials had notice
of the attack; still, it inevitably suggests that real fault lies with
the victim. That prejudicial taint could easily have been
avoided. It would have been possible to write the sentence
pointing out the factual link to Yugoslav officials' knowledge
without saying, as the Inquiry does, that those officials "may be
partially responsible for the civilian casualties." 245 A neutral
formulation is clearly possible, because the issue is Yugoslav
officials' knowledge, not their complicity. Blair's accusation,
bolstered by the Inquiry's own text, hardly serves to support a
claim of effective notification 246 and introduces prejudicial issues by raising the question of why it is included and why a
Committee committed to truth, to fairness, and to the appearance of fairness would not see it as a problem, instead of its
24 7
best evidence.

thorities may be partially responsible for the civilian casualties
and may suggest that the advance notice given by NATO may in fact
have been sufficient under the circumstances.
245. For example, one could write: "Various observers have suggested
that Yugoslav officials nonetheless knew of the attack, through the agency of
the foreign reporters, and this may suggest that the advance notice given by
NATO may have in fact been sufficient under the circumstances."
246. In fact, the "evidence" of Yugoslav officials' knowledge upon which
the Inquiry relies is a bare assertion by Blair that they knew, and the fact that
they did not remove the personnel-non-action that would also be perfectly
consistent with not knowing, a conclusion that would weaken somewhat the
Inquiry's reasoning about the sufficiency of NATO's chosen medium for giving notice.
247. See Benvenuti, supra note 8, at 523 ("The responsibility of Yugoslav
officials for not following the extremely surreptitious NATO warning is consistent only with the upturned realities of Alice in Wonderland."). Cf RFE/RL
Newsline, Del Ponte: Milosevic Knew of Attack on Serbian Television, (Jan. 24,
2001), available at http://www.rfer.org/newline/2001/O1/240101/asp:
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Koryia: Discussing NATO's attack on the village of Koriga,
the Inquiry again raises the possibility that Serb forces were
contributorily liable for civilian deaths. After discussing the
known facts and NATO's position, the Inquiry notes, "There is
some information indicating that displaced Kosovar civilians
were forcibly concentrated within a military camp in the village of Koriga as human shields, and that Yugoslav military
forces may thus be at least partially responsible for the deaths
there." 248 The argument is not merely noted in passing: In

the following paragraph, it is reprised as quite literally the last
statement before the Committee concludes that no crime has
been committed. 249 Combatants' obligations are not necessa-

rily reduced by an enemy's willful attempt to place civilians in
harm's way, as the Committee evidently knew, 250 yet the Inquiry freely departs from this consensus view to place the focus
Del Ponte's spokeswoman ... said in Belgrade ... that Milosevic

knew that NATO had targeted the building of Radio Television Serbia for bombing on 23 April 1999 ....Del Ponte provided information to that effect from NATO to [a lawyer] who represents the
families of 13 of the 16 people killed in the bombing ....

The

families maintain that Milosevic knew that the building was slated
for attack but kept it open and did not warn the staff of the danger.
The families also want to charge NATO for the deaths, but Del
Ponte told [their lawyer] that she does not have sufficient information to link the bombing to any one individual.
248. Inquiy, supra note 3, 88.
249. Id. 89:
The available information concerning this incident is in conflict
....

It appears that a relatively large number of civilians were

killed. It also appears these civilians were either returning refugees
or persons gathered as human shields by FRY authorities or both.
The committee is of the view that the credible information available is not sufficient to tend to show that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal has been committed by the aircrew or by
superiors in the NATO chain of command. Based on the information available to it, the committee is of the opinion that OTP
should not undertake an investigation concerning the bombing at
Koriga.
250. Id. 51 (noting that although it is often difficult to avoid civilian
casualties because of mixed-use settlement patterns, "[c]ivilians present
within or near military objectives must, however, be taken into account in
the proportionality equation even if a party to the conflict has failed to exercise its obligation to remove them"). The Inquiry analyzes Koriga in terms of
mistake, not proportionality, but the general point is the same: Liability for
civilian deaths is measured by the existing circumstances and is not necessarily lessened by the other side's failure to remove civilians from legitimate
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of censure on Yugoslav forces, thereby reducing the liability
confronting NATO.
Implicit instances: There are other instances that, while not
using the overt language of tu quoque, act to transfer responsibility to the victims of NATO attacks. For example, the Inquiry
describes the attack at Grdelica by quoting U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre: "[O]ne of our electro-optically
guided bombs homed in on a railroad bridge just when a passenger train raced to the aim point. We never wanted to destroy that train or kill its occupants. We did want to destroy
the bridge and we regret this incident." 25 1 Hamre's phrasing
is hardly neutral: He says that the bomb was aimed at the
bridge 'just when a passenger train raced to the aim point." The
causal relationship between bomb, train, and explosion that
Hamre develops is consistent with his version of liability: It
suggests the train as the active element, racing to a given point
where explosion inevitably awaits, rather than two elements
being in motion-and one rather faster than the other, as anyone who has seen a missile fired or ridden a train in Yugoslavia
will know. While it is understandable that Hamre colors his
description in a way that shifts responsibility to others, it is
harder to understand why the Committee accepts such a shading and thinks him an appropriate source for its truth.
A further example is the Inquiry's use of "war-monger" to
describe the Serb leadership: "If the media is the nerve system
that keeps a war-monger in power and thus perpetuates the
war effort, it may fall within the definition of a legitimate military objective." 25 2 War-mongering-a crime against the jus ad
bellum, if anything-is presumably a bad thing, and for that
very reason it is curious to see it invoked. It sounds like taking
sides to suggest that one of two military opponents is a warmonger, implying that the other may be justified in taking up
arms-not normally relevant in a conventional jus in bello analysis-and even that the object of attacks may be contributorily
targets. See Additional Protocol, supra note 82, arts. 51(7)-(8), 58(a), 1125
U.N.T.S. at 26-27.
251. Inquiry, supra note 3, 59.
252. Id. 55. The usage here is general, but elsewhere the Inquiry uses
similar wording to describe the Serb leadership: "[NATO's] primary goal
[was] disabling the Serbian military command and control system and to
destroy the nerve system and apparatus that keeps Milosevic in power." Id. 1 76

(emphasis added).
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liable for all harm that ensues. It is all the more curious when
the Inquiry has explicitly disavowed jurisdiction over the jus ad
25 3
bellum.
The formal argument the Inquiry advances could be
made just as cogently without loading on contributory liability,
crimes against peace, or justifications for intervention: One
could assert that "if the media is linked integrally to the survival in power of parties committed to continuing military efforts, and thus perpetuates armed resistance, it may fall within
the definition of a legitimate military objective," or any number of alternative formulations. But the Inquiry said what it
said-that has come down to us, in words like law. More than
the implications for legal argument, however, it is the tone created by such words that defines, or reveals, the voice of the
Inquiry. A prosecutor seriously considering investigation
would not employ a phrase dismissing the victims of a potential accused, or allow it to escape his editorial review. Only a
prosecutor fundamentally unprepared to consider seriously
that a "war-monger" might also be a "victim," which would be
the logical conclusion of investigating NATO, would lack incentive to guard against such words.
Tu quoque and contributory liability (though formally illegitimate) frequently appear in legal discourse because they
speak to the moral values underpinning resort to law's justice.
They make claims about who is the good side, or about there
not being one good side, with the inevitable suggestion either
that those who are morally right should be judged by different
standards25 4 or that no one party is guilty, as all are equally
good or bad. They therefore constitute either a deeply moral
argument or an amoral, relativizing one. Either case is prob253. Id. 4 (noting the International Court of Justice's jurisdiction over
crimes against peace). See also id. 1 30-34.
254. See id.
32 (discussing arguments before the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg and in the 1950s linking jus in bello analysis to the
right to resort to force, though noting further that "The [Nuremberg]
courts were unreceptive to these arguments . . . [and the debate in the
1950s] died out as the participants realized that a crude reciprocity was essential if the law was to have any positive impact. An argument that the 'bad'
side had to comply with the law while the 'good' side could violate it at will
would be most unlikely to reduce human suffering in conflict."). The Inquiry thus formally rejects a differential approach but is evidently conversant
with its arguments.
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lematic for those who value process and consistency, and as a
practical matter tu quoque and contributory liability always argue to limit the liability of the main actor. It is therefore particularly troubling when, as in the Inquiry, they are pursued by
the Prosecution.
B.

Sympathy: Who is in View, Whose Voice is Heard

The Inquiry considers the mens rea, or mental state, of
NATO actors, and necessarily so: In the Djakovica case, for
example, where pilots' impressions of the battlefield below
were of the essence, an assay of their views in context would be
essential to any finding of recklessness or intent. Normally, in
prosecutorial practice, such an exercise is tempered by objective (or at least conventional) estimates of what defendants
should have known. However, the Inquiry goes well beyond
this normal exercise in perspective, relativizing its discussion
of law and fact in a way that dramatically alters the Prosecution's ability even to contemplate liability. Adoption of
NATO's subjective view not only concedes ground on issues of
liability; by converting a potential suspect into the subject, it
creates an atmosphere of sympathy.
We have seen how the Inquiry relies on NATO's own descriptions, with a concomitant bias in its conclusions; how the
Inquiry considers NATO statements "generally reliable;" and
how its "reasonable commander" standard makes liability a
function of NATO's view. Building on this, the Inquiry asserts
the good intentions of NATO and approves NATO's belief that
it targeted only legitimate objectives, declaring that "[a]s a
general statement, in the particular incidents reviewed by the
committee ... NATO was attempting to attack objects it per-

ceived to be legitimate military objectives." 255 A suspect's selfevaluation is relevant, but he cannot simply demonstrate belief
in his own propriety to claim excuse. Presumably, most war
criminals think their actions legitimate, and the challenge for
prosecutors is to show that they should have known better. A
prosecutor certainly has no strategic interest in emphasizing a
suspect's subjective view. What, then, is the purpose of this
"general statement"?
255. Id.

55.
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There are two parts to the Inquiry's concession: NATO's
belief in the legitimacy of its targets and the Prosecution's focus on targets intended rather than objects struck. If accepted
at face value, their joint effect is to presuppose that civilian
deaths are collateral: Whenever NATO hits what it was aiming
at, that object is deemed a legitimate target (relying on
NATO's own belief in its legitimacy), and inquiry is at an end.
When NATO hits an illegitimate target, because NATO's good
intent is conceded, the assumption is that a mistake was made.
This prejudicial framing device is also employed for the specific incidents, relying for its power on the consistent location
of NATO actors in the subjective lens of the Inquiry. In the
Djakovica convoy incident, for example, considerable attention is paid to NATO pilots' perceptions of Serb forces' actions
in the period leading up to the destruction of the convoy:
A reconstruction of what is known about the attack
reveals that in the hours immediately prior to the attack, at around 1030, NATO forces claimed to have
seen a progression of burning villages . ...

They

formed the view that MUP and VJ forces were thus
methodically working from the north to the south
through villages, setting them ablaze and forcing all
the Kosovar Albanians out .... 256
The pilots' subjective belief about what had been happening in the valley was critical to the Inquiry's view that no liability lay for destroying the convoy, because it is acknowledged
that the pilots could not actually identify the targets when they
launched the strike; 25 7 they were relying on what they assumed
to be happening-as reported, apparently, by NATO. As an
act in war, that reliance may be reasonable, but in judging that
act, the Inquiry's reliance on a relativized combatant's-eye-view
makes a "should have known better" standard almost beside
the point because, in effect, the "reasonable combatant" is the
pilot himself. However reasonable this may make the limit on
256. Id. 65. Here is an example of a text that bears on the facts, and is
probative of legal conclusions, that is not attributed to NATO yet is almost
certainly derived from its sources without corroboration or critical review.
257. It is ironic to consider the precision of the impressions that the Inquiry reports the pilots formed, considering how imprecise their view of the
actual battlefield was, again according to the Inquiry, when the time came.
See id.
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liability appear, it is a function of extremely defensive, discretionary postures about what the marginal legal interpretation
should be. One may question, then, the prominence the Inquiry affords to NATO's subjective views (especially since no
indictment gives similar weight to an accused's subjective evaluations) and the decision to make such a generalization. Why
is the Prosecution assuming anything about NATO's intentions? What is gained, and more importantly, what is lost?
A focus on the suspect's view makes him the subject of
sympathy, an effect a prosecutor normally wishes to avoid.
One cannot resist noting the irony in the Inquiry's declaration
that "the aircrews [who attacked the Djakovica convoy] could
have benefited from lower altitude scrutiny of the target at any
early stage[;] '' 258 surely it was the 75 civilians on the ground

who could have benefited. 259 Of course, this is more than
irony: Focusing on the "benefit" to the crews confirms the
sense of unfortunate error, directing our attention and our
sympathy to their difficult task, not to the plight of those unable to dodge missiles that, whether launched reasonably, recklessly, or with cool deliberation, hit the ground just as hard
and killed just the same. At one level, this focus on the pilots'
perspective is wholly proper: It is necessary to consider the
potential suspects' view (and not only the victims'), since it is
against them that liability would lie. Yet we know that prosecutors do not normally make a special point of this, but rather
focus insistently on victims' suffering; it may not be the best
law, but it is the most common practice. Here, inquiry has
taken place off-stage, and the conclusion about these deaths,
as in Greek tragedy, is simply reported, while our eyes stay with
the actors.
How else might one phrase this, if one were writing as a
prosecutor? "Lower altitude scrutiny of the target at an early
stage might have prevented the loss of civilian life"; "The aircrews might have been able properly to identify the targets
had they flown at a lower altitude"; "The deaths of 75 civilians
258. Id. 70.
259. Cf Tania Voon, Pointingthe Finger: Civilian Casualties of NATO Bombing in the Kosovo Conflict, 16 AM. U. INT'L. L.R. 1083, 1112 (2001) ("[Tlhe
primary beneficiaries of NATO's precision weapons technology were the aircrews, who were able to direct attacks from higher altitudes at lower risk to
themselves, rather than the civilians.").
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were caused by the NATO pilots' bombing from an altitude
too high to allow proper identification"; or even "Senior
NATO commanders' instructions to pilots to bomb from high
altitude were a direct cause of these 75 innocent civilians'
deaths." Surely these formulations are at least as accurate as
the Inquiry's. They also imply a greater responsibility, in part
because they do not place the suspects' subjective impressions
in the most favorable light. But surely our conclusions about
those matters should be substantive; surely they should not
hang on mere choice of phrasing between equally meaningful
alternatives, or on who is in the narrative focus-that is to say,
on matters of style?
C.

Regret: Accusation, Restraint, and Expressions of Frustration

Perhaps the most striking manifestation of this identity of
style and view is the absence of emotive distance between
NATO and the Prosecution. In failing to express frustration
or regret about the difficulties of developing a case, the Inquiry foregoes a cost-free opportunity to develop the law: The
Inquiry almost never hints at what it would take to make a case
in similar circumstances; instead, it states its belief that on these
facts there is nothing worth investigating. This is a very different matter and a different way of saying it.
Expressions of regret are counterfactual; they allow prosecutors to suggest standards for other cases without affecting
the one at hand. For example, in the following (rare) instance, by expressing regret the Inquiry identifies a data point
affecting proportionality analysis: "Assuming the station was a
legitimate objective, the civilian casualties [between ten and
seventeen 260 ] were unfortunately high but do not appear to be
clearly disproportionate." 26 1 This posture-besides confirming
that NATO is not liable-identifies a point of permissibility:
For an analogous target, seventeen deaths would not be excessive. Yet the Inquiry's few limits serve to identify isolated,
decontextualized points of pemnissibility and not, as would have

260. Inquiry, supra note 3,

261. Id.

71.

77 (emphasis added).
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been possible, points beyond which a violation would be
26 2
found.
The Prosecution does express regret. Regret is rare in indictments (since by definition the Prosecution believes it can
make the case), but in terminating other investigations the
Prosecution has made clear it believed liability would have lain
had circumstances been different. For example, the Deputy
Prosecutor issued a statement regretting that Croatia's former
President Franjo Tudjman would not be brought to justice,
suggesting that there was a moral case against him that could
not be brought only on the compelling procedural grounds
that he was dead. 26 3 The Prosecution has similarly asserted its

belief that there was substantive guilt when responding to
losses in court.2 64 The Prosecution has also recommended
262. Any decision to acquit or not to indict implies a point of permissibility for analogous facts, but it is possible to craft decisions to suggest where
liability would lie.
263. See RFE/RL Newsline, Tudjman Would Have Been Chargedby War Crimes
Tribunal (Nov. 10, 2000), available at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/ 2000/
11/101 100.asp:
Graham Blewitt, a prosecutor for the UN war crimes tribunal at
The Hague, said on 9 November that the late President Tudjman
would have been indicted by the court if he were still alive ....
Blewitt declined to comment on the charges that would have been
brought against Tudjman, but he said evidence of his role in the
Balkan wars will come out as more prosecutions are conducted.
264. See, e.g., Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Statement by Carla Del Ponte, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Apr. 19, 2000), at http:
//www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p494-e.htm:
The Prosecutor is deeply alarmed at the decision of the Chambers
of this Tribunal to release two of the accused.., in ... the Bosanski
Samac case ....

The Prosecutor has at all times strenuously op-

posed the application by these two accused for their provisional release ....

When the Trial Chamber ordered the provisional release

of the two accused... the Prosecutor immediately lodged a notice
of appeal ....

The Prosecutor will monitor closely the activities of

the two accused, who will be returned to Republika Srpska, in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
When informing the Court that it wished to withdraw a count in the
Furundijacase, the Prosecution noted:
1. ... [T] he Prosecutor does not concede the arguments set forth
by the Defence.
2. The confirmingJudge determined that the Prosecutor met her
primafacieburden as concerns crimes recognised by Article 2 of the
Tribunal Statute. The Prosecutor has, however, reconsidered the
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amendments to the Statute, showing that even when matters
fall outside itsjurisdiction, it is prepared to press to place them
26 5
on the international agenda.
appropriateness of proceeding on the establishment of international armed conflict. The Prosecutor considers that it is in the
interests ofjustice, of a fair and expeditious trial and, [sic] the judicial economy of the Trial Chamber, for the Prosecutor not to pursue Count 12 of the Indictment.
Prosecutor v. Furund2ija, IT-95-17/1-PT, Prosecutor's Response to Defence
Motions to Dismiss Count 12 of the Indictment for Failure Adequately to
Plead International Armed Conflict and to Dismiss Counts 12, 13, 14 for
Defects in the Form of the Indictment, 1-2 (Mar. 6, 1998). See also Press
Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecution Files Motion to Withdraw Article 2 Charges, at http://www.un.org/
icty/pressreal/p300-e. htm:
The Prosecutor announced its intention to withdraw the charges
under Article 2 of the Tribunal's Statute ("Grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949") ....
Pursuant to the Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal

on Jurisdiction,rendered on 2 October 1995 by the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of
1949 can be committed only in the course of an international
armed conflict. Charges under Article 2 of the Statute therefore
require proof of the international character of the conflict, which
involves complicated questions of fact and law.
The Prosecutor still maintains that the conflict was international in
character. However, she takes the view that the withdrawal of those
charges should "significantly expedite the trial proceedings," let it be un-

derstood that the charges maintained cover all the alleged criminal
conduct of the accused.
It is interesting to compare the Prosecution's willingness here to insist on
the correctness of its view, even in light of requirements for "proof ...involv[ing] complicated questions of fact and law," id., with the Inquiry's vocal
reticence to pursue proportionality. Cf Inquiry, supra note 3,
48-50.
265. OTP Address, supra note 103 (calling for amendment of the Statute
to remove the "armed conflict" requirement to allow prosecutions of crimes
against Serbs and Gypsies after NATO's occupation of Kosovo). In this connection the Prosecutor noted:
[The] ICTY's forced inaction on what has been happening in Kosovo since June 1999[ ] undermines the Tribunal's historical credibility. We must ensure that the Tribunal's unique chance to bring
justice to the populations of the former Yugoslavia does not pass
into history as having been flawed and biased in favour of one ethnic group against another. Besides, if we obtain this morally justified and necessary extension of our mandate, the Tribunal might
become a deterrent factor against the ongoing ethnic-cleansing
campaign in Kosovo.
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In NATO's case then, it must be that the Committee genuinely felt there was no substantive guilt, since it expresses no
regret or frustration about procedural or evidentiary obstacles.
Perhaps there is no rhetorical distance between what it believes and what it can prove, because that is the substantive
conclusion to which the Prosecution came: NATO did nothing wrong-or nothing seriously wrong-and the text reflects
that. This is a perfectly plausible position. A prosecutor is supposed to be skeptical and critical, not contrary or vicious; if he
believes there is no liability, he should say so. To criticize the
Prosecution's lack of regret, then, may require descent into
the thicket of substantive argument that is beyond the scope of
this Article. It did not believe anything seriously criminal had
occurred, and its language reflected that.
Still, in deciding what the law does not reach, it undeniably foregoes saying what the law should reach. At the verges of
rhetoric-perhaps as a mere matter of style-an easy, uncomplicated declaration that some facts do not give rise to liability
hardly comports with the prosecution's purported function,
whether that be to produce evidence of guilt or a balanced
assessment. In the Inquiry, the same Prosecution that kept its
investigation into Operation Storm 266 open for six years

before producing an indictment that met its (and the Chamber's) requirements does not sound vicious or contrary, nor
even critical or skeptical. It sounds as if it has nothing to regret: not the paucity of information, nor NATO's obfuscation,
nor the double-edged ambiguities of law. Yet the tone is not
relaxed; one might almost think it determined.
Voice-Information-Argument-Style-StructureConsequence-Silence

-

Id. The Prosecutor further stated, "It is regrettable that the Tribunal's stat-

ute ... makes only a minimum of provision for compensation and restitution[,]" and requested its amendment. Id.
266. Operation Storm (Oluja) was the 1995 Croatian offensive that retook
areas of western Croatia occupied by Serbs, most of whom fled into Bosnia,
giving rise to accusations that Croatia had engaged in ethnic cleansing. See
S.C. Res. 1019, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3591st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1019

(1995).
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A "SITUATION QUITE UNFORESEEN": STRUCTURE,
PUBLICITY, AND THE PURPOSE OF SERIOUSNESS

The image of the Inquiry that we have seen-biased information, defeatist argument, distorting stylistics-is troubling.
But what does it mean? Rather than being accidental or haphazard, these problematic elements reveal a pattern grounded
in the public nature of the document they constitute-a structure with evident purpose: The Inquiry is a window onto the
intentions of the institution that, quite unexpectedly, felt a
need to create it and then reveal it to the world.
A.

Interpretation Reprised: Seriousness and the Real Consistency
in the Inquiry

We began with an approximation: The Prosecution is inconsistent, because while it is conservatively consensual in the

Inquiry, it is progressive in other cases. We must now revise
that approximation, for it would be wrong to say that the Inquiry always relies on consensus. We have seen the Inquiry
adopt entirely novel theories, departing from consensus to advance its reasonable commander standard, redefine proportionality, or employ tu quoque arguments; these represent marginal and progressive interpretations of the law. Is there then
any consistency in the Inquiry's approach?
The one interpretation that renders the Inquiry's arguments consistent is a tendency to reduce NATO's potential liability. On this reading, the Inquiry's frequent reliance on consensus simply reflects the fact that most of the time, expansive
interpretations would increase liability, but when consensus
might entail a risk of liability, the Inquiry adopts restrictive
(progressive) interpretations. The Inquiry's real consistency,
then, is not that it is consensual, but that it is cautious. This
does not mean NATO should have been found liable, but it is
instructive to consider the reasoning the Prosecution consistently adopted in choosing its interpretations and, beneath this
consistency, its intention. The question is not if the Prosecution thought NATO's acts were serious, but how seriously the
Prosecution thought about it.
The Inquiry asserts that, even if proven, the crime base
alleged against NATO would not constitute grounds for indictment for anything but war crimes or grave breaches: "If one
accepts the figures . . .of approximately 495 civilians killed
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and 820 civilians wounded .. , there is simply no evidence of
the necessary crime base for charges of genocide or crimes
against humanity."2 67 This view-an argument about law and
numbers-is completely at odds with the Prosecution's representations in other cases. To be sure, far more heinous crimes
occurred in Bosnia and Croatia, where individuals committed
acts, such as some of the sexual depravities, at a level of unmediated intimacy and, as at Srebrenica, with a sweep that is
grotesquely epic. 268 Yet many crimes charged could not rea-

sonably be termed more serious than those alleged against
267. Inquiry, supra note 3, 90.
268. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Anto Furundiija, IT-95-17/1-PT, First Am. Indictment
25 (June 2, 1998) ("While being questioned by FURUNDZIJA,
[REDACTED] rubbed his knife against Witness A's inner thigh and lower
stomach and threatened to put his knife inside Witness A's vagina should
she not tell the truth"); Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladic, IT-95-5/18-I, Am. Indictment 25 (Oct. 11, 2002):
25. As Commander of the Main Staff of the VRS, General Ratko
MLADIC, acting individually and in concert with other members of
the joint criminal enterprise, participated in the joint criminal enterprise from no later than 12 May 1992 until at least 22 December
1996 in the following ways:
a. Planning, preparing, facilitating, or executing a campaign of
persecutions, which included acts of genocide, within BiH, by establishing control of [various] municipalities . . . attacking and de-

stroying non-Serb towns and villages, as well as looting, destroying,
and/or appropriating residential, commercial and religious
properties in the municipalities; killing and terrorising the nonSerb inhabitants, and submitting them to cruel and inhumane
treatment and conditions, including physical, psychological and
sexual abuse, often in detention facilities; using non-Serbs for
forced labour, including at front lines, and as human shields; imposing restrictive and discriminatory measures on the non-Serb
population; and separating, deporting, and permanently removing
non-Serbs who did not subjugate themselves to Serb authorities;
d. Planning, preparing, facilitating, or further executing the campaign of persecutions, which included acts of genocide, after the
capture of Srebrenica in July 1995, by forcibly transferring the Bosnian Muslim women and children from the Srebrenica enclave to
Kladanj; capturing, detaining, summarily executing, and burying
thousands of Bosnian Muslim men and boys from Srebrenica, all of
whom were either separated from the group of Bosnian Muslim
refugees in Potocari or captured from the column of Bosnian Muslim men escaping the Srebrenica enclave; and exercising command
and control over an organised and comprehensive operation designed to conceal the execution campaign by exhuming bodies
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NATO: 269 The Prosecution has indicted individuals for harming one individual, 270 and the Tribunal's jurisprudence and
the Prosecution's indictments make clear that a single act
against a single victim can constitute a crime against humanity. 2 7 1 The Prosecution has also charged genocide for lower
numbers of deaths, 2 72 and it is clear that genocide could be
27 3
charged for a single killing, or even no killings at all.
from the initial mass graves and reburying them, en masse, in isolated secondary locations....
269. Cf Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Statement by the Prosecutor Following the Withdrawal of the
Charges against 14 Accused (May 8, 1998), at http://www.un.org/icty/
pressreal/p314-3.htm:
I have re-evaluated all outstanding indictments vis-d-vis the overall
investigative and prosecutorial strategies of my Office. Consistent
with those strategies, which involve maintaining an investigative focus on persons holding higher levels of responsibility, or on those
who have been personally responsible for the exceptionally brutal
or otherwise extremely serious offences, I decided that it was appropriate to withdraw the charges against a number of accused in ...
the Omarska and Keraterm indictments ....
On the relative gravity of crimes, see Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a
Hierarchy of Crimes in InternationalCriminalSentencing, 87 VA. L. REv. 415, 420
(2001).
270. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furund2ija, IT-95-17/1, First Am. Indictment
(June 2, 1998) (complicity in one rape).
271. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Mrksic, Radic, & Sljivancanin, IT-95-13-R61, Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 30 (April 3, 1996) ("Crimes against
humanity are to be distinguished from war crimes against individuals, and,
particularly, they must be widespread or demonstrate a systematic character.
However, as long as there is a link with the widespread or systematic attack
against a civilian population, a single act could qualify as a crime against
humanity."); Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-T, Judgment of Trial Chamber II
649 (May 7, 1997) ("[A] single act by a perpetrator taken within the context
of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population entails individual criminal responsibility and an individual need not commit numerous
offences to be held liable.").
272. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Jeligic, IT-95-10, Second Am. Indictment (Oct.
19, 1998) (charging defendant with the crime of genocide and detailing defendant's alleged murder of 25 individuals).
273. See Annex to Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph2 of
Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), (S/25704) (STAT. I.C.T.Y.), Art. 4(2)
("Genocide means any of the following acts[:] ... (b) causing serious bodily
or mental harm ... ; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births...;
(e) forcibly transferring children .... "), Art. 4(3) ("The following acts shall
be punishable: (a) genocide; (b) conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) direct
and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) attempt to commitment ge-
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It is another question whether or not an indictment
would ultimately make sense-there are other elements to genocide and crimes against humanity, 274 which perhaps the
Prosecution believed lacking 2 5-but the Inquiry does not seriously consider the question, dismissing it as a matter of law in
contravention of its own prior arguments. Lack of seriousness
reveals itself in language: It could have written that "while genocide can be charged for a single killing, the other elements
cannot be made out," but instead it frames its dismissal in
terms of the number killed. To focus on numbers implies not
that other elements were absent, but rather
that the harm, like
2 76
the matter, was not sufficiently serious.
Perhaps this is a hopelessly substantive dispute, but it
seems hard to separate from a procedural and institutional
core: Does the Tribunal demonstrate any willingness or ability
seriously to contemplate such questions, regardless of its ultimate findings or the obvious correctness of one particular outcome? No one could reasonably suggest that the Inquiry attempts to highlight the seriousness of questions before it
through its substantive outcome (it finds no liability for anynocide ....
").The Prosecution has never suggested it would concede that a
given number of killings is an element of genocide.
274. Crimes against humanity also require a systematic or widespread attack against a civilian population; genocide requires intent to destroy a national or religious group in whole or part by specified acts, including killing.
ICTY Statute, supra note 234, art. 4, 5. See also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes
Against Humanity, in CRIMES OF WAR, supranote 150, at 107, 107-08; Dinstein,
supra note 143, at 374-93 (surveying contemporary jurisprudence on crimes
against humanity); Diane F. Orentlicher, Genocide, in CRIMES OF WAR, supra
note 150, at 153, 154-55; Guglielmo Verdirame, The Genocide Definition in the
Jurisprudenceof the Ad Hoc 7ibunals,49 INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 578, 584 (2000)
(discussing genocide and noting the ICJ's primafacie finding in the Legality of
the Use of Force case that NATO did not appear to have the requisite intent).
275. Certainly observers have made that argument. See, e.g.,
Ronzitti, supra
note 14, at 1019, 1026-27 (noting that the F.R.Y.'s genocide charge against
NATO "lacks any serious foundation" but also noting the mathematical
problem with the Inquiry's dismissal of the genocide allegation and suggesting that questions about NATO's mens rea were dispositive in dismissing
the allegation).
276. The Inquiry also does not suggest that it is foregoing investigation
because of resource limitations-a relative measure of seriousness consistent
with believing that crimes occurred, but were simply less pressing than
others needing investigation. Instead, it tends to argue for the absolute absence of serious crime. Thanks to Richard Goldstone for raising this observation.
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thing NATO did) so there are only dicta and tone to advance
the argument. As we have seen, the record is one of omission,
bias, and selectivity. Thus, to say that the Prosecution concluded in all seriousness that the allegations were not serious is
not sufficient, because it does not explain the mannerin which
the Inquiry-a document, after all, significant parts of which
are cribbed verbatim from a law review article written by the
Inquiry's principal author two years before the war 2 77reached its conclusions. If the Inquiry did not take its task
seriously-and a sober reading tends inexorably towards that
conclusion-that is a serious matter indeed.
B.

Purpose and Publicity: The Inquiry's Existence as a
Novel Category

Having examined problematic aspects of the Inquiry, and
before turning to its consequences, we should consider the
document itself as a whole-returning, in a sense, to questions
posed at the beginning: Why does this document look different? Why does it exist?
The Inquiry looks, and is, very different from other works
of the Prosecution. Three sections-thirteen of its ninety-one
paragraphs-address the Committee's mandate, review criteria, and work program. In no other investigative document is
so much room given to justifying the Prosecution's deliberative procedures. Why does the Prosecution expend such effort
explaining this? But this curious view into the Prosecution's
inner workings only begs a further question: Why does the
Inquiry exist as a public document at all? The Inquiry is a novel
category, the only such document the Prosecution has ever released, and as noted earlier, there would have been no indictment even if it had not been published. So why publish it?
The Prosecution gave this justification for publicizing its
internal deliberative processes:
277. William J. Fenrick, Attacking the Enemy Civilian as a PunishableOffense,
7 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L. L. 539 (1997) (detailing the various principles of
warfare). The Inquiry does not cite the article. See Laursen, supra note 14, at
776 (noting that "[c]onsidering the importance of the [Inquiry], one might
also expect that resources are on hand to research and write a new report,
thus avoiding the 'cut and paste' method," but also that it is "hard to find
anything fundamentally wrong with such an approach").
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It is not the Prosecutor's normal policy to make public the details about investigations or allegations received but not investigated. Standard practice is to
comment only about indictments that have been
made public. Even then, any comment by the Prosecutor outside the courtroom must be extremely limited. The Prosecutor considers that individuals
against whom allegations are made should, under
normal circumstances, be entitled to the presumption of innocence. The good reputation of innocent
persons would undoubtedly be damaged by public
disclosure that they are being investigated for serious
crimes. For this reason, in the absence of any indictment, which would provide an opportunity for such
persons to defend their name, it is not proper to divulge details of who may be under investigation by
the Prosecutor. The NATO air campaign, however,
does not raise such considerations and there has already been much public debate about the allegations. The Prosecutor considers that in this situation,
quite unforeseen when the Tribunal came into existence, she should take the unusual step of making
her reasoning public.

278

This is a curious conclusion to draw from the premise that
harm to reputation can result from report of investigation,
since in this case the Prosecutor is not investigating, a fact that
could have been established without publishing an Inquiry. 279
Why else, then, might it have been necessary to take the "unusual step," not only of announcing that there would be no in278. ICTY Press Release, June 2000, supra note 6.
279. The Prosecution has not chosen to insulate any other public figure
or institution from such reputational harm. Cf Press Release, International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Press Statement by the Office
of the Prosecutor (Mar. 24, 1999), JL/PIU/387-E, at http://www.un.org/
icty/pressreal/ p387-e.htm [hereinafter ICTY Press Release, March 1999]:
The Prosecutor does not comment on the existence or progress of
any investigation, and this has been the policy of the Office from its
inception. In the same way the Prosecutor does not announce or
confirm that particular persons are the subject of an investigation,
in fact we go out of our way to insure that persons are not named

until publicly indicted.
But see supra note 38 (regarding the Prosecutor's announcement that
"NATO is not under investigation").
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vestigation, but "of making [the Prosecutor's] reasoning public"? The reason, clearly, is the reasoning itself: to show how a
considered, impartial decision about NATO's non-liability was
reached. The logical assumption must be that it is in the very
act of publication, of publicity, that its value lies; it is the public nature of the document that matters.
One view would say the Prosecution released the Inquiry
to forestall criticism from groups that had urged it to investigate by demonstrating its procedural equality. 280 Or perhaps
the Prosecution intended to assert its right to do more on the
merits and thus demonstrate that international law governs
the powerful as well. We shall consider this possibility further
in the next section, noting here again that any such intention
was given effect-if at all-only through dicta or tone, but not
through the substantive assessment, because that assessment
completely vindicated NATO and, indeed, vindicated it publicly. Without the Inquiry, no one would have known that the
28 1
Prosecution was not investigating.
What, then, did the Prosecution intend with this unprecedented step? Its own text is ambiguous: Whether the "unforeseen situation" was the bombing campaign itself, or the spectacle of the world's foremost military alliance coming under
scrutiny before the Tribunal whose creation its members had
advocated, is not clear. Regardless, the phrasing only highlights the sense that this post hoc Tribunal was designed for
other purposes and was finding it difficult-conceptually and
institutionally-to re-orient itself to investigate its principal
supporters. 282 Even more than the timidity of its probing, the
very fact that the Inquiry exists is a powerful proof that the

280. See, e.g., Inquiry, supra note 3,

5 ("The committee has applied the

same criteria to NATO activities that the Office of the Prosecutor has applied
to the activities of other actors in the territory of the former Yugoslavia...

[including] allegations of crimes committed by Serb forces in Kosovo.").
281. Recall that the Inquiry creates a novel and public category intervening between no action and investigation. Its very structure and existence,
therefore, serve to forestall investigation, or at least publicly to signal its termination.

282. Cf Ronzitti, supra note 14, at 1018 ("When the [ICTY] was established in 1993, nobody could imagine that soldiers of permanent members
of the Security Council would run the risk of being submitted to its jurisdiction.").
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Prosecution viewed this as a dangerous, potentially explosive
subject.
But perhaps it was not so troubled after all-that depends
on what it thought its goals and audience were. As we have
seen, the goal the Inquiry seemingly set for itself in advance
was, in certain respects, overachieved: Reasons for NATO's
non-liability were found in abundance. The effect of publicizing that exuberant, abundant reasoning was to provide an
even more forceful exoneration of NATO than a bare announcement, or even silence, would have done. What the effect of that has been-and will be-we shall now consider.
Voice-Information-Argument-Style-StructureConsequence-Silence
VII.

A

NEW VOICE: THE EFFECT OF THE INQUIRY ON
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

The impression one receives from the Inquiry is of a Committee convinced, from before the outset, that NATO committed no crimes worth investigating. As an outcome, that is unobjectionable, but as a process, it is deeply troubling: Even
assuming the facts most favorable to the Committee's view, it
should not follow that the form of the Inquiry bespeaks the
inevitability of a done deal. But even if one concedes the
faults in the Prosecution's method, what is the practical effect
of the Inquiry in international criminal law? The flaws in the
Inquiry matter for several reasons: They create a limiting precedent for the Tribunal and the new ICC in responding to new
modes of warfare, and they send a dangerously licit message
about the attitude of international justice to power itself.
A.

Untaken Opportunities: Regulating Aerial Combat and the
Recourse to War
Leopold II never saw a drop of blood spilled in
anger. He never set foot in the Congo. There is
something very modern about that, too, as there is
about the bomber pilot in the stratosphere, above the
clouds, who never hears screams or sees shattered
homes or torn flesh.
28 3
-Adam Hochschild, King Leopold's Ghos(
...

283. ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD'S GHOST 4 (1998).
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Most narrowly, the Inquiry matters because no other
court will address NATO's actions; 284 if the Tribunal's approach is flawed, there will be no remedy. Even someone convinced that NATO did nothing wrong can see that the Inquiry
does not seriously consider the matter; even he could concede,
on the evidence of the text, that this was a deeply flawed (and
aborted) process. This is a harm in itself-to the Tribunal's
reputation, to public confidence-although frankly it is a
small harm already past, if you agree with the outcome.
But foreclosing more serious investigation incurs a
broader cost beyond this one investigation and this one Tribunal. The Prosecution's preference for campaign-level focus is
a potentially legitimate outcome of interpretative discretion,
but real substantive and institutional consequences flow from
this choice-a choice effectively forced upon the Tribunal by
the Prosecution's apparent determination not to consider alternatives. Two effects are of note.
First, a discretionary preference for campaign-level analysis makes it more difficult to ask productive questions about
individual incidents, assuming one wanted to, and arguably
this will have a disproportionate distracting effect on consideration of aerial incidents, with their high level of coordination,
their over-the-horizon impersonality, and the "collateral" nature of the incidental harm they cause. It is perhaps easier to
conceive of a single egregious bombing incident as part of a
campaign than a single on-the-ground atrocity, and in turn,
thinking at a campaign level may change how we evaluate intentionality: a focus not on Dresden, but the whole Second
World War. This will tend to reduce the potential liability for
NATO and similarly situated actors in the future, because aerial bombardment is the preferred tool of military intervention, with expansive claims being made for its efficacy and accuracy 285 and every indication that it will occupy an increas-

ingly prominent place in military strategy.
284. A Milogevic-era district court in Yugoslavia tried leading figures of
NATO and its member states in absentia, found them guilty, and handed
down 20-year prison sentences for violations of the laws and customs of war
and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. See Benvenuti, supra note 8,
at 527.
285. But see Barry & Thomas, supra note 101, at 22 ("The risk is that policymakers and politicians will become even more wedded to myths like 'surgical
strikes.' The lesson of Kosovo is that civilian bombing works, though it raises
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The NATO campaign was unlike any other operation
under the Tribunal's jurisdiction: 286 The previous conflicts
were ground wars negotiated on a village-to-village level; the
mode of death was direct and, for all its dehumanization,
often intensely personal and unmediated. Even the conflict
between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo followed this pattern.
NATO's intervention was an entirely different war, an example
of the paradigmatic "Revolution in Military Affairs" that will
become ever more common. 28 7 The debate on air warfare and
moral qualms and may not suffice to oust tyrants like Milosevic. Against military targets, high-altitude bombing is overrated. Any commander in chief
who does not face up to those hard realities will be fooling himself."); Mark
Bowden, The Kabul-ki Dance, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 2002, at 66, 81, 84
(noting that perhaps half of all bombs dropped in Kosovo exploded where
targeted, compared to 75 percent in Afghanistan, as well as pilots' acknowledged inability to identify properly targets from 25,000 feet). See generally
A.P.V. Rogers, Zero-Casualty Warfare, 82 INT'L. REV. RED CROSS 165, 170-3
(March 2000); MATTHEW C. WAXMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE POLITICS
OF URBAN AIR OPERATIONS 55-67 (2000) (both discussing the characteristics,
uses, and constraints of stand-off weapons).
286. Cf Peter Rowe, Kosovo 1999: The Air Campaign. Have the Provisionsof

Additional Protocol I Withstood the Test?, 82

INT'L REV. RED CROSS

147, 148

(March 2000):

[NATO's war] objectives set a difficult task for international humanitarian law to control. This was largely because the conflict did
not fit within those types of armed conflicts envisaged by the drafters of Additional Protocol I or by those States which had become
High Contracting Parties to it. There were no ground forces engaged in combat against each other, but only attacks from the sea,
and more particularly from the air, against targets on land ....The
conflict was, therefore, quite unlike any other. Denied the persuasive value of precedent in a situation where their attacks were
largely unopposed by enemy forces, NATO military commanders
and politicians were forced to think through the consequences of
each military action.
287. On the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), see Andrew Latham,
Warfare Transformed: A Braudelian Perspective on the "Revolution in Militay Af-

fairs," 8 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 231, 231 (2002) ("[S]ince the Gulf War, it has
become fashionable to argue that the United States is in the midst of a
profound 'Revolution in Military Affairs,' . .. a term that is used both to
describe and explain the momentous changes in the nature of warfare that
appear to be taking place in the current era."); id. at 237 (noting the existence of "a new paradigm based on 'non-linear' combat operations, 'information warfare' and 'precision destruction'"); id. at 239-40 (citing MICHAEL
KLARE, ROGUE STATES AND NUCLEAR OUTLAWS: AMERICA'S SEARCH FOR A NEW

(1995) ("[The new warfare] bears as little relation to the
attrition-oriented battles of World War I and II as those did to the infantryFOREIGN POLICY 95
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But see WESLEY K.

CLARK,

124
(2001) (noting that RMA has not yet translated into ready materiel for

WAGING MODERN WAR:

warmaking).

BOSNIA, Kosovo, AND THE FUTuRE OF COMBAT

See generally Donald H. Rumsfeld, Transforming the Military, FoR-

AFF., May-June 2002, at 20; David Armstrong, Dick Cheney's Song of
America, HARPER'S MAG., Oct. 2002, at 76 (outlining the development of U.S.
defense planning since the early 1990s and noting its goals of maintaining
overwhelming military superiority and developing electronic warfare capacEIGN

ity and airspace dominance); Thom Shanker, Military Spending ProposalsEnvision Changing Battlefield, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2002, at A18 (discussing a
"transformation defense budget" and American plans for space-based
com-

munications systems and pilotless aircraft).
Latham, summarizing conventional thinking, suggests the developing
RMA will be dominated by
long-range smart munitions able to strike with precision over great
distances; stealthy and unpiloted weapons platforms with stand-off
capability... and advanced battle management and communications systems able to integrate, process and distribute information
so that commanders can apply dominant forces in just the right
place and atjust the right time .... Such operations are the antithesis of traditional tactics, involving instead high-tempo attacks conducted simultaneously against key tactical, operational and strategic targets throughout the length, depth and breadth of the battlespace. This new doctrine... calls for near-simultaneous, fast-paced,
hard-hitting offensive operations (airmobile assaults, long-range air
and missile attacks, surprise maneuvers, etc.) against the enemy's
key tactical, operational and strategic "centers of gravity."
Latham, supra, at 239; see also Lewis H. Lapham, The Road to Babylon: Searchingfor Targets in Iraq, HARPER'S MAG., October 2002, at 37-38 (quoting Lieu-

tenant General Thomas McInerney (ret.), former Assistant Vice Chief of
Staff of the U.S. Air Force, testifying before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 31 or August 1, 2002, describing proposed operations in Iraq "using what I will call blitz warfare to simplify the discussion.
Blitz warfare is an intensive 24-hour, seven days a week precision air-centric
campaign supported by fast moving ground forces composed of a mixture of
heavy, light, airborne, amphibious, special, covert operations working with
opposition forces that all use effects-based base operations for their target
set and correlate their timing of forces for a devastating violent impact.").
"Effects-based" operations refer to application of overwhelming force, a variant of the Powell Doctrine developed around the 1990-91 Gulf War. See
Armstrong, supra, at 78, 81.
One of the prominent features of the new approach is a focus on warmaking capacity, rather than only on military forces proper. The new "ap-

proach emphasized attack not upon the enemy's combat power, but upon its
willingness to fight and upon its operational cohesion." Colin McInnes, Spectator Sport Warfare, CONTEMP. SECURITY POL'Y 157 (1999), cited in Latham,
supra, at 237.
On Kosovo in the new war paradigm, see generally MICHAEL IGNATIEFF,
VIRTUAL WAR: Kosovo AND BEYOND (2000); Stephen Biddle, The New Way of
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the propriety of targeting civilian infrastructure inevitably
would have been altered by whatever the Tribunal said about
its legality. 288 The Inquiry was a first test, and to judge from it,
the Tribunal chose to consider only the one, more ancient
kind of killing. It has remained silent-perhaps worse than
silent-about the new.
Second, the Inquiry's campaign-level focus covertly encourages importation of extra-jurisdictional concerns about
which party is the aggressor-that is to say, the jus ad bellum.
As we have seen, consistent with prior practice 28 9 and mainstream views, the Inquiry refuses jus ad bellum jurisdiction. 29 °,
Yet its logic inevitably encourages analysis of a campaign's
29 1
overall purposes and assessment of each side's rectitude.
We have seen how the Inquiry's reliance on NATO's sources
and viewpoints comports conveniently with NATO's description of itself as an humanitarian intervenor fighting a just war
292
justly.
At the outset the Committee seems to have asked,
War? Debating the Kosovo Model, FOR. AnF., May/June 2002, at 138 ("[Kosovo]

helped crystallize a fundamentally new 'American way of war,"' citing WAR
OVFR Kosovo (Andrew Bacevich & Eliot Cohen, eds., 2001).). On Kosovo as
an example of how the new strategy aims to affect civilian morale, see DEFENCE SELECT COMMITTEE, FOURTEENTH REPORT, 2000, HC 347-1, at
99, cited
in Benvenuti, supra note 8, at 508 (addressing efforts to "influence perceptions" of "target audiences," one of which was "the Serbian people as a
whole," by strategic bombing); Biddle, supra, at 140 (noting recent studies
that emphasized the practical success of the strategic infrastructure bombing
and the "largely fruitless counter-military strikes favored by NATO Supreme
Commander Wesley Clark.").
288. See Laursen, supranote 14, at 812-13 (noting that the Inquiry's failure
to identify media as protected facilitates trends toward targeting civilian infrastructure).

Cf Tarak Barkawi, Air Power and the Liberal Politics of War, in

Kosovo TRAGEDY: THE HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSIONS 307, 311 (Ken
Booth ed., 2001) (discussing the political calculus of going to war and constraints on the means used to conduct it).
THE

289. See Inquiry, supra note 3,

34.

290. Id. ("As a matter of practice ...

we in the OTP have deliberately

refrained from assessing jus ad bellum issues in our work and focused exclu-

sively on whether or not individuals have committed serious violations of
international humanitarian law as assessed within the confines of jus in
bello."). See also RATNER & ABRAMs, supra note 140, at 124-28.
291. It is perhaps not coincidental that although the Inquiry formally eschews jus ad bellum arguments, it actually spends considerable time discussing them. See Inquiry, supra note 3,
30-34.
292. Cf Barkawi, supra note 288, at 310 ("[T]he notion of 'humanitarian
war' offers an irresistible and exciting morality tale in which Western militar-
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"Who is the right side?" Of course, the right side cannot be
convicted, nor investigated. That is a possible question-indeed, there is debate about whether or not it should be
asked 29 3-but it is not clear it makes sense to ask NATO. It is,
moreover, a very different rule from what the Prosecution purports to apply and one that goes to the heart of the adjudicative enterprise. 294 It hardly seems a trivial difference to say
that international law should excuse an intervenor's actions by
virtue of his virtue. To call that merely a change in the substantive rules would be like saying that reintroducing trial by
ordeal (or by combat) would be a merely preferential change
in procedure, rather than a different vision of justice.
ies are figured as the sword ofjustice. Air power plays a crucial role in sheltering this tale from the ambiguities of war.").
293. There is considerable divergence of opinion, not only about the propriety of importing jus ad bellum analysis into the jus in bello, as the Inquiry
notes, but about what effects doing so might have, in particular regarding
the obligations it might impose on humanitarian interventions. Inquiry,
supra note 3, 33. For example, jus ad bellum considerations might be used
to excuse an attack on a radio station propagating genocide even though
that is not technically a war activity-and therefore jus in bello analysis can
sometimes only be completed by reference to the jus ad bellum. See Laursen,
supra note 14, at 787-88. Still, this kind of conflation probably limits itself to
what is in effect a redefinition of the military objective-it cannot do anything to limit the parties' liability for an otherwise illegitimate target or
change their mens rea requirements-and might in toto result in greater potential liability. "(I]f Operation Allied Force is legally justified as a humanitarian intervention, i.e., to save the Kosovar-Albanian population, it would be
hard to justify an allocation of the risk of casualties onto the Kosovar-Albanian population in order to avoid losses among NATO pilots." Id. at 811. Cf
Bothe, supra note 14, at 535:
Both in relation to the question of the definition of the military
objective and in relation to the proportionality principle, the [Inquiry] fails to raise yet another fundamental question. Do traditional considerations of military necessity and military advantage
have a legitimate place in a conflict the declared purpose of which
is a humanitarian one, namely, to promote the cause of human
rights? The thought would deserve further consideration that in
such a conflict, more severe restraints would be imposed on the
choice of military targets and of the balancing test applied for the
purposes of the proportionality principle than in a "normal" armed
conflict.
In any event, these would be the matters to sort out, and the Inquiry does
not engage in the attempt.
294. Cf Barkawi, supra note 288, at 310 (noting the effects on discourse of
identifying one side with humanitarian interests).
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It seems incumbent upon us, as moral observers of the
existing legal consensus, to acknowledge that neither identity
nor intimacy determine the criminal actus reus. NATO, in the
course of a self-described humanitarian intervention, killed
hundreds of civilians by bombing. If its acts were otherwise
criminal, they were no less serious for having been committed
by a friend of the court, with sincere intentions, from a distance. Evil does not arise solely from the aesthetic immediacy
of an act; most observers do not make a moral distinction between being beheaded with a machete or carbonized by a fuelair bomb. Evil arises from willful dehumanization, whether
through denial in the face of a pleading victim or through a
bureaucratic determination, a thousand nautical miles away,
that a cruise missile causes nothing but collateral damage.
The primitive fears and prejudices which make us suppose that wielding a knife is somehow more evil than launching a missile (if all the other elements of murder are made
out) should not necessarily guide us. The seriousness of law's
purpose requires no less than that it be able to consider, in
theory and practice, the potential criminal seriousness of hightech, over-the-horizon killing. 295 This is, indeed, one of the

most obvious progressive contributions the Inquiry does not
make: to assert, clearly and authoritatively, that seriousness is
a matter of consequence, not of style, and that liability is not
limited by the identity of the warrior or his access to technology. The Inquiry could have taken the opportunity to confirm
the obvious proposition that distance killing can be criminal
and serious, that armies' obligations extend beyond the horizon. It could have taken that opportunity even without charging NATO. It did not.
This is why the Inquiry's approach-not its take on the
rules of aerial warfare or even its campaign-level focus as such,
but its deferential, ask-nothing approach-is troubling: Given
the way the Inquiry's reliance on NATO's categories and perceptions comports so closely, not only with NATO's interests,
but with its view of the conflict and itself, has it not in effect
already embraced this changed vision of war, in advance of any
295. Cf Report on the Human Rights Situation Involving Kosovo, U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. Doc. HC/K304 (Apr. 30, 1999) (calling for Security Council review of the legality of "prolonged bombing campaign[s] in which the bombers choose their targets at will").
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consensus on the question and while publicly denying it is doing so? What does this approach say about this or any court's
ability to conduct a serious debate of this sort, 296 or the propriety of its trying? It is important to ask if the Tribunal, or any
court, is a forum capable of answering-or even asking-the
right questions about war, power, and law in a changing world.
This is all the more problematic precisely because
changes in military technology will alter powerful states' moral
calculus about the costs of war, 297 and it is powerful states that
increasingly dominate the new kind of war. 29 8 If the Inquiry is
296. Cf Philip Allott, Kosovo and the Responsibility of Power, 13 LEIDEN J.
L. 83 (2000) (suggesting that the Kosovo conflict represented a
change in the world order that an international court-in his discussion the
I.C.J.-is constitutionally ill-equipped to accommodate or assert responsibility for).
297. Cf Biddle, supra note 287, at 13940 (arguing that high-flying, overthe-horizon wars are less costly to the technologically superior side, with the
result that there is less political resistance to such campaigns and consequently less likelihood of domestic restraint on military behavior); Reisman,
supra note 163, at 287-88 (noting the asymmetry of power in interventions:
"Consider operations like those conducted recently in Kosovo and Serbia
.... Here again, there is asymmetry between belligerents and, as a result of
the nature of the internal policing dynamic or enforcing dynamic of the law
of war-the implication of reciprocity or retaliation-there will be strong
pressures on external participants to reduce their casualties by externalizing
the risks of conflict onto the civilian population of the adversary, in ways
likely to violate the laws of war."); Rowe, supra note 286, at 161 (noting that
given "the relative ease with which a State can convince itself not only that a
selected target is a military objective, but also that mistakes in targeting are
rare when compared with the number of bombing raids or that the enemy's
actions are much worse, it seems not unreasonable for the law to take into
account the development of these smart weapons."); Gardner Botsford, It
INT'L.

Used to Be Just the Soldiers Who Died, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2003, at A29 (noting

that changes in air warfare have tended to change the ratio of military to
civilian casualties and that "warfare has become much safer for the American
foot soldier"); Michael R. Gordon, US. Air Raids in '02 Preparedfar War in
Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2003, at Al (reporting on U.S. military internal
briefings discussing operational and planning elements of the air campaign
against Iraq in 2002-03, noting that "Air war commanders were required to
obtain the approval of Defense Secretary Donald L. Rumsfeld if any planned
airstrike was thought likely to result in deaths of more than 30 civilians.
More than 50 such strikes were proposed, and all of them were approved.").
On how the precedents of one war affect the prospects for the next, see
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Good Reasons for Going Around the U.N., N.Y. TIMES,

Mar. 18, 2003, at A33.
298. See, e.g., Bowden, supranote 285, at 69 (discussing the high-tech dominance of U.S. forces in the 2001-02 Afghanistan conflict).
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ultimately seen as confirming the principle that even powerful
political actors are subject to judicial oversight, then it will
have served a useful purpose. No charges were brought
against NATO, but they could have been. If it is seen instead
as having hesitated to pursue an investigation because of the
subject's identity, then it will have reinforced the suspicion of
many that international criminal law is still immature victors'
justice, suited only for defeated dictators of tinpot countries.
This may be the most reasonable conclusion to draw from the
Inquiry, which, given its mode of argument, does little to defeat the impression.
No state today openly contests the Tribunal's right to
bring charges even against the powerful.2 99 States will, however, oppose prosecution of their own forces or leaders with all
legitimate means at their disposal.30 0 They will oppose such
outcomes all the more forcefully, encouraging any effective
immunity, if courts signal an unwillingness to assert their prerogatives. In its public rhetoric-quite apart from its outcome-the Inquiry does little to challenge that determination;
it rather reinforces and rewards it. Although issuing the Inquiry could be seen as asserting the Prosecution's prerogative,
it serves another purpose: It gives public notice that inquiry is
at an end.3 0 ' There will be no investigation. Although the
Prosecution has the right to revisit the matter, the Inquiry publicly declares that it has no intention of doing so (and, indeed,
suggests obliquely that investigation might actually exceed its
299. Arbour noted that NATO states "said with their deeds what some of
them were reluctant to say with words. They have voluntarily submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of a pre-existing International Tribunal, whose
mandate applies to the theatre of their chosen military operations, whose
reach is unqualified by nationality, whose investigations are triggered at the
sole discretion of the Prosecutor and who has primacy over national courts."
Press Release, ICTY, Office of the Prosecutor, May 13, 1999, CC/PIU/401-E,
cited in Boelaert-Suominen, supra note 3, at 248.
300. See Colum Lynch, European Countries Cut Deal to Protect Afghan
Peacekeepers,WASH. PosT, June 20, 2002, at A15 (noting that Britain, negotiat-

ing on behalf of 19 other countries, "obtained written assurances that their
troops serving as peacekeepers in Afghanistan would be immune from arrest
or surrender to the court[,]" and that the accord was reached "'in a great
rush' and with no public debate"); see also IGNATIEFF, supra note 287, at 128,
199-200 (noting American military opposition to jurisdiction and that "in
practice, [U.S. military officers] say, we'd never give them jurisdiction").
301. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
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legitimate discretion) . 3 02 Given NATO's near-monopoly on
probative information, this amounts to a practical grant of immunity. NATO thus gains public vindication of the campaign's lawful conduct and public reassurance that it will not
be subjected to investigation or requests for potentially compromising internal materials. All of this is at the cost of tolerating a weakly phrased reminder of theoretical jurisdiction
that no NATO state had ever openly contested. In that context, the novel, public Inquiry does little to advance the development of international criminal law, and may set it back considerably.
B.

The Risk of Caution: Against Incrementalism

What of the alternative-an investigation of NATO?

03°

It

seems unquestionable that investigation would have asserted
the Tribunal's right to proceed against powerful states, and
could have advanced debate on substantive rules for air war, in
a way the Inquiry has not. Of course, a baseless investigation
could have ended up harming the enterprise of international
law by reducing the essential elements of support and seriousness, upon which a justice system relies for its legitimacy. We
may suppose, however, that NATO would consider the charges
baseless regardless of the merits. It is entirely plausible that
NATO might undermine the Tribunal rather than acquiesce
in trials of its leadership,3 0 4 and it is almost certain that NATO
302. See Inquiry, supra note 3, 5 (noting that "any investigation failing to
meet [the Prosecution's test for jurisdiction] could be said to be arbitrary
and capricious, and to fall outside the Prosecutor's mandate"). Cf Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, President
McDonald Reports the Continued Non-Cooperation by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Security Council (Mar. 19, 1999),JL/PIU/386-E, at
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p386-e.htm (reporting the Prosecution's
assertion, in a letter to the President of the ICTY, that "[T]he standard of
review [for a Prosecution decision to investigate] is an arbitrary and capricious standard ....
[F]or 'a reviewer' to conclude that the decision was
arbitrary and capricious, he/she would have to 'find no reasonable person
could have decided to initiate an investigation'").
303. Full investigation was not the only alternative; another, differently
constructed Inquiry, or none at all, was possible and would not have required greater resources. It is useful, however, to consider the starkest alternative in terms of its likely effects. See Part VIII, infra.
304. Cf Marlise Simons, Rwanda Is Said to Seek New Prosecutorfor War Crimes

Court, N.Y.

TIMES,

July 28, 2003, at A2 (noting efforts by the U.S., U.K., and
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would decline further cooperation.3 0 5 In either event, the
damage to the institutions of international law would be real,
and the Prosecution could not help being aware of this.
It is a separate matter whether such concerns legitimately
should enter the Prosecution's deliberations about whom to
investigate (and, as in the Inquiry, whom not to), or what the
effect on the Tribunal's moral stature would be if it were dissolved for having asserted jurisdiction over the powerful. Perhaps the Prosecution was wise to act conservatively, because
any assertion of principle that harmed the Tribunal's material
and political position-or persuaded states that the ICC
30 6
should not be supported-would be too high a price to pay.
Rwanda to remove Del Ponte as Prosecutor for the Rwanda Tribunal because of attempts to investigate Rwandan civilian and military officials).
305. Cf Press Release, NATO, Statement by the Secretary General of
NATO, Lord Robertson, in Response to the Report Given by the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Carla Del Ponte, to the U.N. Security Council (June 2, 2000), available at
http://www.nato.int/ docu/pr/2000/pOO-057e.htm:
The statement by Chief Prosecutor Del Ponte that the ICTY is not
opening an inquiry into NATO's actions comes as no surprise.
NATO's civilian leaders and military authorities took extraordinary
precautions throughout the entire air campaign to ensure that
NATO consistently acted in accordance with international law ....
NATO isas committed as the ICTY itself to bringing war criminals
tojustice. The ICTY's decision should help ensure that the world's
attention is focused exactly where it belongs-on bringing the real
war criminals of the Balkan wars to face justice in The Hague."
306. Cf GaryJ. Bass, Why Not Victor'sJustice?, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2002, at
A33:
In a perfect world, it would be ideal to have respected international
courts that could enforce justice against citizens of any country,
strong or weak. But at a time when impunity is still all too typical,
as shown by the recent collapse of U.N. efforts to set up a war
crimes tribunal for Cambodia, waiting for perfect international
courts might well mean no justice at all. Milosevic does not want a
fairer brand of justice; he wants no justice.
It's true that a tribunal that prosecuted only Serbs would be unfair,
just as it was unfair that Nuremberg tried Germans for some crimes
that had also been committed by the Soviets. But the Hague tribunal, sensitive to such accusations, also investigates Croats, Bosnian
Muslims and Kosovar Albanians. If more of the defendants are
Serbs, that is because Milosevic drove his people into war after war:
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. The tribunal even looked
into Serb allegations that NATO was guilty of war crimes in its
bombing of Yugoslavia, and decided there was no case there.
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A more searching inquiry would have confirmed states' worst
fears about the dangers of an independent prosecution. 30 7 If a
rough estimate suggested no serious crimes occurred, why
cause irreparable damage to a more important enterprise
whose moment might not come again for another fifty years?
This incrementalist argument has great pragmatic force,
but it is a calculation and may be wrong. First, it must be questioned in light of states' existing attitudes toward the ICC: It is
difficult to imagine the United States' posture toward an international trial of its citizens being any more resistant than it
already is308 (although the future always confounds imaginaNote the linking of themes: the vision of strong and independent courts,
the imperfection of existing ones, the need to compromise, and the risk in
demanding too much-implicitly, that a new court might not be established.
307. See Neil A. Lewis, US. to Renounce Its Role in Pact for World Tribunal,
N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2002, at A18 (noting comments by John R. Bolton,
Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control, referring to the ICC as "a product of fuzzy-minded romanticism" and "not just naive, but dangerous"). Cf
Editorial, On the Backs of Bosnians, WASH. POST, July 2, 2002, at A]4 ("[There
is a] risk that the [ICC] may at some point be turned for political reasons
against American service members, in which case it will constrain the Kosovo-style humanitarian interventions that human rights groups rightly advocate.").
308. See, e.g., BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 16383 (2003); KRISTINA M1SKOWIAK, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: CONSENT, COMPLEMENTARITY, AND COOPERATION 80-81

(2000)

(discussing

U.S.

strategy during the drafting);Justice Louise Arbour & Morten Bergsmo, Conspicuous Absence of JurisdictionalOverreach, I INT'L. L. F. 13, 16-17 (1999)
[hereinafter Arbour & Bergsmo]; John R. Bolton, The Global Prosecutors:
Hunting War Criminals in the Name of Utopia, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at
157, 162; Bar-tram S. Brown, U.S. Objections to the Statute of the International
Criminal Court: A Brief Response, 31 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 855 (1999); Lee
A. Casey, The Case Against the International Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT'L.
L.J. 840, 871 (2002); Allison Marston Danner, Navigating Law and Politics:
The Prosecutorof the InternationalCriminal Court and the Independent Counsel, 55
STANFORD L. REv. 1633, 1633 (2003) [hereinafter Danner, Navigating];
Lapham, supra note 287, at 38 (noting U.S. demands that its soldiers be
granted immunity from ICC judgments); Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard
Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO.
L. J. 381, 447-57 (2000); David Scheffer, The United States and the ICC, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS:

THE ROLE OF THE INTERNA-

203-06 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); John Washburn,
The InternationalCriminalCourt Arrives-The U.S. Position: Status and Prospects,
25 FORDHAM INT'L. L. J. 873, 877-80 (2002) (surveying development of the
U.S. view). See generally Timothy L. H. McCormack, Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War Crimes and the Development of International Criminal Law, 60 ALB. L.

TIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
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tion), and this in the wake of a most pragmatic demonstration
of the law's caution-that is, the Inquiry itself.30 9 A more
searching inquiry might have made things worse, but it is hard
to see what would have made them better, if the real Inquiry
couldn't.
In any event, advocates of incrementalism must face the
interim consequences of their approach, even if they are confident of its ultimate vindication. The short- and middle-term
damage seems clear:3 1 11 If the Prosecution indeed took the
risks to future courts or its budget into account in contemplating NATO's actions, then necessarily it gave conventional understandings ofjustice and process a lesser place. This may be
for the greater good, but it also is a sacrifice, and at some
point sacrifices must come to an end; costs are only "worth it"
if, over time, they contribute to the prospects for a more authoritative international criminal jurisprudence. Of course,
over time, differential treatment based on differences in
power is antithetical to serious and legitimate judicial authority. Any court that appears to take a lighter approach with the
powerful necessarily opens itself to charges of clientelism and
complicity, undermining the appeals to neutrality, procedural
fairness, and equal justice that underpin legi timacy and credibility3 1 1-especially if these practices become entrenched as
REv. 681 (1997) (discussing states' resistance to application of international
criminal law to their nationals).
309. Consider this view:
Most Americans would be amazed to learn that the ICTY, created at
U.S. behest in 1993 to deal with Balkan war criminals, had asserted
leaders for allegedly criminal cona right to investigate U.S ....
duct-and for the indefinite future, since no statute of limitations
applies. Though the ICTY prosecutor chose not to pursue the
charge-on the ambiguous ground of an inability to collect evidence-some national prosecutor may wish later to take up the
matter as a valid subject for universal jurisdiction.
Henry A. Kissinger, The Pitfalls of UniversalJurisdiction, FOREIGN AFF., JulyAug. 2001, at 86, 94.
310. There are short- and middle-term benefits as well: The Inquiry left
NATO member states free, and probably more inclined, to continue cooperating with the Tribunal on cases against their wartime enemies in the F.R.Y.,
which has been the object of concerted pressure from the U.S. to increase its
cooperation with the Tribunal.
311. See Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of
Effective SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 312-13 (1997). Cf Developments in the Law, supranote 138, at 2021 ("In order to garner and sustain
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precedent and institutional worldview. Pragmatism, like complicity, can become habit.
There is also reason to believe that an overly incremental
approach is less certain of success. There are risks to asserting
oneself; the examples of courts crushed by dictatorships are
too numerous to mention, and all courts must consider their
circumstances. But my critique is limited, an antidote to a
kind of timorously encomiastic thinking that hesitates to demand anything of the Tribunals lest it weaken them. No
court, unsure in its powers and position, has ever achieved security and prominence solely by playing safe. Courts gain authority in part because they assert themselves. The U.S. Supreme Court owes its prominence to a particular legal culture,
to fortune, but also to important decisions, such as Marbury v.
Madison,3 12 that over time helped establish its claim to be an
independent, not a subservient, actor. 3 13 Concern about the
risks of boldness is curious, considering that the Tribunal
3 14
often has been encouraged to adopt an expansive agenda
and to indict the presidents of the F.R.Y. and Croatia; sometimes political realism masks political preference. Ultimately
this is a question of timing and priorities: Perhaps advocates
of caution are still right, but for how long and to what end? If
the Inquiry is evidence of that strategy's prospects, the answer
may not satisfy caution's boldest hopes.
The truth is, while societies sometimes grant courts independence and sometimes refuse, they are never generous in
giving it to courts afraid to ask. Subservience and patience today are not rewarded with independence and responsibility in
some golden future. Subservience is rewarded with more opportunities to serve, and patience with more time to wait, besupport, the ICC must appear to be legitimate and free from the influence
of political groups.").
312. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
313. Cf Lewis, supra note 307 (quoting Professor Harold Hongju Koh, a
former Assistant Secretary of State in the Clinton administration, comparing
the creation of the ICC to the Marbury v. Madison decision for its role in
defining the relationship among the governing branches, and saying "This is
an international Marbury versus Madison moment[.]"). Marbury is an especially valuable proof that a court's admitted political weakness need not dictate adoption of weak positions; indeed, the Court's weakness was the very
vehicle it used to make an expansive institutional claim to power.
314. See, e.g., discussion on sexual crimes supra Part 1V.D.
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cause both are seen as weakness. Whether one thinks that law
is a special endeavor or just politics, a court's authority will
only extend as far as it asserts itself and as other actors cede it
ground. Even in mature legal communities this truth is never
far from the surface, and in the inchoate culture of international criminal law, this truth is practically an everything.
C.

InternationalCriminal Law in an OriginalPosition

Begin then, by clearing your mind of the prejudices it
harbours. Shake off the hidebound notions which
can only lead to error, and put yourself in the position of a brand-new man on the point of hearing
what you yourself admit to be a brand-new language.
-Episde to Diognetus 315
Young, untested, still largely without form: International
criminal law can become many things, and must become certain things if it is to be worth the endeavor-a legitimate alternative to domestic fora. As it takes on more attributes of domestic systems, especially in creating criminal courts, 316 seemingly narrower issues of practice will become more prominent.
Broader issues will continue to matter, but the luxury of grand
reflection that international law's fundamental marginality
long afforded will no longer be available as it grapples with the
quotidian realities of devising procedures, conducting trials,
and becoming, perhaps, a normal body of law.
Yet in its current, immature phase, international criminal
law is still more concerned with particular outcomes than with
the integrity of its processes.31 7 There is a temptation to prove
315. Anonymous, The Epistle to Diognetus, in EARLY CHRISTIAN WRITINGS:
169, 173 (Maxwell Staniforth trans., 1984).
316. See Cherie Booth & Phillippe Sands, Editorial, Keep Politics out of the

THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS

Global Courts: International Judges Must be Independent and Representative,
July 13, 2001, available at 2001 WL 24850786 (noting the increas-

GUARDIAN,

ing reliance on international adjudication).
317. "Though the United States has been at the forefront of the charge
for international justice, it has never been willing to place itself at the mercy
of a system it did not trust. And it has never been willing to trust a system it
did not control." Samantha Power, The United States and Genocide Law: A History of Ambivalence, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

165, 172 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000) [hereinafter Sewall & Kaysen]; cf. Sir Robert Jennings, Kosovo and International Lawyers, 1
INT'L L. F. 166, 166 (1999) (discussing institutional and structural limits on
COURT
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courts' worthiness and strength by bringing in convictions, because the reality of human beings in the dock reinforces the
reality of international law3 18 (and because it would be a tremendous embarrassment not to secure conviction of people
"so obviously guilty"). This is especially true when each case
constitutes a discernible share of international justice's tiny
docket; failure in these early days is hugely damaging. The felt
sense today is that it would be outrageous to imagine-and
unacceptable to tolerate-a Milogevic or Karad~ic "walking on
a technicality." 319 Most people want justice-by which they
mean a just outcome; when a court is created, as the Tribunal
was, as a post hoc, ad hoc response to crimes already occurring, this logic is all the more compelling and all the more in
accord with states' interests. Yet to say "any system that would
release a major war criminal must be flawed" is a conclusory
determination, the antithesis of that commitment to procedural justice that is true respect for law. 320

For we ought to be

perfectly content to see-prefer to see-any accused set free if
there is not sufficient evidence or if procedural protections
have been neglected, rather than insist on his conviction be32 1
cause of our conviction that he is "obviously guilty."

international legal decision-making); Note, Breathing New Life into
Prosecutorial Vindictiveness Doctrine, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2074, 2080-82 (2001)

(discussing goal-oriented attitudes of prosecutors and judges).
318. Cf Sadat & Carden, supra note 308, at 385 ("[T]he Court will put real
people in real jails.").
319. Cf Danner, Navigating, supra note 308, at 1641 ("The necessity for
the [ICC] can be captured in a single word: impunity."). Obviously, the
Chamber has found defendants not guilty on some charges; I am speaking of
tendency and tone.
320. Cf W. Michael Reisman, Kosovo's Antimonies, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 860,
860 (1999) ("The insistence on the integrity of procedures is not and formalism. Lawyers know that however noble the impulse, action in the common interest that is taken without formal authority may have incalculable
costs."); Bass, supra note 306, at A33 ("In the real world, it is victory that
makes justice possible, but it is the fairness of the process that makes itjustice.").
321. See Robert H. Jackson, The Rule of Law Among Nations, Address
Before the American Society of International Law (April 13, 1945), in TEL
FORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS:
OIR 44-45 (1992):

A PERSONAL MEM-

Of course, if good faith trials are sought, that is another matter. I
am not troubled as some seem to be over problems of jurisdiction
of war criminals or of finding existing and recognized law by which
standards of guilt may be determined. But all experience teaches
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So international legal justice will have to develop
processes less guided by outcome. An opportunity to change
that balance seems to present itself, for the new ICC, however
limited its competence, 322 exercises authority in advance of

the crises that will generate its docket. No one yet knows
which matters will come before it, nor what the political constellations will be when they do; no one can say in advance
what outcomes he will want. We are, by imperfect analogy, in
Rawls' original position at this new Court's constitution,23 in
which procedures should matter more than outcomes. Freed
of ad hoc restraints, the new Court will have to shift-to create-the balance between outcomes and procedures.
That is the challenge. If the prospect of creating a Court
properly accountable to political actors and yet insulated from
the tyranny of outcomes is too daunting, we must recognize
that the alternative is to reduce our expectations of what international justice can accomplish: 324 Rawls' theory, after all, is
an aspiration, not a prediction. These alternatives are mirrored in the ongoing struggle over the Court's role, 325 for it

would be a mistake to think that all procedural and political
questions were settled in its Statute and Rules: They will be
that there are certain things you cannot do under the guise ofjudicial trial. Courts try cases, but cases also try courts ....

You must

put no man on trial before anything that is called a court... if you
are not willing to see him freed if not proven guilty .... "
322. Concerning the weaknesses confronting the ICC, see, e.g., RichardJ.
Goldstone & Gary Jonathan Bass, Lessons from the InternationalCriminal Thbu-

nals, in Sewall & Kaysen, supra note 317, at 51, 51-60.
323. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17 (1972).
324. See Brown, supra note 308, at 884 ("If the experience of the ICTY is
any indication, the ICC will be too timid rather than too bold."); see also
Developments in the Law, supra note 138, at 1981-82; Giulio M. Gallarotti &
Arik Y. Preis, Politics, InternationalJustice, and the United States: Toward a Permanent InternationalCriminal Court, 4 UCLAJ. INT'L. L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 18-

30 (1999) (discussing the likely effects of structural and political weakness in
the ICC's statute). But see Reisman, supra note 163, at 288-89 (concluding
that the ICC's jurisdiction may discourage states from participating in interventions). This is plausible, but equally so is the possibility that the ICC will

adjust its own jurisprudence and working assumptions to reduce the dissonance and reassure intervenors; the Inquiry suggests that the latter possibility is a real one.
325. See MIsKowIAK, supra note 308, at 76-77 (identifying states with "re-

strictive" and "progressive" attitudes to ICC jurisdiction).
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contested in the Court's early cases. 326 What would not be acceptable would be to graft the forms of ambitious independence onto structures of complicity. The new Court must be
both bold and cautious: bold in asserting the privileges of independence, 3 27 cautious in developing the law. To be the opposite-cautious in independence, and bold in law-is a most
dangerous thing.
D.

Courts of the Conqueror: The Inquiry's Legacy to the ICC

Of course, we are not truly at the beginning. We have the
experience and precedent of the ad hoc Tribunals, 328 which
326. Cf Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability

of ProsecutorialDiscretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT'L. L.
510, 510-11 (2003) [hereinafter Danner, Legitimacy]:
The Prosecutor of the ICC sits at a critical juncture in the structure
of the Court, where the pressures of law and politics converge. The
cases adjudicated by the ICC are infused with political implications
Because of the high
and require sensitive decision making ....
stakes of its subject matter and the threat that its decisions can pose
to powerful international interests, the ICC will inevitably be subject to charges that it is a purely political institution ....

The Court

will face serious challenges that will question its independence
from political institutions, its legitimacy as an authentic interpreter
of international norms, and its accountability to the states that created it and whose nationals face prosecution within its courtrooms.
327. On judicial independence as privilege, see EUROPEAN UNION ACCESSION MONITORING PROGRAM,

CIAL CAPACITY

MONITORING THE

EU

ACCESSION PROCESS: JUDI-

14-17 (2002), at http://www.eumap.org/reports/2002/con-

tent/70.
328. The notion that, despite differences in their statutes, the Tribunals'
structure and experience have had a decisive influence on the ICC is universal. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 233, at 186 (noting that the Tribunals' case law
"greatly influenced the elaboration of the elements of crimes"); MERON,
supra note 176, at 197; Morten Bergsmo et al., The Prosecutors of the International Tribunals: The Cases of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the ICTY and
ICTR, and the ICC Compared, in THE PROSECUTOR OF A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 121, 124 (Louise Arbour et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter Arbour et al.] (noting that "it is obvious that the experience of... the

ICTY and ICTR[ ] is highly relevant to the ICC."); The Board of Editors, The
Rome Statute: A Tentative Assessment, [hereinafter Cassese et al.] in 2 THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL

COURT:

A

COMMENTARY

1901, 1901-02 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002) (noting that the ICC was a

"direct beneficiary" of the regulatory framework evolved at the Tribunals,
which "paved the way, in an immediate sense, for the ICC[,]" and referring
generally to the Tribunals' effect on the ICC); Sean D. Murphy, Progress and
Jurisprudenceof the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 93
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will provide decisive guidance in the new Court's early years as
it defines its own institutional identity; 329 their successes and

failings will define and delimit the possibilities open to the
330
new Court, both in law and in its institutional relationships.
Its scope for action will be strengthened to the degree the
Tribunals vindicate their own claims; conversely, it will be
weakened if the Tribunals do the opposite. And what have
they done? These courts have inevitably been colored by their
post hoc, ad hoc formation: In creating a judicial solution,
states necessarily had decided that matters in the particular
case warranted it and therefore preferred-expected-concomitant outcomes.3 3

1

They have not been disappointed.

AM. J. INT'L. L. 57, 62, 95-97 (1999) (discussing the effect of the Tribunal's
substantive and procedural decisions and suggesting that the "ripple effect"
of its jurisprudence "will strongly influence the development of international
humanitarian law"); Patricia Viseur Sellers & Kaoru Okuizimi, Intentional
Prosecution of Sexual Assaults, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 76-77
(1997) (noting influence on the Preparatory Committee and the Rome Conference).
329. See MERON, supra note 176, at 189 ("To be credible, an ad hoc tribunal for the former Yugoslavia must respect impeccable legality and fairness.
For better or worse, the precedent of such a tribunal will be invoked in future situations."); Developments in the Law, supranote 138, at 1954 ("As important as they are in their own right, the ICTY and the ICTR are perhaps most
intriguing for what they herald. Their efforts to establish individual accountability revived widespread interest in a permanent international criminal
court."); id. at 1974 n.102 (citing Richard Goldstone, The United Nations' War
Crimes 7ibunals: An Assessment, 12 CONN. J. INT'L L. 227, 227-8 (1997) as
"declaring that the ICTY is primarily useful in serving as precedent for the
ICC"); see also Abram Chayes & Anne-Marie Slaughter, The ICC and the Future
of the Global Legal System, in Sewall & Kaysen, supra note 317, at 237, 243.
330. Support for the ICC has been bolstered by observation of fair proceedings at the Tribunals. See, e.g., Richard J. Goldstone & Gary Jonathan
Bass, Lessons from the International Criminal Tribunals, in Sewall & Kaysen,
supra note 317, at 51, 52, 55-56. Evidence of bias logically would reduce
support or create demand for higher standards.
331. See, e.g.,
Developments in the Law, supra note 138, at 2022 ("[I]t was
clear from the outset that the international community already suspected
that genocide had occurred in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. As such,
the chambers were under significant pressure both to find that genocide
had occurred and to hand down genocide convictions."). The Chamber did
not sustain the genocide charge in Jelisic. It did, however, allow the trial to
proceed and issued rulings easing and expanding the definition of genocide, and in any event, the Prosecutor unquestionably pursued the charge.
Prosecutor v.Jeligic, IT-95-10, Trial Chamber IJ.
99-108 (Dec. 14, 1999).
Cf Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
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The Inquiry was the last great instance in which the Tribunal confronted the limits of law in the face of power.3 3 2 The
circumstances of the Yugoslav wars inevitably meant that powerful states created a Tribunal whose targets were from small,
prostrate nations; until the NATO bombing, it never had real
occasion to address the acts of the mighty. The Tribunal had
been frustrated by the warring parties' recalcitrance,3 3 3 and
lukewarm support 334 threatened to consign it to the rolls of
past failures as late as 1998. 3 3 - Since then, support from pow-

erful states and (enforced) cooperation by the former warring
parties has increased.3 36 When, by the Kosovo crisis, Yugoslavia still resisted investigation, it was an isolated pariah whose
opposition could not prevent indictment of its leadership.
Introductory Statement by Justice Louise Arbour, Prosecutor ICTY and ICTR
at the Launch of the ICC Coalition's Global Ratification Campaign (May 13,
1999) JL/PIU/401-E, at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p401-e.htm:
Irrationally selective prosecutions undermine the perception ofjustice as fair and even-handed, and therefore serve as the basis for
defiance and contempt. The ad hoc nature of the existing Tribunals
is indeed a severe fault line in the aspirations of a universally applicable system of criminal accountability .... The broader the reach
of the International Criminal Court, the better it will overcome
these shortcomings of ad hocjustice.
332. Cf Christopher Greenwood, InternationalLaw and the NATO Interven-

tion in Kosovo, 49 INT'L. & Comp. L.Q. 926, 933 (2000) ("The NATO operation in Kosovo raised fundamental questions about the nature of modern
international law and the values which it is designed to protect."); Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Kosovo:
Statement by the President of the ICTY, Gabrielle Kirk McDonald (Mar. 31,
1999), CC/PIU/392-E, at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p392e.htm
(calling the response to the Kosovo war "a test of our nascent order of international criminal justice").
333. See Arbour & Bergsmo, supra note 308, at 13 ("[T]erritorial States
have been able to impede ICTY investigations and prosecutions simply by
cynically disregarding their obligations under international law.").
334. On initial western reticence, see IGNATIEFF, supra note 287, at 122-23,
126-27.
335. See Bass, supra note 306, at A33 ("The Hague has long had an uneasy
relationship with NATO, whose Balkan agenda is more about stability than
about prosecuting war criminals.").
336. See Akhavan, supra note 17, at 8; Goldstone & Bass, supra note 322, at
52. Russia, despite having participated in the Tribunal's creation, generally
has been hostile. See, e.g., OTP Address, supra note 103 (responding to Russian criticism of the Tribunal as anti-Serb and a threat to the unity of accepted international law). At the same time, the Prosecutor frequently notes
the Tribunal's statutory reliance on the Security Council. Id.
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Thus it was a much stronger Tribunal that confronted the
bombing, though one whose new strength rested on the stillcontingent willingness of states, especially NATO members, to
pressure the former warring parties, capture indictees, and
fund its operations. 337 Indeed, the stakes were far higher, for
though the warring parties had frustrated investigations, they
337. See, e.g., IGNATIEFF, supra note 287, at 199 ("Practically, of course, Arbour is dependent on NATO governments for everything from the helicopters that fly her to the sites in Kosovo to the secret intelligence she needed in
order to indict Milosevic."); MERON, supra note 176, at 279 ("In contrast to
Nuremberg . . . the tribunal has had to depend on the readiness of the
Security Council and the international community to exert pressure for full
compliance on reluctant parties. When that pressure has been in short supply, the tribunal has encountered setback after setback."); cf Laursen, supra
note 14, at 774. On support by NATO (whose members include the world's
sole superpower, three permanent members of the Security Council, which
created the Tribunal, the Tribunal's host, and its principal funders and suppliers of technical support and intelligence), see CLARK, supra note 287, at
371, and in particular on the transfer of western intelligence, see IGNATIEFF,
supra note 287, at 121-22; Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, Kosovo/ICTY: Statement by the Prosecutor (Apr. 21,
1999), CC/PIU/398-E [hereinafter ICTY Press Release, April 1999]:
We... need the sophisticated kind of assistance that only states can
provide .... We have been steadily building our co-operation with
a number of countries, and their decisions to increase our access to
sensitive information takes us another important step forward. It
should also send a signal to leaders and commanders on the
ground who are implicated in the commission of war crimes that
they will be brought to justice.
See also MERON, supra note 176, at 284 (noting that the United States "has
given the tribunal more political, budgetary, and logistical support than any
other nation"); Fred Abrahams, The Tribunal, A VILLAGE DESTROYED, at
http://www.hrcberkeley.org/ avillagedestroyed/thetribunal.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2003) (noting that the Tribunal's first public reference to the
events in Kosovo occurred on March 10, 1998, following the first Serbian
offensive in Drenica, and noting the United States' grant, three days later, of
$1,075,000 U.S. to support the Tribunal's investigations in Kosovo). Exhumations in Bosnia and Kosovo have been conducted almost entirely by statesponsored teams. NATO intelligence has been used in a number of cases.
See, e.g., ICTY Press Release, April 1999, supra (noting use of British and German intelligence).

Cf Marc Weller, The Kosovo Indictment of the International

Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, in THE Kosovo TRAGEDY: THE HUMAN
RIGHTS DIMENSIONS, supra note 224, at 207 (noting the Tribunal's reliance
on external sources). The Tribunal's appropriations and appointments are
dependent on the United Nations, which itself is not famously independent.
See Scott T. Johnson, On the Road to Disaster: The Rights of the Accused and the

InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 10 INT'L LEGAL PERSP.
111, 116 (1998) (asserting that the U.N.'s power to appoint and fund "send a
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never posed the sort of existential threat to the Tribunal's legitimacy or operations that a different finding in the Inquiry
would have engendered.3 3 8 Even so, these risks may not have
affected the deliberations of the Prosecution and may not have
had to.
It should not have to be said and yet bears repeating: I do
not argue that the Prosecution made any decision under political pressure.3 3 9 What I do argue is this: The Tribunal operates in a political and institutional atmosphere that encourages caution, conciliation, and co-optation, creating incentives
for the Prosecution to reach the kinds of conclusions it does in
the Inquiry, in the way it does-conclusions marked with that
stately, certain, but compromised moral vision possessed by
what Marshall called "courts of the conqueror. 3 40 Rather
than reassuring us of the Prosecution's probity, the text of the
Inquiry is a product and a proof of that environment. Although it puts no one in the dock, the Inquiry reads like a
document drafted within a worldview that favors justice over
law, one that views process as a potential obstacle to outcomes
consistent with its convictions-a court, in short, in which law
has become, in the worst sense of the word, politics. Nuremberg often has been criticized as victor's justice, but in the Inquiry the place of power looks much more subtle and
postmodern: Today, the victors have outsourced their justice
to a Tribunal that, in a strange form of self-censorship, believes in its own independence even as it produces a text in
clear message to the tribunal to produce results: to prosecute and convict!"), in Developments in the Law, supra note 138, at 2022 n.115.

338. Many states would oppose such an exercise of pros ecutorial power:
the nineteen NATO members, but also states with peacekeepers under the
territorial jurisdiction of the Tribunal, as well as states that would fear the
precedent of an aggressive and independent prosecutor for the ICC. Cf
Akhavan, supra note 17, at 19 ("[T]he air campaign has also put the independence and impartiality of the ICTY to the test .
").
339. Former Prosecutor Louise Arbour explicitly has denied having been
put under any pressure from NATO or the U.N. and, along with former U.S.
Ambassador for War Crimes David Scheffer, has denied that the timing of
the Milosevic indictment was linked to U.S.-supplied intelligence. See IGNATEFF, supra note 287, at 119-20, 123.
340. "Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot
deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals may be,
respecting the origin of the claim which has been successfully asserted."
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 588 (1823).
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NATO's voice. A stronger court, such as the Tribunal had become, should have been able to confront the risks of co-optation more forthrightly, establishing a precedent for its, and its
successor's, place among the tribunes and powers of the nations.
It is widely accepted that prosecutors, like courts, must
somehow be both independent and accountable.3 4 ' Whatever

those vague terms mean, they limit direct interference in core
decisional processes. Yet commentators have noted "the tribunals' particular susceptibility to [political] pressure [,]"342 such
as the Rwanda Tribunal's rescinding an order to release JeanBosco Barayagwiza after hearing "new facts"-a threat by
Rwanda to cease cooperation. 343 All prosecutors and all courts
are accountable to someone; all courts and prosecutors are political in that sense. 344 The risk is that, without institutionalized political accountability, influence will be subterranean,
uncontrolled, and contested as pure power. The unavoidable,
necessary intrusion of politics into the judicial process must be
visible, institutionalized, and grounded legislatively. An unmediated political process that lacks institutional restraints or
visibility inevitably will produce a court constitutionally incapable of critically considering the actions of the politically powerful or of asking fundamental questions about the law-not because it has been crushed, but because it has been seduced.
The problem we confront is not blatant and slavish subordination but a more subtle, structural co-optation at the margins.
The margins, of course, are where law is made.
So this is what we expect for the new Court, as a legacy
from the Tribunal. Though the Rome Statute differs significantly from that of the Tribunal, the provisions on
prosecutorial independence, 3 45 and especially its discretion341. See, e.g, Freiburg Declaration on the Position of the Prosecutor of a
Permanent International Criminal Court, in Arbour et al., supra note 328, at
667-69 (especially Preamble (1 3) and Points 1, 3, 4, 7, & 9).
342. Developments in the Law, supra note 138, at 2022.
343. Id. at 2023.
344. Indeed, it could be dangerous and undesirable if a prosecution truly
eschewed all "political" considerations, howsoever narrowly defined, in making its decisions. (Thanks to John Packer of the OSCE Office of the High
Commissioner on National and Ethnic Minorities for this point.)
345. Although the Rome Statute's independence provisions (Art. 42) are
more detailed than those in the ICTY Statute (Art. 16), no one suggests that
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ary, ad hoc funding,3 46 are similar enough to raise analogous
expectations, and thus to make the Inquiry an object lesson. It
is ironic that almost all of the concern over the ICC Prosecutor
has centered on the risk that he might act irresponsibly, and
not on the risk, so evident in the Inquiry, that he might find
the ICTY Prosecutor is not, or should not be, effectively as independent of
political influence as the ICC Prosecutor is supposed to be. It follows thatvariation notwithstanding-the ICTY's experience may offer guidance about
what independence could mean in practice. Compare Rome Statute, supra
note 120, at 1024, with ICTY Statute, supra note 234, Art. 16. See, e.g., Danner, Legitimacy, supra note 326, at 510 (noting the ICC Prosecutor's greater
independence from the Security Council); Id. at 511 (calling the Prosecutor
of the ad hoc Tribunals "the closest analogue to the ICC Prosecutor"). Most
importantly, the Inquiry suggests that the area in which the Statutes do differ
the most-the ability of the Prosecutor to initiate investigations proprio
motu-is actually less important than his discretion to refrain from investigating; in that, the Statutes are effectively identical. But see Richard J. Goldstone & Nicole Fritz, "In the Interests of Justice" and Independent Referral: The
ICC Prosecutor's Unprecedented Powers, 13 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 655, 657 (2000)
[hereinafter Goldstone & Fritz] (calling the ICC Prosecutor's proprio motu
powers "a fundamental departure" from the ICTY). See also Danner, Navigating, supra note 308, at 1647 ("The [ICC] prosecutor is also subject to a variety of important checks exerted by states .... Most importantly, the ICC

prosecutor is dependent entirely on state cooperation in the investigation of
his cases . . . ."); Valerie Oosterveld et al., The Cooperation of States with the
InternationalCriminal Court, 25 FoRnHAm INT'L. L.J. 767, 768 (2002) (describing the ICC's institutional weakness and its need for states' support). Brown,
supra note 308, at 884-5, notes that Arbour
observed that there is more reason to fear that the international
prosecutor will be impotent than there is to fear that she will be
overreaching. The ICC prosecutor, like Justice Arbour, will depend upon the United States and the Security Council for essential
political support and enforcement and will have no reason to pursue frivolous prosecutions against the citizens of any state.
That is accurate; the issue, however, is not the effect of dependency on frivolous prosecutions, but on serious ones.
346. The financing provisions of the Rome Statute, though differing from
those for the Tribunal (direct funding by States Parties' assessed contributions, Art. 115a), do not suggest a radical departure (allowing voluntary contributions, for example, Art. 116, and U.N. contributions, Art. 115b) on
those matters where experience or reason might suggest the greatest opportunities for influence and cooptation. See Rome Statute, supra note 120, at
1066. Indeed, in certain ways, a permanent court may be more susceptible
to financial pressures. See Tullio Treves, Some PracticalRemarks on the Early
Functioning of the InternationalCriminal Court, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
A CHALLENGE TO IMPUNITY 271, 280
(Mario Politi & Guiseppe Nesi eds., 2002).
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irresponsible reasons not to act.3 4 7 Without the institutional

anchoring that public accountability affords, the pious insistence on prosecutorial independence at the ad hoc Tribunals
has simply obscured the processes of influence, to the benefit
of the powerful. Indeed, one of the best tactical arguments for
U.S. involvement in the ICC is the Tribunals' record of pro347. See, e.g.,
Cassese et al., supra note 328, at 1907-08 ("The necessary
safeguards have been built in against the 'loose cannon' (or 'politically
minded') Prosecutor: the provisions ensuring his independence, his non-reelectable term, the provisions for his removal, the complementarity provisions, the Pre-Trial Chamber 'filter,' and the possibility of the Security Councilrequesting deferral of the investigations or prosecutions he has initiated."); Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi, The Role of the Prosecutor,in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:

THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE:

ISSUES,

175, 181-82 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999); Goldstone &
Fritz, supra note 345, at 657-58, 661 (outlining limits on the Prosecutor's
NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS

ability to act); Kissinger, supra note 309, at 94 (asserting that "prosecutorial

discretion without accountability is precisely one of the flaws of the [ICC]"
and, making a comparison to special prosecutors in the U.S., that "such a
procedure is likely to develop its own momentum. .. and can turn into an
instrument of political warfare"). These comments demonstrate a singular
focus on restraining the Prosecutor's independence; there is little in them
about ensuring he will act. Cf Arbour & Bergsmo, supra note 308, at 18
(noting that "States can paralyse the ICC not only by holding back acceptance of its jurisdiction and by pursuing domestic investigation and prosecution.., but also by not co-operating with the... Prosecutor in the preparation of cases;" that ICC Statute Art. 99(1) is "likely to create insurmountable
difficulties for case preparation in cases where there has not been a change
in regime after the alleged atrocities[;]" and that it is implausibile that the
ICC would find a state unwilling to prosecute and yet receive assistance from
that state).
In one extremely narrow circumstance the Statute does provide that the
Pre-Trial Chamber may require the Prosecutor to proceed with an investigation he has declared he will not pursue "if [his decision] is based solely on
paragraph I (c) or 2 (c)" as not being in the interests of justice. See Rome
Statute, art. 53(3) (b), supra note 120, at 1029. See also Rules of Procedure
and Evidence for the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/1/3 (1998), R.

110, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/basicdocuments/rules (e) .pdf
(noting that in such a case the Prosecutor "shall proceed with the investigation or prosecution"). However, the Prosecutor need merely have any other
reason to render this power ineffective; can simply not declare to the Chamber that investigation is not warranted; or can decide later, on the basis of
any information, to halt investigation. It is very difficult to imagine this formalistic procedure forcing the Prosecutor to investigate if he has other incentives not to. See Guiliano Turone, Powers and Duties of the Prosecutor,in 2
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
TARY,

A COMMEN-

supra note 328, at 1137, 1156-58 (including a note that a "judicial order

to investigate" exists in Italy).
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The U.S. may be quite

wrong to worry so much about a dangerously independent
prosecutor at the ICC and the rest of the world, for surprising
reasons, wrong to worry so little.
It does not matter, then, whether or not there was real
complicity, of which this Article presents no evidence. What
matters is what appears: an analysis and a style that could only
result from a convergence of views functionally equivalent to
complicity. The ancient English axiom that justice must not
only be done, but be seen to be done, is not a cynical posture,
but the subtlest wisdom. Both are necessary because justice is
a social good and must be perceived publicly. Yet even sincere
effort is no guarantee against that conflation of (self-) image
with substance that is the highest art of modernity. The very
public Inquiry exhibits just such a concern, asserting its correctness, its neutrality-in short, its professionalism-while
moving inexorably, and with the sloppiness of the singularly
determined, toward its result, which is (or appears to be) complete exoneration and the removal of all taint. It does not
matter if taint is there; it matters that the Inquiry seems determined that it shall not be.
The Inquiry failed to find a language showing it had not
succumbed to the risks of complicity. That failure is not one
of creativity alone-it is a failing of seriousness and of purpose. The Inquiry failed because its authors did not believe
NATO was liable in fact, could be liable in law, or should be
liable at all, because they shared NATO's view of the conflict
and of air war's impersonality, and because they believed
NATO was right to go to war-and evidently believed all that
before inquiring. That belief, of course, should have told them
nothing about NATO's liability, nor what to write. The Inquiry
could have done much more, rhetorically, to advance international law and to solidify its prosecutorial prerogative without
touching NATO. That it did not suggests it was cautious in the
extreme. It is that sense of caution-and what it says about
how justice is understood by those who will practice it in the
348. Cf

DAVID CHANDLER, FROM KOSOVO TO KABUL:

HUMAN RIGHTS

AND

148 (2002) ("In the absence of any collective
body which can enforce its rulings, it is clear that the ICC will be as reliant
on the United States and other Western powers as the earlier UN tribunals.").
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

20031

UNEXPLODED BOMB

new Court-that should disturb even those who completely
agree with the Inquiry's outcome. The Inquiry represents the
failure of an institution, and a new one-"the last great international institution of the Twentieth Century" 349 -may well
pay the price: in the failure to move beyond ad hocjustice; in
the foregone opportunity to expand the role of international
humanitarian law, especially in regulating aerial warfare; 3 50 in
the quiet conflation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, with its
implicit devaluation of the judicial role; in the discursive
ground lost to the militant confidence of the great powers;
and in the reinforced sense that justice is only serious when it
pursues the weak and the reviled.
There are different visions for what a court should be:
Some, like me, believe that though a court inevitably is political in some sense, it also has a unique role in restraining the
exercise of power. Others see a court as more explicitly political, an actor like any other, or even one more tool in the toolkit we employ against the enemies of the just society, just like
an army. Yet even those more sanguine about the value of harnessing law to one nation's political agenda will at least want to
know the prospects of such a project; even they will have to
admit that, if this description of how a prosecution decides is
right, they too will have to locate their hopes for justice, and
for restraint on the abuse of power, in the powerful themselves
and not in a court.

The decision not to investigate surely confirmed the opinion among Serbs that the Tribunal is incapable of independent judgment, but then opinion among Serbs hardened
against the Tribunal long ago. 3 5' Indeed, throughout the for-

mer Yugoslavia, public opinion has long considered the Tribu349. Sadat & Carden, supra note 308, at 385.
350. Cf Reisman, supra note 163, at 284, 287-89 (suggesting that the ICC
will prove ineffective in the face of certain kinds of conflicts).
351. See, e.g., RFE/RL Newsline, Will the Trial Lead to Soul-Searching in Ser-

bia? (Feb. 12, 2002), available at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/ 2002/02/
120202.asp ("[E]fforts in Serbia to come to terms with the recent past are
limited chiefly to a small number of intellectuals and artists ....Most Serbs
still believe that Milosevic's wars were essentially defensive in nature and that
the tribunal is an anti-Serbian instrument of Western policy, U.S. policy in
particular."); Kristen Cibelli & Tamy Guberek, Justice Unknown, Justice Unsatisfied? Bosnian NGOs Speak about the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia 12, 15, 18 (2000), available at http://epiic.com/class/justicer-

eport.pdf.
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nal fundamentally illegitimate, 352 and the chance to persuade
the peoples of the region that it is a legitimate or necessary
contribution to justice probably already was lost irrevocably.
The larger issue is not the Balkans, but the world community's
attitude toward justice and the new Court. It would be a great
loss if the world were to adopt, in however veiled a fashion, an
analogous view: that a court is useful when it pursues one's
enemies but dangerous and illegitimate when it threatens
one's own. The compliant, results-driven style of the Inquiry
gives no cause to believe that the Tribunal-or the world-has
embraced a view of justice any more mature than that held by
the partisans of those presently in the dock in The Hague.
Voice-Information-Argument-Style-StructureConsequence-Silence
VIII.

CONCLUDING SILENCE

That four great nations, flushed with victory and
stung with injury, stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes
that Power has ever paid to reason.
-Robert H. Jackson, opening statement before the
Nuremberg Tribunal3 5 3
Here is yet a postscript.
4
-Malvolio, in Twelfth Night 35
An equally legitimate approach to the Inquiry's subjectand to the dearth of probative information-would have been
silence. There was no obligation to publish an inquiry; no
other pre-indictment inquiry has been issued, even when con352. Akhavan, supra note 17, at 22 ("In August 2000... a survey reported
that ... [o]ver 60 percent of those polled [Croatian citizens] believed that
the ICTY was 'unfair,' in contrast to 15 percent who believed it was fair ....
The pollsters concluded that there is 'an express anti-Hague atmosphere in
the country.'"); Casey, supra note 308, at 871 (noting Croat and Serb beliefs
that the ICTY is biased); Tim Judah, Serbia backs Milosevic in Trial by TV, OBSERVER, Mar. 3, 2002, at 23 (noting widespread belief in Serbia that the Tribunal is a "kangaroo court").
353. TAYLOR, supra note 321, at 167.
354. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TWELFTH NIGHT act 2, sc. 5, in THE COMPLETE
WORKS 691, 702 (Stanley Wells & Gary Taylor eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1988).
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siderable controversy surrounded the Tribunal's inaction.3 5 5
Of course, one cannot be insensitive to the costs of an ill-considered or ill-explained silence. Refusal to investigate NATO
would have met with criticism from rights groups and observers in the former Yugoslavia, who would have seen it as proof
that the Tribunal was a tool of western policy.3 56 It might have
been at least as harmful to the appearance of justice if the
Prosecution had simply said nothing, if it had issued a terse
note declaring NATO not liable, or if it had loudly asserted its
formal right to investigate but never pursued the matter. In
this sense, the Prosecution was damned if it did and damned if
7
35

it didn't.

Still, these were not its only alternatives. The Prosecution
could have issued an inquiry treating the matter candidly and
assertively, regardless of its conclusions, and pointedly refusing
to draw conclusions without sufficient information. The Prosecution could have pressed publicly for the information it
needed, and criticized NATO if none was forthcoming. It
355. Consider the Prosecution's response to leaked documents about its
investigation of Croatia's 1995 Operation Storm:
In a confidential document belonging to [the] Office of the Prosecutor, leaked to The New York Times in March 1999, [Croatian
generals were] mentioned as potential indictees. However, the
prosecutor's office said the leaked document was out of date and
"merely represents expressions of opinion, arguments and hypotheses from various staff members ... and not in any way the concluded decisions of the prosecutor."
Mirko Klarin, Crimes in the "Homeland War," GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, July 28,
2001, at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/2OO1/O802icty.
htm. See also ICTY Press Release, March 1999, supranote 279; Raymond Bonner, War Crimes PanelFinds Croat Troops "Cleansed" the Serbs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
21, 1999, at Al (noting that "[i]n the course of the three-year investigation
... the United States has failed to provide critical evidence requested by the
tribunal, according to tribunal documents and officials").
356. Cf Konstantin Obradovic, InternationalHumanitarianLaw and the Kosovo Crisis,82 INT'L REv. RED CROss 699, 730 (2000) ("If the Chief Prosecutor
of the ICTY... does not take into serious consideration the charges brought
against NATO and does not initiate proceedings, or does not convincingly
explain why that was not done, the Tribunal's already weakened credibility
will be finally eroded.").
357. Cf KatyJ. Harriger, Damned If She Does and Damned If She Doesn't: The
Attorney General and the Independent Counsel Statute, 86 GEO. L.J. 2097, 2111-14
(1998) (arguing that Attorney General Janet Reno's consistent, legalistic interpretation of the Independent Counsel statute generated political controversy).
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could have drawn clear distinctions between investigation and
accusation, between pursuit of a process and pursuit of NATO.
By refusing to publish conclusive findings, then, the Prosecution could have retained a real option to voice its concerns
and seek the truth. Even in demonstrating impartiality, it
could have done things differently, with different effects on
the future possibilities available to other tribunals. Silence has
a voice, and silence can bear the marks of courage, too.
In the event, of course, NATO was not investigated. Deciding if that was an intentionally or only unconsciously complicit decision would require access to facts available only to
the most knowledgeable insider; surely the motives of those
involved were complicated anyway. But a reader of the public
record, who cannot know such things, can see this much: The
Inquiry is not a courageous or even a convincing document.
Whatever the correctness of its conclusions, it was not right in
reaching them. It could have reached the same outcome-or
a different one-in a way showing that commitment to law,
not timidity before power, determined the result. As it is, one
can hardly say. Correct, but not right, and lacking the courage
to be convincing: That is no way to create a new law for a new
court, which will require boldness, determination, and words
to match. Law afraid of confronting power, even to its own
detriment, is a dangerously pacifying soothsayer and not worth
having.
One is tempted to conclude with measured proposals for
reform: greater transparency; coherent standards for
prosecutorial discretion in inquiry, investigation, and indictment;3 5 8 regularization of states' ad hoc financial contribu-

tions; even a more serious debate about rules of air warfare or
linkages between jus ad belium and jus in bello. All of these are
welcome, to be sure, but while the technical issue identified
here concerns the prosecution's discretion not to act, the
problem revealed in the Inquiry is a more general and more
rooted one: It is about a court's fundamental orientation toward power. It is not about getting facts or law wrong; it is
about a way of arguing and of conceiving the work of a court:
the deliberations it considers proper, the compromises it
thinks possible, the standards it insists upon, and the influ358. Cf Danner, Legitimacy, supra note 326, at 541-50 (setting forth suggested prosecutorial guidelines).
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ences it absorbs. It is about the seductive dangers of caution,
and the tribute that reason pays to Power.
The Kosovo air war-that "situation quite unforeseen"fell upon the Tribunal like a rocket from the skies, threatening
to overturn what it worked for and the order in which it
worked. The Prosecution-perhaps afraid, perhaps not seeing
it for what it was-left it alone. But it is sometimes better to
make a bomb explode, especially at the time and place of
one's choosing when one can brace for the shock. Left where
it fell, dormant, an unexploded bomb breeds an easy cowardice, an uncomfortable amnesia, and a silence that says there is
no problem, while all the time one must step around, speak
carefully, and never, ever touch. Because we all fear what
unexploded bombs sometimes, some day, do-and is that not
the real danger?
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